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Purpose: Directing and controlling a company to achieve its strategic and tactical 
goals requires a complex network of relationships with stakeholders which means 
boards need to have directors with adequate competencies and skills. Do directors of 
boards have the required level of knowledge and does such knowledge have potential 
impacts on corporate governance policy? This thesis examines these questions in the 
context of financial derivatives in the emerging economy of Vietnam to add to the 
literature on individual directors’ understanding of the use of such controversial 
instruments. 
Methodology: This thesis used a mixed methods approach, with a survey of 119 
directors followed by qualitative interviews with 19 directors of public corporations in 
Vietnam using insights from the theory of planned behaviour combined with the model 
of board roles and attributes, and stakeholder theory.  
Findings: Directors’ knowledge of financial derivatives is relatively low and strongly 
affected by their education and working experience. In addition, directors’ knowledge 
is associated with critical factors that impact their intention to use financial derivatives, 
which is the direct predictor of their future behaviour in deciding to use the instruments. 
Such an interaction among knowledge, intention and behaviour is a concern to the 
directors who were experienced in financial issues; directors worry about threats to 
corporations when directors lack knowledge while having positive attitudes and high 
levels of intention. Financially experienced directors suggested appropriate corporate 
risk management policy and director training as two key solutions to these threats. The 
interviews also uncovered emerging themes about business culture, the government’s 
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role and the market for financial derivatives which have impacted directors’ 
knowledge and corporate policies.  
Research Limitations and Implications: Key limitations include the use of single 
country and cross-sectional data combined with a relatively small sample size and 
potential self-reporting bias. The main implications include the need for enhanced 
collaboration and cooperation among key stakeholders including the government, 
boards, individual directors and relevant training organisations. The government 
should lead by setting up a legal and regulatory framework for financial derivatives. 
Boards should clarify their corporate risk management policy, choose members to 
ensure the necessary competencies are available and accept continuous training. 
Individual directors should be aware of and take part in self-learning and training to 
be suitable for their position. Finally, training organisations should customise their 
courses for directors to suit directors’ time constraints and their strategic level 
leadership. 
Originality: This thesis was the first to investigate individual board director behaviour 
in Vietnam and to analyse directors’ understanding of financial derivatives and their 
related decision making in an emerging economy. 
Keywords: Theory of Planned Behaviour, Stakeholder Theory, Board Directors, 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1. Introduction 
As one of the most popular types of commercial organisation in human society, 
corporations wield significant influence within nations and transnationally. Hence, the 
effective and ethical governance of these entities warrants significant attention. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2014) summarised recent developments in corporate 
governance literature ranging from CEO successions, the boards of directors of 
financial institutions, board independence, gender balance and directors’ networks. 
These topics continue to dominate the literature, with popular research themes 
including a general perspective on corporate governance (Aguilera, Florackis, and Kim 
2016,Louizi and Kammoun 2016, Kock and Min 2016, Kumar and Zattoni 2016b, 
West 2016), corporate disclosure (Chang and Lim 2016, Hooghiemstra, Hermes, and 
Emanuels 2015, Khalil, Saffar, and Trabelsi 2015, Madhani 2015a), executive and 
board compensation (Hong, Li, and Minor 2016, Kumar and Zattoni 2016a, Lerong 
and Junxiong 2016, Oxelheim and Clarkson 2015), CEO succession (Berns and 
Klarner 2017, Guoli et al. 2015), board committees (Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib 2016, 
Dixon-Fowler, Ellstrand, and Johnson 2017, Kusnadi et al. 2016, Lin, Hutchinson, and 
Percy 2015) and risk management (Campbell 2015, Chen, Ni, and Tong 2016, 
Srivastav and Hagendorff 2016).  
The board of directors has been a central feature of corporate governance since the 
beginning of modern joint stock companies. The board consists of those people who 
direct a company and is effectively the top of the corporate hierarchy. However, a 
board’s effectiveness in exercising this responsibility has been challenged (Hamilton 
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and Micklethwait 2006). Boards have been studied from various perspectives such as 
board attributes and characteristics (Madhani 2015b, Shaukat, Qiu, and Trojanowski 
2016, Yatim, Iskandar, and Nga 2016 ), board structure (Choudhuri 2017, Farag and 
Mallin 2016, Mehrotra 2016), board diversity (Adams et al. 2015, Ben-Amar, Chang, 
and McIlkenny 2017, Buse, Bernstein, and Bilimoria 2016, Cumming, Leung, and Rui 
2015, Hillman 2015) and board human capital (Lajili 2015, Mishra, Devi, and Gupta 
2015, Volonté and Gantenbein 2016). Khanna, Jones, and Boivie (2014) investigated 
board directors from human capital and cognition perspectives and found that directors’ 
general human capital, their prior experience and their education can be a source of 
competitive advantage by making them more effective at monitoring management and 
providing advice, depending on the information processing load they need to undertake 
in their other board appointments.  
Boards have been a focus in corporate failures in recent decades. Since the 1970s, 
serious concerns and scandals linked to the practice of corporate governance have 
emerged after a series of spectacular corporate failures and scandals in leading 
corporations, such as Barings (UK), Allied Irish Bank (Ireland), Enron (US), 
WorldCom (US), Tyco (US), Marconi (UK), Swissair (Switzerland), Royal Ahold 
(Netherlands) and Parmalat (Italy) and more recent cases such as King Fisher Airlines 
in India ( Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch 2016, Kaur 2014, Yeoh 2016, Ravi 2016,). 
Several elements have been identified as the root causes for the scandals, such as 
corporate overexpansion; over-dominant Chief Executive Officers (CEOs); greed, 
hubris and desire for power; failure of internal controls; and ineffective boards 
(Hamilton and Micklethwait 2006). Consequently, boards of directors are increasingly 
expected to be responsible for risk governance including board-level risk committees, 
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empowered chief risk officers, the use of risk appetite statements, and establishing a 
robust risk culture (Gontarek 2016).  
One of the most popular risk management tools is financial derivatives. Even though 
it is costly to develop a derivatives market, financial derivatives transactions have 
increased due to competition between exchanges and countries racing to become 
global financial centres. The strong emphasis on profit-making and a lack of internal 
risk control make derivatives risky to society as demonstrated by major corporate 
collapses. In addition, the sophistication and information asymmetry in modern 
finance has led to overpriced derivatives that cancel out the benefits (Su and Si 2015). 
Souza Murcia, Murcia, and Pfitscher (2017) called derivatives “mass destruction” to 
Brazilian company Sadia, with a net loss of approximately US$1 billion in 2008, due 
to both internal governance and external regulatory problems such as the board of 
directors’ failure to specify and assign a specific division in an inherently weak 
control system to control risk in the derivatives transactions. Furthermore, even 
hedging products have become financial speculations when their transaction value far 
surpasses the scale of the protected assets. In China, the stock index futures bubble 
burst created a stock market crash in 2015 (Yang 2017). 
This thesis is set in the context described above. The following sections provide an 
overview of the literature, motivation, research methodology and findings as well as 
the overall structure of the thesis.  
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1.2. Corporate Governance, Board of Directors and Financial Derivatives  
1.2.1. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance issues and concerns emerge when there is a separation between 
ownership and management (Cordery and Howell 2017, Gourevitch and Shinn 2005, 
Mingardi 2015, Pargendler 2016, Solomon 2007, Swan 2000, Tricker 2012), which 
occurred even earlier than Berle and Means’ 1933 suggestion (Acheson et al. 2015), 
and which relates to the development of corporate governance which can be traced 
back to the formation of joint stock companies in the seventeenth century.  
Currently, there are several definitions of corporate governance, emerging from 
different disciplinary perspectives, including agency theory, stewardship, institutional 
theory, resource dependency, and the stakeholder point of view. Originally, corporate 
governance dealt with issues related to the maximisation of profits for shareholders. 
That primary focus has gradually expanded to include a wider range of stakeholders 
(Smith, Russell, and Tennent 2017, Kooskora 2006, Ayuso et al. 2014, Loi 2016) as 
corporations have come to be viewed as “social institutions” (Berle and Means 1933). 
This thesis investigates corporate governance from the stakeholder point of view and 
adopts the following definition: “corporate governance is defined as the system of 
checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that 
companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their business activities” (Solomon 2007, 14).  
Different approaches emphasise different aspects of corporate governance. The focus 
could be on ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
(OECD 2004, Haxhi and Aguilera 2016), or on board roles and operations (Tricker 
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2012, Greene et al. 2017); a narrower focus could be on shareholders and ownership, 
directors and monitoring, management and performance (Monks and Minow 2004, 
Cremers, Khanna, and Gordon 2017). All of these approaches include common related 
parties, and all consider the board of directors to be a vital element of effective 
corporate governance. 
1.2.2. Directors: Roles, Responsibilities and Competencies  
The directors’ primary roles include supporting and exercising oversight over the CEO, 
determining the direction of strategy, and ensuring that the corporation’s affairs are 
conducted in an ethical, legal and socially responsible fashion (Lorsch and MacIver 
1989, 75-6). Directors’ duties vary depending on the particular role they assume, such 
as insiders, business experts, support specialists, or influential members of the 
community (Markarian and Parbonetti 2007). Their job constitutes the widely-known 
duties of boards of directors in general including a linking role, coordinating role, 
control role, strategic role, maintenance role and support role (Hung 1998). Corporate 
boards perform different tasks at the same time, according to the characteristics of the 
company and its environment (Rindova 1999). These well-specified roles of directors 
are supported by current research (Alabede and Muff 2015, Caiazza and Simoni 2015, 
Brandes, Dharwadkar, and Suh 2016, Mehta and Coomar 2016, García Lara et al. 
2017). 
Directors’ capability to undertake the roles depends on their level and exercise of 
corporate power, based on their legal authority, confidence in expressing their ideas 
and views, their control of the agenda and discussion process, and their knowledge of 
the matter under discussion (Lorsch and MacIver 1989). There is a process that enables 
directors’ knowledge to contribute to creating corporate value; the starting point is that 
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directors have the knowledge necessary for the corporation and the next step is to put 
such knowledge to work in the board’s processes, such as in decision making. Board 
processes are the key to understanding board effectiveness (Leblanc 2005, Nielsen and 
Huse 2010a). Jonnergård and Svensson (1995) demonstrate that board behaviour is the 
mechanism that transforms board inputs (tenure, background, attitudes) into output 
(board performance, board policies).  
Directors’ abilities influence the board’s performance via the mechanism in which the 
attributes of individual directors and of the board as a whole interact with the 
corporation’s characteristics to form board responsibilities, which then result in the 
board’s eventual actions (Cravens and Wallace 2001, 3). To improve board processes, 
the board needs to have members with appropriate expertise in different areas and with 
strong communication skills (Finkelstein and Mooney 2003). 
What are the crucial competencies that directors of boards should have?  
The competencies needed differ according to the type of director, such as board chair 
or inside executive member or outside director. Technically, members of the board of 
directors must have a minimum knowledge of accountancy, corporate law and the 
industry, and have corporate directing experience because board structures are 
operated by people (Van den Berghe and Levrau 2004). Outside directors are chosen 
first and foremost on the basis of their expertise and familiarity with the organisation 
(Provan 1980), which is expressed in their breadth of experience and knowledge, their 
contacts outside the firm, and their independence from the CEO and other top 
executives, and especially their business experience (Kesner 1988). 
After comprehensive research on board directors’ competencies, Dulewicz, Gay, and 
Taylor (2007) suggest a relatively comprehensive list of desirable features, including 
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integrity, a critical faculty, perspective and vision ability, willingness to change, 
listening ability and good judgement. Directors’ core competencies are those critical 
for success and the competencies listed do not cover all those required to carry out 
their role, but are pointers for success as a director (Tricker and Lee 1997). 
The Institute of Directors (United Kingdom) also specifies what knowledge directors 
need to have including knowledge specific to boards (corporate governance, board 
roles, relationships and processes, board standards of good practice, corporate finance 
and accounting principles and practices), and specific to the company and the business 
environment (political, economic, social and cultural issues, key trends and 
development, public affairs and communication) (Tricker and Lee 1997, 92). Effective 
boards require capable individuals who contribute wide company experience, financial 
expertise and have credibility with shareholders (Long, Dulewicz, and Gay 2005). 
Financial expertise is essential to understand the complex workings of the firm and the 
risks associated with the firm’s policies, but many bank boards have lacked sufficient 
financial expertise to identify and control exposure to risk in the years preceding the 
2007–2008 global financial crisis (Srivastav and Hagendorff 2016). When there is a 
shortfall of knowledge, many directors remain silent to save face, which makes them 
ineffective (Lorsch and MacIver 1989). In reality, boards of directors do often lack in-
depth know-how in auditing, risk management and communication (Hilb 2005a). 
Globally, the demand for skilled directors is increasing while the supply is decreasing 
(Brown and Brown 1999, Linck, Jeffry and Yang 2009), so training for directors in 
professionalism and in the complexity of board tasks is in great demand (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau 2004). However, people have become less interested in learning, 
and there is a limit to their acquisition of knowledge if there is no incentive that exerts 
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pressure on them (Shen 2003). Incentives are definitely available as shown in the 
Centro case in Australia. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
pursued a case against seven directors and the Chief Financial Officer of Centro 
Properties Group (CNP) and Centro Retail Group (CER) in 19 October 2009, and won 
in court on 27 June 2011. The Federal Court found that the seven directors had 
breached their duties when they signed off on financial reports that disclosed short-
term liabilities as non-current and failed to disclose a post-balance event, because 
directors should understand the company financial position and be able to 
communicate accurately to the market (Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission 2011). This case raised concerns about directors’ financial and 
accounting literacy not only in Australia (Australian Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 2012, Clayton Utz 2011, Wood 2011) 
but also in South Africa (Deloitte & Touche 2014). 
In conclusion, directors’ expertise, especially financial knowledge, is essential for 
effective board decisions. It is the source of legitimacy and power that determines a 
director’s contribution to board deliberations. Because of the importance of this 
expertise, this thesis investigates board directors’ understanding of one aspect of 
finance: financial derivatives. While there have been some studies on the topic in 
developed countries such as the United States and the Netherlands, a dearth of research 
on emerging economies leads to this thesis focusing on Vietnam, a developing country. 
1.2.3. Financial Derivatives and Directors’ Knowledge 
A derivative can be defined as “A sale of a promise to provide an agreed asset: (1) at 
an agreed price, and (2) at an agreed future time, which may be settled by choosing 
from agreed alternatives”; the promised asset can be cash or commodities, and the 
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agreed price can be referenced to any standard of measure (Swan 2000, Kolb and 
Overdahl 2010). The agreed settlement alternatives may be expressed or implied by 
market practice (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). Derivatives are used for financing future 
activities, securing supplies and managing risk and speculation, as well as being 
something to sell (Swan 2000). Typical forms of financial derivatives are forwards, 
futures, options and swaps; in addition to these, there are other structured products 
(Kolb and Overdahl 2010). 
Since their initiation, commodities and financial derivatives have experienced 
intermittent prohibition and acceptance, until finally they have been recognised and 
enforced by laws across different countries. There have been recurring moves to 
eliminate derivatives markets through legislative action (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). 
However, derivatives are now recognised, regulated and legislated as a part of normal 
business in many countries and jurisdictions such as Australia, China, Japan, United 
Kingdom and the United States, which demonstrates their great attractiveness to the 
business world.  
For the public at large, financial derivatives have long been the most mysterious and 
least understood of all financial instruments (Gordon, Hayt, and Marston 1996, Klein 
1996, Schwimmer 1994, Kolb and Overdahl 2010, Masheane 1998, Swan 2000). 
While some financial derivatives are fairly simple, others are very complicated and 
require considerable mathematical and statistical knowledge to understand fully (Kolb 
and Overdahl 2010). The very nature of these financial derivatives makes them 
potentially subject to misuse, accident or mischief (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). 
Derivatives are still in their early stages in the corporate environment in Vietnam, as 
were stocks before 1929 in developed nations, and are likely to cause trouble until 
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regulations and training are implemented so that the marketplace can better understand 
and manage these products (Zask 1996). 
In addition to hedging and speculation, two more uses of financial derivatives are tax 
optimisation and arbitrage including regulatory arbitrage, accounting or perception 
arbitrage, and funding arbitrage (Murphy 2008, Hull 2014). Hedging adds value to a 
firm by reducing expected taxes or financial distress costs, by mitigating the effect of 
underinvestment, or by allowing a firm to increase its debt capacity and take advantage 
of debt tax-shields without an increase in risk (Allayannis, Lel, and Miller 2012). 
Speculators are important for market liquidity and formation (the risk purchasing side) 
(Swan 2000). 
To make sure that derivatives are used in a prudent manner, we need the education, 
involvement and the support of senior management and directors (Seltzer 1996). Four 
factors common to all derivatives scandals are: exceptionally large wagers based on 
faulty strategies or the wild speculative activities of rogue traders; significant 
exogenous shocks that are difficult to predict and extremely rare; dysfunctional risk 
management systems and the lack of access to reliable sources of liquidity when 
needed most (Kolb and Overdahl 2010, 313). 
The 2007–2008 financial crisis originated, among many causes, from sub-prime 
market failures and was exacerbated by financial engineering using financial 
derivatives (Griffith 2012, Robinson and Hronsky 2012). This raised the question of 
whether directors, especially independent non-executive directors, understand 
strategic models and sophisticated securitised instruments and the risks their 
companies can face (Tricker 2012). The three best-known failings that lead to 
derivative losses are failings of knowledge, accountability and judgement (Zask 1996). 
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Lack of knowledge or not properly understanding derivatives is a matter of the board 
and management who usually do not have time to study the instruments and their 
companies’ position before threats appear (Zask 1996). The biggest risk in using 
financial derivatives originates from the people in charge; however, their weakness 
can be improved (Zask 1996). 
Grant and Marshall (cited in Marsden and Prevost 2005) note that since the widely 
publicised derivatives losses of the early 1990s one of the most important aspects of 
derivatives control among large UK companies is board-level approval. In their survey 
of derivatives usage among private and public New Zealand companies, Prevost, Rose 
and Miller (cited in Marsden and Prevost 2005) found that the board played an 
important role in the decision to use derivatives. Boards should approve all the 
purposes and uses of derivatives, limits and control procedures (Little 1999). In the 
United States, directors have been found guilty of breaching their duty of care by 
failing to supervise executive management and not becoming aware of the essentials 
of hedging in a way to allow the business to be monitored effectively (Seltzer 1996). 
1.3. Vietnam: Corporate Governance and Emerging Financial Derivatives 
Market  
1.3.1. Corporate Governance in Vietnam 
Two securities exchanges for listed companies were formed in Vietnam in 2000 and 
2005, with a third exchange (UPCoM) for unlisted public corporations formed in 2009. 
These exchanges have sharply boosted the number of listings and contributed greatly 
to the development and growth of public companies across the country. During this 
development process, the equitisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is the 
principal mechanism to create joint stock public corporations, including listed 
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companies inside and outside of the VN301 baskets, and it demonstrates the role of the 
government in market formation (Lien and Holloway 2014).  
The Vietnamese government has actively developed an enhanced and more complete 
corporate governance framework, and international institutions in the country have 
strongly supported these developments, but the passive attitude and nature of the 
companies themselves is slowing down the embedding of improved corporate 
governance practices (Lien and Holloway 2014). 
1.3.2. The Future of Derivatives Markets in Vietnam 
In mid-April 2013, the State Securities Commission (SSC) of Vietnam announced its 
plan to issue a decree on financial derivatives at the end of the year. This was a signal 
for the opening of a new financial market in Vietnam. According to experience from 
other emerging economies, the derivatives markets usually start with index derivatives 
and then single-stock derivatives (Bhaumik and Bose 2009, Fernandez 2006, Lien and 
Mei 2008, Martins, Singh, and Bhattacharya 2012, Nair 2011). Vietnam has finished 
its preparation for an index derivatives market: in early 2012 the country’s two stock 
exchanges issued new indices (VN30-Index and HNX30-Index) in addition to the 
long-standing VNI-Index and HNX-Index. There are now four indices, and the index 
derivatives market is likely to open. The new market operators are likely to promote 
the participation of individual investors and institutional investors.  
                                                          
1 A basket of 30 stocks with the largest market capitalisation (80% total market capitalisation) and the 
greatest liquidity (60% of total market trading value) in Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange. 
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1.3.3. Pressure on Directors   
Lel (2012) conducted an exhaustive survey and tests to find that corporate governance 
at both company and country levels significantly influences the decision by firms to 
use currency derivatives, and to what extent. Strongly governed firms tend to use 
derivatives to hedge currency exposure and overcome costly external financing, while 
weakly governed firms appear to use derivatives mostly for managerial reasons. 
Derivative contracts are particularly appealing to managers for speculation because of 
the leverage they can provide, and because the complexity of interpreting the 
consequences of their use on firms’ operations and limited disclosure requirements in 
many countries means managers may feel less constrained by investor scrutiny (Lel 
2012).  
Lel’s explanation is strongly supported by research by Buckley and Van Der Nat (2003) 
into non-executive directors’ knowledge and attitude to financial derivatives in 80 
companies in the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The results indicate that only one third of directors have appropriate knowledge of 
derivatives risks and operations, but highly favour the use of the instruments; directors 
rely heavily on management, auditors and audit committees when making a decision. 
A similar conclusion was reached by Schwimmer (1994). 
The situation that directors favouring financial derivatives are less constrained is 
problematic because accounting manipulation, intentionally misstating a company’s 
financial information “to favourably represent the entity’s financial performance” by 
its managers (Trussel 2003, 616), and derivatives as complementary income-
smoothing instruments have been confirmed by Attia’s (2012) analysis of previous 
literature. In other words, derivatives can be as dangerous as accounting manipulations; 
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and if directors are concerned about manipulation, they should apply the same level of 
concern to financial derivatives. Therefore, if directors, especially non-executive 
directors, do not understand what executives are using derivatives for, they cannot 
impose the appropriate level of controls to ensure accounting outcomes that best 
benefit relevant stakeholders. 
Directors’ lack of understanding of derivatives occurs in most developed countries, as 
the surveys by Schwimmer (1994) and Buckley and Van Der Nat (2003) suggest. Does 
the same situation exist in Vietnam? Is this lack of understanding reflected in current 
corporate governance policies on risk management, especially for derivatives? 
Answers to these questions are useful for financial market developers and the 
companies themselves, especially in emerging economies. 
1.4. Motivation and Benefits of the Study  
There is a plethora of studies on boards of directors, but Tricker (2012, 79) has pointed 
out that “current research misses a focus on personal behaviour rooted in basic values 
(morality, honesty, integrity, decency, concern for others, respect and trust)”. Tricker 
added that future research needs to investigate the “black box” that is the boardroom, 
and to focus on board-level activities, directors’ behaviours and board leadership. He 
also suggests that the implementation of corporate governance below board level goes 
to the heart of corporate governance (Tricker 2012), which significantly widens the 
field for future research on corporate governance. 
In addition, Vietnam is still an under-researched location in world studies of corporate 
governance; it has not appeared in books and journal papers in the field such as  “A 
Survey of Corporate Governance” (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), “Law and Finance” 
(Porta et al. 1998), Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective 
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(OECD 2001), “Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey” (Claessens and Fan 2003) 
and Corporate Governance and Accountability (Solomon 2007). This reflects that 
research on corporate governance in Vietnam is quite limited. Hence, a thorough 
investigation into corporate governance practices and policies of listed companies in 
Vietnam is of interest to different stakeholders and an effective contribution to the 
literature.  
Access to the studied subjects is the typical barrier faced by researchers (Stiles and 
Taylor 2001) because board directors are very busy people (Lorsch and MacIver 1989). 
Hence, there is a dearth of publications about the “black box” of board processes 
(Tricker 1993a). Applying a general decision making model, the theory of planned 
behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein 1997, 2000, Ajzen 2002, 1991, Madden, Ellen, and 
Ajzen 1992), this thesis aims to shed light on the relationship between directors’ 
knowledge, attitude and intention to use financial derivatives and the consequences of 
this relationship in the context of Vietnam, an emerging economy.  
This thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of corporate governance and 
directors’ behaviour and voices on financial derivatives in Vietnam. How have 
directors and CEOs, especially from non-financial companies, prepared for new 
financial derivatives market promotion and accompanying pressure? How should they 
protect their companies in a new market context? What kind of policies do they think 
are needed? 
In summary, there are gaps in the current literature on corporate governance on:  




 the current awareness and understanding of financial derivatives by directors of 
boards in Vietnam 
 the relationship between directors’ understanding of financial derivatives and 
directors’ intention and readiness to use the instruments for business purposes. 
This thesis addresses these gaps to benefit regulators, directors, corporations and other 
investors in derivative markets. 
The thesis is a timely contribution as the government of Vietnam officially launched 
its first securities derivatives market in August 2017 (State Securities Commission of 
Vietnam 2017a). Therefore, the findings could be used as a baseline for future 
longitudinal studies not only in Vietnam but also in other developing markets.  
1.5. Research Objective and Questions, Theoretical Framework and Research 
Approach 
This thesis analyses how directors of boards in Vietnam understand the use of financial 
derivatives (both the upside and downside), their attitudes to using derivatives, and the 
subsequent effects on corporate governance. It aims to answer the following questions:  
RQ 1. What is the level of perceived knowledge of directors of boards in 
Vietnam about the benefits and risks associated with using financial 
derivatives? 
RQ 2. Does directors’ perceived level of knowledge affect their attitude towards 
using financial derivatives? 
RQ 2a. Does such perceived level of knowledge and attitudes impact 
boards’ policies on risk management, especially on financial derivatives? 
RQ 2b. What is the mechanism channelling the impact of directors’ 
perceived knowledge on the board’s policies? 
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RQ 3. Who are the key stakeholders in the board of directors’ consideration of 
using financial derivatives for corporate purposes and what are their roles? 
To investigate directors’ understanding about financial derivatives and the relationship 
between this and their intention to use them, a mixed methods approach, using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods, was used because of the mix of research 
questions. The sequence was a survey instrument (quantitative) followed by personal 
semi-structured interviews (qualitative) conducted with directors in Vietnam. 
1.5.1. Pragmatism 
Pragmatism is the attitude of not being committed to any one system of philosophy of 
reality; its worldview arises out of actions, situations and consequences rather than 
antecedent conditions, and focuses on the problem in question for which researchers 
use all approaches available to understand (Creswell 2009). For that purpose, mixed 
methods research that combines quantitative and qualitative components in accordance 
with the researchers’ free choice is used (Creswell 2009, 10-11). Pragmatism argues 
that quantitative and qualitative methods are compatible, hence a combination of these 
methods in one piece of research is feasible (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003, 7). 
This thesis follows the pragmatist approach in answering the research questions. A 
combination of the quantitative and the qualitative approaches is intended to explore 
and explain directors’ understanding about using financial derivatives and the effect 
of that understanding.  
1.5.2. Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Governance  
Among the proliferation of corporate governance theories such as agency, institutional, 
resource dependence, managerial hegemony and stewardship, stakeholder theory 
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agrees with the others that corporate governance consists of structures and processes 
that ensure companies are controlled and directed (Solomon 2007). However, the 
stakeholder approach extends the scope of corporate governance to cover more than 
just shareholders and management and executives. The stakeholders also include 
regulators, employees, institutional investors and society in general.  
Stakeholder theory supports pragmatism and pluralism (Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar 
2004), accepting a collection of interacting, reinforcing and contradictory theories of 
business strategy instead of absolute objective definitions (Hitt, Freeman, and Harrison 
2001, Hutton 1997). Therefore, a mixed methods approach does come under this 
theoretical framework.  
The advantage of using stakeholder theory in this thesis as an explanatory lens is that 
value is created for the powerless stakeholders as well as for the company as a whole, 
by dealing with stakeholders on the basis that their partially shared interest is 
recognised in avoiding loss-making trade-offs (Freeman 2009).  
1.5.3. Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Originating in psychology, the theory of planned behaviour predicts personal 
intentions on the basis of the antecedents of beliefs, attitudes, subjective norms and 
perceptions of behavioural control, and the impact of intentions on behaviour (Ajzen 
2011, 1115). In the theory of planned behaviour model, “attitude” is the kind of 
favourable or unfavourable feeling about the behaviours, “subjective norm” is the 
perceived social pressure, and “perceived behavioural control” is the perceived ease 
or difficulty of performing the behaviour. They are respectively affected by 
“behavioural beliefs” (beliefs about the likely consequences or other attributes of the 
behaviour), “normative beliefs” (beliefs about the normative expectations of other 
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people) and “control beliefs” (beliefs about the presence of factors that may further or 
hinder the performance of the behaviour). All are predictors of behavioural intention 
(Ajzen 2002, 665).  
1.5.4. Model of Board Attributes and Roles 
The effectiveness of boards in conducting the three roles of service, strategy and 
control depends on the board’s attributes, which include composition, characteristics 
or personality, structure and process. Characteristics refer to the directors’ experience, 
functional background, independence, age, education, values, experience, stock 
ownership, and similar variables that influence their interest in and performance of 
their board tasks (Zahra and Pearce 1989). In other words, board characteristics and 
individual directors’ attributes have a potential impact on board process and decision 
making in general. Although board personality may persist for some time, a 
considerable change in board composition and its members’ backgrounds can 
transform it (Zahra and Pearce 1989). The attributes of individual directors create the 
human capital. The human capital theory emphasises the role of education and training 
in improving people’s knowledge and skills, which increase productivity at work (Tan 
2014).  
Guided by the pragmatism approach, this thesis uses a combination of stakeholder 
theory, theory of planned behaviour and the model of board attributes and roles as the 
theoretical lenses in explaining the data and the phenomena to answer the set of 
research questions. The model of board attributes and roles supplements the theory of 
planned behaviour to create a more comprehensive model of directors’ decision 
making processes; the stakeholder theory allows the consideration of context features 
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in influencing the directors’ decisions. The research is operationalised through the two 
component inquiries described below.  
1.5.5. Quantitative Inquiry 
Board members’ knowledge is crucial for their individual contribution and general 
board performance. With appropriate knowledge, directors can raise their voice, 
influence others and suggest solutions to problems. In turn, this level of knowledge is 
normally derived from directors’ education and experience, and influenced by the 
industry they are in and the nature of the corporation. This concept applies to all kinds 
of knowledge, including understanding how to use financial derivatives which is the 
focus of this study.  
Financial investment and other savings decisions are where theory of planned 
behaviour applies, and in addition to the three normal factors (attitude, subjective norm 
and perceived behavioural control), past experience (range of previous investment or 
reading of financial news) affects intention (East 1993). Since knowledge contributes 
to directors’ decision making, it is added to the theory of planned behaviour model to 
see how it interacts with other factors determining directors’ intention to use financial 
derivatives. Taking into account these factors, hypotheses were formed to test during 
the quantitative inquiry phase. The resulting data were processed using the SPSS 
Statistics 23 program. 
1.5.6. Qualitative Inquiry 
The purpose of the qualitative inquiry of this research was to seek an explanation for 




All the interviews were semi-structured, with some predetermined questions followed 
by others emerging from answers to these questions. Structured interviewing is used 
to collect data that can be coded for pre-specified categories, while unstructured 
interviewing expands the understanding of complicated behaviours for which pre-
categorisation could limit the investigation (Fontana and Frey 1994, 366). One general 
question may be enough to activate a long and information-rich conversation (O'Neal 
and Thomas 1995). 
The 19 interviewees (3 females and 16 males) were from various industries including 
securities, fund management, steel manufacturing, commodities import-export, 
banking, paper manufacturing and petroleum extractions, and all had expertise and 
lengthy experience in finance. The interview data were coded during the analysis phase 
to ensure the anonymity of the participants. 
Selection of interviewees with expertise in finance had been an integral part of the 
research proposal with the aim of collecting deeper insight into the survey results, and 
only directors with financial expertise agreed to be interviewed. The qualitative data 
were processed using the NVivo 11 program.  
1.6. Key Research Findings 
Figure 1.1 below is a scheme of the quantitative inquiry and its findings with the mean 
scores of all variables in the large red rectangle frame on a five-point Likert scale in 
brackets, and summate scores for two variables in the green boxes. The results are 
from 119 completed questionnaires, a response rate of 19.07 per cent. 
Board directors’ less-than-expected understanding about financial derivatives was 
clear from the survey results. Similarly, the survey also demonstrated directors’ 
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generally positive attitude to the derivative instruments, their strong belief in support 
from related people, low confidence in their ability to control the use of such 
instruments, and their strong intention to use financial derivatives, as summarised in 
Figure 1.1. 














Further analysis demonstrated that Knowledge was significantly correlated with Risk 
Propensity, Subjective Norm, Attitude and Perceived Behavioural Control. These four 
factors were correlated with Intention to use financial derivatives. Knowledge was not 
directly correlated with Intention; potentially its effect is channelled through Risk 
Propensity, Attitude, Subjective Norm and Perceived Behavioural Control to arrive at 
Intention (see Figure 1.1). These factors have implications for corporate governance 
policies.  
Following the survey, face-to-face interviews investigated the deeper explanations for 
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the survey. Interviewees agreed with the survey results, particularly the reasons for the 
directors’ insufficient knowledge, positive attitude, risk neutrality and strong intention. 
The only mismatch was the interviewees believed the real level of understanding might 
be lower than around 2.5 on the five-point scale that was reflected in the survey results.  
Interviewees were directors with expertise in finance, and they had a balanced view of 
the benefits and risks associated with financial derivatives. The main benefits of 
financial derivatives perceived by the interviewees were protection, insurance, risk 
mitigation and management, a longer-lasting business, value added to the business, 
and achieving enhanced goals in investments and profit. The major risk was related to 
significant technical complexity. Some secondary risks were: major potential losses, 
minimal protection from the existing legal framework, an inappropriate purpose of use, 
underlying asset risks and risks raised by counterparties in transactions. 
The interviewees accepted that directors without financial expertise (who account for 
a majority of the board director community in Vietnam) perceive that there are more 
benefits than risks, as the survey revealed, so company high risk exposure is possible. 
Most of the interviewees were concerned about the gaps between knowledge, attitude 
and intention (as seen in Figure 1.1.) causing missed opportunities, strategic error, 
wrong corporate direction and high costs, while others were not so apprehensive, 
because of the long time lag between intention and action. 
Those interviewees who were concerned suggested that directors set up appropriate 
corporate policies on financial derivatives, introduce a risk management framework, 
provide delegation of authority to approve, develop an ethics policy, use an outside 
consultancy, have a board membership mix of knowledgeable people and non-experts 
and develop a comprehensive reporting mechanism. In addition, they recommended 
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ways to improve directors’ knowledge of financial derivatives by having a 
combination of financial derivatives experts on boards of directors, enhanced training, 
self-learning and experienced practice, and greater use of outside consultants.  
Interviewees supported an intuitive recognition that expert knowledge is at the root of 
the gaps between knowledge, attitude and intention, so they suggested ways of filling 
the gaps by enhancing directors’ knowledge of financial derivatives and corporate 
policy on these instruments in particular, and on risk management in general.  
Three additional themes emerged from the interviews: business culture, the 
government role and the market for financial derivatives. Low attention to preserving 
wealth, over-focus on making money, and distrust of employees all hinder directors 
and owners from establishing a clear corporate risk management policy and framework. 
The government’s major role is evident in subsections of the three most popular types 
of financial derivatives, in market developments and especially in corporate scandals. 
The directors interviewed concluded with a call for the government to set up a more 
effective legal framework for financial derivatives, to develop the underlying markets 
and to take part in disseminating knowledge and training, especially for directors.  
This study is an application of the mixed methods research approach of a survey 
supplemented by face-to-face interviews to research the complex issue of board 
directors and decisions related to financial derivatives. By using a mix of survey and 
interview research methods, a more comprehensive set of empirical data on the 
research problem is provided.  
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1.7. Thesis Structure 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction of the background, 
motivation and benefits of the thesis, followed by research objectives, questions and 
methodologies, and key research findings. Chapter 2 is an in-depth review of literature 
about corporate governance and its principal theories, directors’ roles and 
competencies, and financial derivatives’ history, nature and practical uses in business. 
The chapter identifies gaps in the current literature, including the lack of research on 
individual directors’ competencies, especially their knowledge of specific areas such 
as financial derivatives, in both developed and emerging economies. To clarify the 
context of such a gap in a specific country, Chapter 3 reviews the issue of corporate 
governance in Vietnam, its developments and fundamental characteristics including 
the leading role of the government, the active participation of international 
organisations and the passive nature of local businesses.  
Chapter 4 presents philosophies, theories and methodologies and has a detailed 
discussion of the research objectives, research questions, sampling, data collection and 
data analysis of the two component inquiries, the qualitative and the quantitative. The 
results and findings of the quantitative component are presented in Chapter 5 and the 
qualitative component in Chapter 6. Chapter 5 presents directors’ general knowledge 
of financial derivatives and associations with directors’ personal attributes, corporate 
characteristics and components that predict their intention to use the instruments. 
Chapter 6 presents explanations by directors with financial expertise of the overall 
results in Chapter 5 and expands these to identify additional emerging themes raised 
by the interviewees. The chapters are then linked together to form an overall analysis 
in Chapter 7, which shows how all the research questions were answered by each part 
of the study, and offers solutions to problems and implications for theories and various 
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stakeholders, including the government, boards of directors, directors themselves and 
training organisations. Chapter 8 sets out the thesis contributions to knowledge, theory 
and methodology; its limitations and recommendations for future research; and then 
concludes with final observations.  
1.8. Conclusion  
Motivated by the desire to fill the gap in the literature on board directors’ decision 
making process and Vietnamese corporate governance, this thesis studied directors’ 
intention to use financial derivatives and the influencing factors. Directors’ knowledge 
of the instruments was measured and assessed, impacts on the intention and the 
precedents were tested and potential impacts on corporate governance policies were 
analysed. Directors’ considerations of financial derivatives were put into the context 
of Vietnam to investigate the effect of various stakeholders. A mixed methods 
approach was applied with a combination of survey and personal interviews with 
directors under the theoretical lenses of pragmatism, stakeholder theory and the theory 
of planned behaviour, supplemented by the model of board attributes and roles.  
The next chapter details and analyses the literature for this thesis and specifies the gaps 
that emerged during the analysis.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Introduction  
This literature review aggregates theoretical issues on the main topic of board director 
behaviours in corporate governance, using principal sources for management, finance 
and business. In the world of corporate governance, the board of directors is a key 
mechanism (McNulty 2013). Together with the evolution of corporate governance, 
research on boards has a wide range of topics. The two most popular topics are board 
diversity (gender, ethnicity, demographics) (Gray and Nowland 2017, Alazzani, 
Hassanein, and Aljanadi 2017, Reguera-Alvarado, Fuentes, and Laffarga 2017) and 
board characteristics (size, independence, duality, interlock) (Kaur Virk 2017, Titova 
2016, Unda 2015). When studies on board structure had ambiguous findings, 
researchers focused more on the “substance” of the board, in which board processes 
and directors are the central elements (McNulty 2013). There is evidence that process 
is the mediator between board structure and board strategy (Barroso-Castro, Villegas-
Periñan, and Dominguez 2017), which brings to light hidden facts about directors 
(Brown 2015). To understand such processes, sociology and psychological approaches 
have been applied (McNulty 2013). In addition to studying boards of directors as a 
group (Wildenauer 2015), studies on individual directors have proliferated with an 
emphasis on directors’ expertise, experience, education and other characteristics 
(Tseng and Jian 2016, Rousseau and Stroup 2015, Ji and Di 2016, von Meyerinck, 
Oesch, and Schmid 2016).  
This literature review starts with the history of corporations, the emergence and 
development of corporate governance, the main areas of interest and major models. 
This is relevant for the study of the context of corporate governance in Vietnam, the 
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context that determines the conduct of board directors in that country. To establish a 
full framework for further study of director behaviour, six corporate governance 
theories are reviewed; they explain and give guidance on relationships among the 
principal parties in corporate governance, of which the board of directors is a crucial 
component. The review then examines the role of boards, and highlights what 
competencies individual directors are required to have. How are directors’ 
competencies called on in decisions on financial derivatives? To answer this, Sections 
2.5 and 2.6 summarise the nature of financial derivatives and their necessity for 
business, and consider directors’ knowledge of these instruments. Based on this review 
gaps in the current literature become apparent.  
2.1. Corporate Governance and Associated Theories  
2.1.1. The Development of Corporate Governance   
Corporate governance has emerged as a serious academic and professional topic over 
the last 30 years. However, its history and practice is at least 400 years old, starting 
when corporate entities acquired a life of their own apart from that of individuals 
(Tricker 2000a, b, 2011, Dalton et al. 2007, Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 2004), and 
with the separation of ownership and management (Berle and Means 1933, Smith 
1937).  
2.1.1.1. The History of Corporations and Their Nature 
The joint stock entity for trading was first chartered in 1600 in Britain, and in the 
Netherlands in 1602 (Solomon 2007, Tricker 2011). The modern form of a joint stock 
company was enshrined in law in 1844 by the British Joint Stock Companies Act, and 
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the Limited Liability Act of 1855, which separated corporate liabilities from those of 
all shareholders including executive directors (Solomon 2007).  
The limited liability company, which triggered the number and scale of corporate 
expansion, was a significant development in Victorian times (Handy 1993, Gamble 
and Kelly 2001). Through capital accumulation, corporations reached a scale at which 
they became dominant social organisations. At the same time, the nominal control over 
these entities was distributed among a large number of small shareholders and actual 
control lay in the hands of executive management who directed daily operations (Berle 
and Means 1933).  
At the end of the nineteenth century, corporations were used not only for capital-
raising but also for centrally managing the assets and liabilities of several companies, 
such as their subsidiaries (including family firms and entrepreneurial manufacturing 
businesses) (Tricker 2011). The chain connecting assets and owners lengthened 
significantly when derivative instruments such as warrants, options and futures were 
devised and marketed. Tricker was concerned about the appropriateness of the 
nineteenth-century concept of corporations based on ownership power, raising the 
question “Who is now to exercise power over those companies?” (Tricker 1996b, 2).  
The Second World War (1939–1945) interrupted corporation development, but it also 
set in motion an economic boom over the next three decades through government 
subsidy packages across Europe, Japan and North America. It was not until the 1970s, 
when corporate scandals in the United States and the United Kingdom prompted 
attention for the first time on corporate governance (Clarke 2004), was there any 
serious concern raised about corporate behaviour and direction.  
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What is the nature of a company or a corporation? Is business simply a more organised 
criminal entity than the mafia, as Pitelis and Clarke (2004) put it? In the early days, 
people were concerned whether corporations were persons or not. Corporations were 
considered to have no souls and no bodies, so could not be treated like persons (Dalton 
et al. 2007). But in legal terms, corporations are considered “legal persons”. In the 
United States, in 1878, those legal persons were even allowed by the Supreme Court 
to participate in the political process (Monks 2004). However, they are not persons, 
without philosophy, ethics or human characteristics; they are a legal creature whose 
dynamic and purpose is the maximising of profit (Monks 2004).  
The next question is about who benefits from the existence of the corporation. 
Corporations have a contractual relation with capital contributions as the basis of 
income claims (Winfrey 1996, 236). They focus on corporate profits and shareholder 
gains while acting within legal boundaries as natural persons (Handy 1993, Winfrey 
1996), but they are artificial creations existing under specific legal conditions (Demb 
1996, Jensen and Meckling 1976). As a legal institution, corporations are created and 
changed by the exercise of the political power of actor groups such as owners, 
managers and employees, and even by state intervention in the economic and social 
relationship with participants’ conflicting objectives (Vilanova 2007, Aguilera and 
Jackson 2010, Jensen and Meckling 1976). Vilanova (2007) suggests the concept of a 
short-term salient stakeholder who simultaneously possesses the attributes of 
legitimacy, power and urgency2 and suffers the most from corporate decisions. Such 
                                                          
2 The typology of stakeholders is based on the possession of three attributes: power (the stakeholder’s ability to 
influence the firm), legitimacy (the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the firm based upon contract 
or legal title) and urgency (the degree to which managerial delay in attending to the claim is unacceptable to the 
stakeholder). Managers pay more attention to a “definitive” stakeholder, who holds simultaneously the three 




stakeholders win more commitment from managers. In a specific corporation, the 
salient stakeholder changes over time in accordance with a dynamic conflict-solving 
process and firms are run for the benefit of the salient stakeholder group.   
Whoever the corporate beneficiaries are, Berle and Means (1933) saw corporations as 
dominant social organisations. Demb and Neubauer (1992b) enhanced this idea in their 
observation that corporations’ major decisions have significant social and economic 
implications. Corporate groups with a rich diversity of objectives and complex 
ownership structures experienced abuses (Tricker 2011) in the final quarter of the 
twentieth century and raised the issue of effective corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is material for individual asset performance (Solomon 2007, 74) and poor 
corporate governance may lead to fraud and even collapses, such as the South Sea 
Company stock speculation and bubble burst in the eighteenth century (Tricker 2011, 
6).    
2.1.1.2. Developments in Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance has undergone major developments in each decade from the 
1970s onwards (Tricker 1996a). Corporate governance developments appeared in 
response to a critical business reality, such as demand for capital with limited liability 
for individuals in the nineteenth century, dominant shareholders in the 1930s and 
director remuneration and collapses in the 1980s (Tricker 2000a, 5). These 
developments were reactive rather than proactive, and all were responses to negative 
business events and scandals. In the “Golden Age” of the post-war period of the 1950s 
and 1960s, corporations enjoyed a boom, with excellent performance in productivity, 
growth, technology and general social welfare, so people did not focus on any need 
for corporate governance reform (Cadbury 2000).  
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The economy and businesses are cyclic and crisis is unavoidable (Sismondi 1991, 
Marx, Paul, and Paul 1930). Clarke (2004) summarised the cycle: rising personal 
wealth in early years of the twentieth century and economic growth in the 1920s, 
speculation “fever” in 1928-29 and then the Wall Street crash and market collapse. 
Ade-Ajayi (2004, 185) demonstrated the boom and bust cycle for the 1990s in both 
the United States and the rest of the world. The technology revolution added unrealistic 
expectations to the extended boom time of the 1990s and caused pressure that cut down 
profit margins. In that context, to acquire cheaper finance and new markets, businesses 
reduced oversight of their governance obligations and duties, which caused more 
pressure and a growing sense of crisis. Ade-Ajayi (2004) referred to the boom time as 
lacking imperatives for good international governance practices, especially in 
emerging economies. Corporate governance systems mirror market fluctuations, 
focusing on promoting new opportunities (wealth creation) as well as on risk 
management as a method of wealth protection (Clarke 2004). 
Having most relevance to current corporate governance approaches, the decades from 
the 1970s to the 2000s are reviewed in more detail below.  
The 1970s 
In the 1970s, crisis and recessions returned to the developed economies after 30 years 
of economic miracle, and exposed corporate scandals such as in Maxwell publishing 
(UK) and Penn Central (US), which initiated the United States’ Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) investigations into the two companies’ effectiveness of management 
and the competency of board directors (Clarke 2004). There was a growing debate 
about the model for boards (either two-tier or one-tier style), about corporate 
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responsibilities to communities and other stakeholders (Tricker 1996a, 199) and 
whether there should be an audit committee of independent outside directors (Tricker 
2011).  
Director-level research was initiated at the Oxford Centre for Management Studies and 
early research on corporate governance was conducted by the Corporate Policy Group 
at Nuffield College, where the terminology “corporate governance” was coined by Bob 
Tricker (Tricker 1993b, 171).  
The 1980s  
The media, one of the three components of US politics (Monks 2004), denounced the 
business world in the 1980s as “Liars’ Poker”, “The Predators’ Ball”, “Barbarians at 
the Gate”, “The House of Nomura”, or “The Money Machine” (Bartlett 1991). The 
1980s was a decade of corporate abuses with insider trading, stock manipulation, 
failure to disclose, and close links with regulators and the underworld such as at 
Drexel, Burnham, Lambert (US) in 1986, Rothwells Ltd (Australia) in 1989 and 
Nomura Securities (Japan) in late 1980s which were neglected because of 
corporations’ commercial success (Tricker 2011). In Western countries, the 1980s was 
the Reagan and Thatcher era of deregulation, privatisation, market-driven capitalism, 
mergers, acquisitions and corporations as commodities (Tricker 1996a). It was also the 
era of the poison pill, greenmail, hostile takeovers, and golden and silver parachutes 
(Howard 1996) as well as the junk bond and white knight (Tricker 1993c). Hostile 
takeovers transferred wealth from stakeholders such as employees and suppliers to 
shareholders and increased overall social costs (Auerbach 1991). An unprecedented 
conflict broke out between shareholder associations and institutions such as the United 
Shareholder Association and the Council for Institutional Investors and their 
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managements through the proxy, votes and petitions for regulatory change. However, 
management was at a great advantage and shareholders had to wait for another scandal 
to set off another crisis (Thompson and Davis 1997).  
The fiduciary duties of a board of directors, its accountabilities and its relations with 
management were under scrutiny, and prompted an urgent demand for boards to adopt 
a more strategic role and a more value-added involvement (providing foresight, 
managing uncertainty, change and adaptation, developing strategies, and assisting the 
firm’s ability to continually leapfrog its competition) (Tricker 1993c, Howard 1996). 
Tricker (1993c, 1) noted “At the beginning of the 1980s corporate governance was not 
a subject for serious academic study and the phrase could not even be found in the 
professional literature; by the end of the decade both were commonplace”.  
The 1990s  
The hostility of the 1980s was followed in the 1990s by the “dot.com” bubble, 
speculation, greed and insider trading and risky strategies of empire building by 
financial operations instead of a focus on physical operations (Taylor 2003). In 
contrast to the 1980s, corporate failures and collapse could no longer be ignored; for 
example, Maxwell of Maxwell Publishing (UK) died in infamy in the early 1990s after 
an investigation uncovered his illegal and secret channelling of money from his 
companies’ pension funds to save other at-risk companies (Tricker 2011), even though 
all previous audit reports showed healthy financial conditions (Clarke 2004). The 
Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 expanded corporate governance issues outside the 
Western world into other less developed economies, after a series of systemic 
corporate governance failures, especially in China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Thailand (Clarke 2004).  
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The 1980s’ unanswered call for changes in corporate governance was met by a series 
of codes of best practices, starting with the United Kingdom’s Cadbury Report in 1992 
(Cadbury 1993), which was followed by other UK codes and principles, and 
subsequently additional codes and reports in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, South 
Africa and the United States (Tricker 1996a). The wave of reform processes was 
continued by the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), which focused 
on the framework and institutions for corporate governance at the national level 
(“Corporate Governance Update” 1996) and the Commonwealth Association for 
Corporate Governance 1999 guidelines for boards (“Research Report: Principles for 
Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth” 2000). Besides the involvement of the 
OECD, world corporate governance included new participants, such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank (Clarke 
2004).  
Corporate governance attracted wider interest; there was a growing debate about 
corporate governance reform, relationships with major shareholders, board strategic 
directions and the role of directors (Pye 2002). The amount of research on corporate 
governance in the 1990s reached a new height; however, this research did not touch 
on the chemistry or behaviour of board members and lacked analysis of real-life 
situations or activities, owing to limited access to relevant information (Tricker 1996a, 
200). 
The 2000s 
The 2000s opened with a series of scandals in US corporations (Enron, Worldcom, 
Tyco, Adelphia and Global Crossing), in Australian corporations (HIH and OneTel) 
(Taylor 2003, Clarke 2004), and in Royal Dutch/Shell Group (Taylor 2006). A world 
36 
 
financial crisis started in the United States in 2007 with Lehman Brothers, American 
Insurance Group and Merrill Lynch, and quickly spread to other countries (Conyon, 
Judge, and Useem 2011). Debate about the causes of the 2008 financial crisis has not 
concluded; however several scholars agree that the crisis was triggered by a real estate 
bubble together with the misuse of financial derivatives. It revealed weak corporate 
boards of directors, the malfunction of major elements of the US governance system 
(accounting, auditing, and rating agencies), inadequate regulation, high incentives for 
CEOs and insufficient risk management practices (Conyon, Judge, and Useem 2011, 
Clarke 2004, Aguilera and Jackson 2010). Jain and Jamali (2016) quoted Serwer 
(2009) to call the 2000s the “Decade from Hell”. Senior management, boards and other 
related parties were under pressure to regain the public’s trust (Taylor 2003). The 
oversight function of boards had not been performed appropriately (Taylor 2006).  
This decade resulted in more widespread introductions of corporate governance codes 
and reports.3 While the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries preferred 
codes of best practice, principles and a “comply or explain” approach, the United 
States introduced a more rule-based regulation system (Tricker 2011, Clarke 2004) 
with laws such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. Governance compliance needs to respect 
differences between companies and boards across different nations (Cadbury 2000); 
rigid laws and rules proposed as result of these crises may in the future create further 
difficulties because of their inflexibility (Tegner 1993) and following the letter of the 
law could lead to a CEO hegemony that changes the corporate role in society (Monks 
1998). Besides profit maximisation, there are other important goals for corporations 
                                                          
3 Higgs Report (January 2003), Smith Report (July 2003), Tyson Report (June 2003), Revised UK Combined Code 
(July 2003), Myners Report (December 2004), Revised UK Combined Code (June 2006) and the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (June 2010). 
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such as involving owners, commitment to stakeholders’ satisfaction and long-term 
firm valuation (Monks 1994).  
In the first decade of the third millennium, academic studies of corporate governance  
have proliferated in many disciplines (including economics, management, finance, law 
and accounting) with increased academic rigour (Durisin and Puzone 2009). However, 
they have not touched corporate governance’s internal working mechanisms and 
personal behaviour, and they lack an effective overall theoretical framework. Tricker 
calls on future research to discover the “black box” of the boardroom and to focus on 
board-level activities and directors’ behaviour (Tricker 2012). 
Since the mid-1970s, the history of corporate governance has been a history of crises, 
corporate scandals, and responses from governments, institutions and companies. The 
focus has shifted from investors’ and shareholders’ interests to the public interest 
(Pitelis and Clarke 2004). Jain and Jamali (2016) quoted a Rockefeller study (2010) 
predicting that the decade 2010 to 2020 will be the “Doom Decade”, with authoritarian 
leadership dominated by elites, and by social and environmental disasters. 
Corporate governance has become a major stream in academic research, an 
interdisciplinary field dealing with governance issues (Filatotchev and Boyd 2009), 
expanding from single to cross-jurisdiction comparisons, from normative board 
structures and codes of best practices to director behaviour in its interpersonal, political 
and sociological context (Tricker 2000a, 5).  
2.1.1.3. Definitions and Areas of Interest 
Corporate governance has been defined at three different levels: national macro-level, 
corporate micro-level and technical level.  
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At the national level, “corporate governance is the distribution of income, power, and 
authority through politics that creates the public policy regime to reflect preferences 
of related parties” (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005, 57). A national corporate governance 
system includes a legal and regulatory system (company law, securities law, stock 
exchange regulations) and institutions (a central bank and commercial banks, the 
ministry of finance, and state securities commission). 
At the micro-level, Tricker, the seminal researcher of modern corporate governance, 
defines corporate governance as “the exercise of power over the modern corporation” 
(Tricker 1994a, 1) and other entities4 (Tricker 1995). The power is over the direction 
of the enterprise, supervision of executive actions, accountability and state regulation 
of the corporation (Tricker 1994b) with the purpose of value creation, which requires 
board directors to be both critical and creative in resolving conflicts of interest 
(Montagnon 2004) and to be excellent people with effective strategies to ensure 
consistent value creation (Keenan 2004). When wealth is measured in earnings, a 
corporate governance system is a particular configuration of internal and external 
mechanisms that condition the generation and the distribution of residual earnings in 
corporations (Shleifer and Vishny 1997 in Van Essen, Engelen, and Carney (2013). 
Risk management is another constituent of corporate governance (Clarke 2004). Value 
creation is achieved through the effective use of resources, and corporate governance 
organises resource allocation, resolves conflicts (Daily, Dalton, and Canella Jr. 2003 
in Martin et al. (2016) and assigns responsibilities within and across firms through 
strategic choice (Aguilera, Florackis, and Kim 2016).  
                                                          
4 Tricker (1995, 187) opens out corporate governance to cover a wide range of organisations including public, 
listed companies, groups of subsidiary and associate companies, networks of strategic alliances, private family 
companies, government business enterprises, major international partnerships, non-profit educational, medical, 
cultural and other charitable entities. 
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A number of practitioners and academics focus more specifically on the corporate 
environment when defining corporate governance. For them, corporate governance is 
a system for directing and controlling companies within their legal, ownership and 
public contexts (Cadbury 2000), with a focus on not only the key relationship between 
the owners and the managers (Cadbury 2002), but also between the internal and 
external checks and balances that ensure corporate accountability and social 
responsibility to related stakeholders (Solomon 2007, Filatotchev and Boyd 2009, 
Demb and Neubauer 1992b).  
At the technical level, corporate governance comprises the mechanisms which 
influence managerial discretion and govern CEO conduct (Wirtz 2011), such as 
mechanisms for monitoring and ratifying managerial decisions and efficient decision 
making in general (Donnelly and Mulcahy 2008, Winfrey 1996). A narrower focus on 
finance sees corporate governance as the ways finance suppliers assure their returns 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 737) by overseeing management’s roles and 
responsibilities (Westphal and Zajac 2013).   
Aguilera and Jackson (2010) provide a good summary of views on corporate 
governance from different perspectives, such as economics (a nexus of contracts 
among owners without obligations to society), legal (rights and responsibilities of 
corporate actors and rules to regulate firm decision making), sociology (the structures, 
processes and institutions within and around organisations that allocate power and 
control resources among participants) and politics (the system promoting growth, 
protecting investors, generating employment and fostering equality of opportunities). 
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In academic terms, corporate governance consists of concepts, theories and practices 
which are implemented within boards by their directors, and by shareholders, top 
management, regulators and auditors, and other stakeholders (Tricker 1993c, 2). 
Definitions of corporate governance also vary in terms of whom it cares for, what are 
the main aspects and what are the influencing factors. The common components of 
corporate governance are institutional investors, predatory companies, insiders, 
regulators (Tricker 1994c), society and the press (Demb and Neubauer 1992b). They 
are informal and formal structures, processes and mechanisms (Westphal and Zajac 
2013). In demanding that corporations be accountable, Monks and Minow (1991) were 
emphasising the special power of institutional investors. 
What are the main areas of interests in corporate governance during the exercise of 
power over corporate resources? Different approaches to reform emphasise different 
aspects of corporate governance codes and practices: OECD (2004) focuses on 
ensuring a sound basis for an effective corporate governance framework;5 Demb and 
Neubauer (1992b) emphasise the need to deal with paradoxes in corporate 
governance;6 and Tricker (2012) stresses six areas for board improvement.7 Other 
areas of interest are shareholders and ownership, directors and monitoring, 
management and performance (Monks and Minow 2004), stakeholders, remuneration, 
market for control, regulation, communication and disclosure (Padgett 2012), 
institutional investors (Mallin 2013) and self-governance 8  (Ostrom 1992). Some 
                                                          
5 1. Enhancing the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions, 2. The equitable treatment of shareholders, 
3. The role of stakeholders, 4. Disclosure and transparency, 5. The responsibilities of the board (OECD 2004). 
6 1. ‘Cosy club’ versus independent ‘personalities’, 2. Commitment and depth versus detachment and breadth; 3. 
Global vision vs. local needs; 4. Central control vs. local autonomy (Demb and Neubauer 1992a). 
7 1. Clarification of the board role, 2. The board’s access to information and understanding of the organisation, 3. 
Enhancing good relations between boards and management, 4. Effective board oversight of company strategy, 5. 
Appropriate management development, and 6. Succession and risk management (Tricker 2012). 
8 Ostrom (1992) deduces eight design principles for successful self-governance that are applicable for corporate 
self-governance: clear boundaries, rules, collective choice arrangements, monitoring procedures, sanctions, 
conflict-resolving mechanisms, protection from external challenges and multiple-layer activities.  
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global issues are: empowering shareholders, rules and regulations for risk management, 
CEO and chair duality, norms for directors’ responsibility and self-regulation, 
avoiding “too big to govern” phenomena and improving credit-rating and financial 
reporting (Conyon, Judge, and Useem 2011). 
Whatever the details, there are two major areas of corporate governance: conformance 
(providing accountability, and monitoring or supervising) and performance (strategy 
formulation and policy making) (Tricker 1995, 188). The two areas correspond to the 
two roles of corporate governance: wealth creation (performance) and wealth 
protection (conformance). 
Modern corporate governance is mainly about public joint stock corporations, the best 
value-creating and appropriating organisation in history (Pitelis 2004). What is value 
and how is it created? The value may be the labour cost of production or the perceived 
utility realised by the firm’s activities through specialisation, the division of labour, 
resource combination, teamwork and learning (Pitelis 2004). The derivative 
shareholder value forms in the context that the owners are best suited to be “residual 
claimants”.9 Wealth is the realised value in the exchange of commodities in markets 
for a profit and affected by scarcity and the cost of production (Pitelis 2004, 217). 
Monks (2002), an experienced and well-known institutional investor, suggested a 
divergent view of wealth creation and the role of corporate governance. He said that 
being monitored is more likely to enable boards to generate value for corporate owners 
by deploying the skill and application of managements, and effective corporate 
governance at least can prevent value destruction.  
                                                          
9 Pitelis (2004, 213) quotes Alchian and Demsetz (1972): To avoid infinite regress monitoring situation in any team 
effort, it is best if the monitor is self-monitored, by becoming a residual claimant of any surplus left, after expenses 
to the other members of the team are paid. The owners are best suited to be “residual claimants”, this triggers the 
need for “shareholder” value. 
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To sum up, corporate governance is a combination of mechanisms, stakeholders and 
processes, both internal and external to corporations, aimed at ensuring appropriate 
use of power over the corporations to make and protect values for related parties. This 
thesis investigates corporate governance from the stakeholder point of view, and 
adopts the following definition: “corporate governance is defined as the system of 
checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that 
companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their business activities” (Solomon 2007, 14). 
2.1.1.4. Corporate Governance Models 
Descriptive corporate governance analysis at the national level divides the world into 
major groups, or models, according to the particular similarities they share. 
The first classification is to divide countries according to their board structure, which 
falls into two main groups: one-tier (one common board, in the United Kingdom and 
the United States) and two-tier (executive board and supervisory board, in continental 
Europe) (Psaros 2009). These two groupings have been given various names: the 
British American system and the Continental system (Sykes 1994); the market-centric 
model and the relationship-based model (Bhasa cited by Psaros 2009, 228); a market-
based, agency-led shareholder value model and a relational, communitarian 
stakeholder model (Martin et al. 2016). Bhasa (cited by Psaros 2009, 228) added the 
transitional model (Central and Eastern European, newly independent states of the 
former Soviet Union) and the emerging model (India, Taiwan).10 Martin et al. (2016) 
argued for two more categories: strategy-led enlightened shareholder value model and 
                                                          
10 The taxonomy was based on the following criteria: equity ownership; shareholder time frame; capital markets; 
investor protection; management; potential agency costs; management time frame; takeovers as a control on poorly 
performing companies (Bhasa cited by Psaros 2009, 228). 
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an employee-ownership model.11 Whatever the structures are, they all recognise two 
functions of the board: the supervisory function and the managerial function (Psaros 
2009).  
When legal tradition is used to classify corporate governance models, the two main 
models are common law and civil law (including families of French, German and 
Scandinavian) (Porta et al. 1998, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The models are different 
in approaches to investor protection, and this affects the concentration of ownership 
and market development. 
Weimer and Pape (1999, 152-4) produced a detailed and relatively comprehensive 
classification of national corporate governance models that has been cited by other 
authors such as Keenan and Aggestam (2001, 261). The classification includes four 
models: the Anglo-Saxon system, the Germanic system, the Latin system and the 
Japanese system, which cover the categories in the previous paragraphs, presented in 
Table 2.1. As the Weimer and Pape classification is more relevant to this thesis, the 
following sections summarise fundamental characteristics of each of the four models.  
The Anglo-Saxon Model 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States are representatives of 
the Anglo-Saxon model. The model is characterised by a one-tier board of directors, 
market and shareholder orientation and the company as an instrument to achieve 
maximum profit for shareholders, the high importance of the stock market, an active 
external market for corporate control, low ownership concentration, highly 
                                                          
11There are two core questions to be answered: whose rights and interests are, or should be, paramount in a firm’s 
corporate governance approach? and how do a firm's governance structure and approach create an appropriate 




performance-dependent executive compensation and short-termism (Weimer and Pape 
1999, 154). State-owned enterprises in these countries have lost their ground since the 
1980s (Grosman, Okhmatovskiy, and Wright 2016). 
Table 2.1. A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance  
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Source: Adapted from Weimer and Pape (1999, 154) 
 
Short-termism – a focus on financial indicators – is the most common problem of the 
Anglo-Saxon model (Clarke 2004, Tricker 1994c) and has the potential to lead to a 
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series of corporate governance weaknesses12 (Sykes 1994). This originates from the 
Anglo-Saxon culture that encourages simplicity and linear thinking (Goyder 1993) and 
the notion that ownership is the basis of power (Tricker 1993a, 60) and management-
ownership as central to corporate affairs (Cadbury 2002).  
Even considering their sharing of culture and a tradition of law, people in the United 
Kingdom more widely recognise the importance of corporate governance than do those 
in the United States, and investors in the United Kingdom are more concerned about 
well-governed companies (Montagnon 2004).  
The Germanic Model 
This model is adhered to by Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. It is characterised by orientation to the market but 
with an institutional concept of companies; two-tier boards of directors with the 
participation of shareholders together with that of industrial banks and employees; 
moderate to high importance of the stock market; no active external market for 
corporate control; moderate to high ownership concentration; low performance-
dependent executive compensation and long-term economic relationship (Weimer and 
Pape 1999, 154). 
These countries follow the civil law/Roman prescriptive regime (Tricker 1993a, 60). 
Long-termism is common with loyal and knowledgeable owners (Tricker 1994c), who 
see their companies existing in partnership with labour and the wider society (Cadbury 
2002). The two-tier board is compulsorily applied to big companies (for example in 
                                                          
12 Britain and America suffer from four main corporate governance weaknesses: absentee corporate owners, the 
inappropriate terms on which investment institutions employ fund managers, counter-productive remuneration and 
incentives for senior management, and excessive reliance on the takeover threat for management accountability, so 
that corporations fail to meet the main requirement of either owners or management (Sykes 1994, 189). 
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the Netherlands, those companies with more than 100 employees and worth more than 
US$45 million) (Van Hamel et al. 1998a) and is intended to ensure these standards are 
followed.  
The Latin Model 
The Latin model includes Belgium, France, Italy and Spain. Firms are considered 
institutions with relationships with surrounding parties. Boards of directors may have 
one or two tiers, but one tier is more popular. Other stakeholders besides shareholders 
are financial holdings, the government, families and oligarchic groups. The stock 
markets have a moderate level of importance, with highly concentrated ownership, no 
active external market for corporate control, moderate performance-dependent 
executive compensation and long-term economic relationships (Weimer and Pape 
1999, 154). The system lacks a monitoring structure to make corporate insiders 
accountable, and external auditors and the internal control committees are not effective 
(Melis 2005).  
The Japanese Model 
In Japan, companies are institutions in a bigger society. They use one-tier boards 
although nominally there are boards of directors and offices of representative directors. 
Members of boards include city banks, financial institutions, employees and oligarchic 
groups in general. The stock market is highly important but there is no active external 
market for corporate control and low to moderate ownership concentration. Executive 
compensation is only slightly dependent on corporate performance, and in general the 
economic relationships are long term (Weimer and Pape 1999, 154). 
As in the Keiretsu network, cross-holdings of equity, cross-directorships and other ties 
of loyalty form the basis of power (Tricker 1993a, 60) and people consider holding 
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shares both a symbol and a strategy for long-term business networking (Psaros 2009, 
222) that helps to reduce transaction costs (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005, 31).  
There are two dynamic economic regions missing from almost all corporate 
governance categorisations identified above: China and other Asian countries. Those 
countries possess distinctive corporate governance systems that are reviewed below. 
The Chinese Model 
In China, business is considered a succession of contracts or ventures with the core 
lying in family and informal obligation networks (Tricker 1994c). Besides the family-
centric business culture, state-owned enterprises account for an important part of the 
economy and their corporate governance influences the national system (Jiang and 
Kim 2015). The Chinese model is characterised by large controlling shareholders, 
especially the government agencies, and a very limited role for independent directors; 
pay is not an important incentive for state-owned enterprise managers because they 
aim at promotion in the political system; debtors and institutional investors do not 
assume a monitoring role; a CEO is without control in a weak legal environment, there 
is a weak market for corporate control or for management talent; and political 
connections are the real goals of corporate social responsibility (Jiang and Kim 2015).  
The Asian Model (with the Exception of China and Japan) 
Except for China and Japan, other countries in East and South East Asia use the Asian 
model, although they are not entirely homogenous (Thome and McAulay 1992). 
Typical characteristics are a family-run business (Psaros 2009, 233), reliance on 
relationships and trust (Tricker 2012, Roche 2005), outside investors kept in the dark 
and hired managers having no voice (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Public companies 
are still dominated by families, such as in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and other 
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ASEAN countries, and minority public investors need support from the regulatory 
authority to gain power in governance (Tricker 1993a, 60).  
2.1.2. Theories of Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance literature has identified a range of different issues and 
perspectives through several theoretical lenses, including agency, transaction costs 
economics, stewardship, resource dependency, stakeholders, managerial hegemony 
and class hegemony (Stiles and Taylor 2001). On the basis of disciplinary foundation, 
organisation, human nature and motivation, governance challenges and governance 
prescription, Knapp, Dalziel, and Lewis (2011, 297) distinguished three main theories: 
agency theory, stewardship theory and social categorisation as in Table 2.2. The 
theories encompass different dimensions, such as the role of corporate governance in 
organisations and the roles and purposes of boards, theoretical origins, units of analysis, 
focal dimension, details of board activities, levels of empirical support and limitations 
on application (Clarke 2007). 
2.1.2.1. Agency Theory 
Schiehll and Martins (2016), in a systematic review of cross-country corporate 
governance research, concluded that 52 of the 89 studies used an agency theoretical 
framework. It is widely accepted that agency theory is the most prevalent theoretical 
lens used in corporate governance research (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009, 
Claessens and Fan 2003, Clarke 2007, Mallin 2013, Monks and Minow 2004, Psaros 
2009, Solomon 2007, Tricker 2012), with its representative, Anglo-American 
corporate governance, normally treated as the world model of best practice (Aguilera 
and Jackson 2010).  
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Table 2.2. Alternative Views of Organisations, Human Nature and Governance  
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Based on the separation of ownership and management (Berle and Means 1933, Smith 
1937),  agency theory was introduced by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 (Dalton et al. 
2007). In an agency relationship between the principals and the agents involving some 
delegating of authority, the agents tend not to act in the best interest of the principals 
when both are utility maximisers. Methods for reducing such divergence include 
incentives, monitoring, and bonding costs, which all incur agency costs (for example 
monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and 
the residual loss to the principal’s welfare) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In 
corporations, the agency relationship is between the shareholders (owners) and the 
board of directors and senior management (Van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009).  
Corporate governance problems emerge because of the separation between ownership 
and management (Solomon 2007, Swan 2000, Tricker 2012, Gourevitch and Shinn 
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2005). There are agency dilemmas between managers and shareholders and investors13 
(Clarke 2004): the potential consequences of unresolved imbalances are illegal and/or 
unethical events such as fraudulent accounting, insider trading, unauthorised 
transactions and ultimately corporate failure (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005, Hogan 1997, 
Tricker 2012). Remedies for such dilemmas are usually: control over senior 
management through incentive and monitoring structures and systems (Westphal and 
Zajac 2013) and structures such as shareholder general meetings and board of directors 
(Letza, Sun, and Kirkbride 2004, Hendry and Kiel 2004, Westphal 1999), ownership 
structure, and efficient capital and labour markets (Hung 1998). Accountability is the 
essence of corporate governance (Filatotchev and Boyd 2009).  
Agency theory focuses on shareholders and boards as fixed entities (Tricker 2012, 61) 
and it is criticised mainly on the grounds of its assumption of the homogeneity of 
human nature and narrow scope of agent and principal groups of the agency 
relationship. Its view of people as self-interested and untrustworthy is too pessimistic 
(Tricker 1994b, 2000c) and does not cover complex human nature (Muth and 
Donaldson 1998). Stakeholders may in fact assume more than one role and each may 
be a residual claimant (Aguilera, Florackis, and Kim 2016). Large owners and top 
management may cooperate instead of opposing each other, and employers versus 
employees may be sources of conflict (Clarke 2004). In a similar vein, managerial 
motivations are more complex (Donaldson 1995), and there can be conflict between 
loyalty to the focal company’s shareholders and other financial interests (Muth and 
                                                          
13 Such as freedom to take risks vs. effective monitoring; controlling power vs. taking advantage of others; liquidity 
and diversity in the portfolios vs. resource commitment, accurate accounting information vs. misleading 
performance measures and distorted incentives for managers (Clarke 2004). 
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Donaldson 1998), which are under the influence of group interactions, corporate and 
ethnic cultures and inter-personal relationships and power (Tricker 1994b). 
The other limitation of agency theory is that it excludes more active participation by 
consumers, employees and other economic groups, and also excludes corporate 
responsibility to society (Institute of Directors 1995), with the reasoning that admitting 
this responsibility compromises efficiency (Brennan 2006). The agency theory focus 
is too narrow (Dalton et al. 2007, Clarke 2004) on wealth and economic efficiency 
(Keay 2011) and can be challenged (Anderson, Melanson, and Maly 2007) because of 
the mixed and weak supporting evidence for its assumed universal linkage between 
corporate governance and performance (Filatotchev and Boyd 2009, Donaldson and 
Davis 1994), in spite of investors’ belief in this concept (Cadbury 2000).     
The theory needs to be adapted to a new world context (Colli and Colpan 2016) and, 
with caution, brings other stakeholders into consideration (Parmar et al. 2010).  
2.1.2.2. Institutional Theory 
Organisations are set in an institutional context and constrained both formally (by laws 
and regulations) and informally (by norms and conventions) (Judge, Li, and Pinsker 
2010, Hung 1998). Organisations follow enduring and influential norms and beliefs, 
myths and symbols in order to gain legitimacy and social acceptance (Judge, Li, and 
Pinsker 2010, Donaldson 1995). This characteristic is called isomorphism (coercive, 
mimetic or normative), or similarity of structure, thought and action, within 
institutional environments (Judge, Li, and Pinsker 2010, Aguilera and Jackson 2010) 
and symbol management (Westphal and Zajac 2013). Structures and practices, once 
institutionalised at the societal, industrial or organisational level, can promote related 
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responses, thus furthering the process of institutionalisation (Luoma and Goodstein 
1999).  
Under institutional theory, business groups are the product of, and the efficient 
response to, a specific institutional environment (Colli and Colpan 2016). There are 
three levels of organisational structure: the technical (the technostructure), managerial 
(the top management), and institutional (the board), of which the board is a mediating 
structure between the organisation and the larger society (Mizruchi 1983). External 
institutions affect the board’s ability to direct and control the firm (Chakrabarty and 
Bass 2014), and their efforts to maintain the status quo of the organisation (Hung 1998). 
Board members learn and persuade each other that certain corporate governance 
structures and policies are efficient; they adopt symbolic practices, and tend to imitate 
each other (Van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009).  
Unfortunately, institutional theory is not well supported by empirical research. For 
example, it predicts that organisational structures will converge as they reflect the 
normative and cultural systems in society, but in fact variation is increasing 
(Donaldson 1995).  
2.1.2.3. Stakeholder Theory  
Contrary to agency theory, the stakeholder view sees that managers are not always 
opportunistic and that they deserve sufficient autonomy to influence corporate 
decisions for the key stakeholders’ benefit (Vilanova 2007).  
The stakeholder idea appeared in the 1970s in the United Kingdom, was obscured in 
the 1980s (Tricker 2000b) and re-emerged in the 1990s with the Royal Society for the 
Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA) inquiry – Tomorrow’s 
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Company, which called for an inclusive approach to corporations (Tricker 1996a). The 
approach urged that directors hold open dialogue with the investment community, and 
focus on long-term goals; this also recognised the potential of all people being in 
contact, of building a learning organisation, and new relationships between society, 
partners and government (“Corporate Governance Reports Précis” 1996). It is more a 
philosophy of relationships than a predictive theory (Tricker 2000c).  
Originating in 1960s at Stanford Research Institute (now SRI International), the 
concept of stakeholders covers whoever affects or is affected by the company’s goals, 
whose support is important for their achievement, meaning a company needs to ensure 
in the first place that its objectives are of the kind that do attract this support (Hitt, 
Freeman, and Harrison 2001, Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks 2003). The stakeholder 
groups are management, the board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders such as creditors, financial institutions, employees, 
trade unions, public interest groups and general society (World Bank 2006, Weimer 
and Pape 1999). They channel influence over the firm’s decisions by means such as 
political influence and use of the media (Filatotchev and Boyd 2009). In the context of 
a publicly listed company, the board is concerned with four main groupings of people 
and organisations: the business, government, regulation and other stakeholders 
(Tegner 1993).  
The assumptions under stakeholder theory are that values are a part of doing business 
and that business and ethics are connected (Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar 2004, 
Freeman 2009). Stakeholder theory supports pragmatism and pluralism (Freeman, 
Wicks, and Parmar 2004), accepting a collection of interacting, reinforcing or 
contradicting theories of business strategy instead of absolute objective definitions 
(Hitt, Freeman, and Harrison 2001, Hutton 1997).  
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How does the theory explain value creation? Attending to the powerless ones among 
stakeholders is an opportunity to create value for them and for companies, and dealing 
with stakeholders through their partial sharing of interests is a way to avoid trade-offs 
and value-destroying (Freeman 2009). Stakeholder-oriented strategies will distribute 
both benefits and harm between different groups to ensure their long-term support even 
when the results are not favourable for them (Hitt, Freeman, and Harrison 2001). The 
sharing of both favourable and unfavourable conditions among stakeholders creates 
trust and cooperation. This facilitates socially efficient exchange, leading to better 
outcomes (Amess and Howcroft 2001) and to the improvement of everyone’s 
circumstances (Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar 2004), such as higher profits and greater 
shareholder wealth (Donaldson and Davis 1994).   
Being descriptive, instrumental and normative (Hung 1998), stakeholder theory has 
gained support in both academia and practice. The number of academic articles on 
stakeholders has grown exponentially and the business press regularly discusses 
stakeholders (Demb and Neubauer 1992a). The participation of strategic stakeholders 
in the control system can increase the capability of firms to adjust to changes in their 
environment (Turnbull 1997). Stakeholder participation may be related to efficiency 
(Aguilera and Jackson 2010) and increasing interest in corporate social responsibility 
might also reflect recognition of the significance of stakeholder engagement (Aguilera, 
Florackis, and Kim 2016). Stakeholders’ expectations of corporate performance define 
the corporate life space for the company (Demb and Neubauer 1992a). Corporations 
are complex social systems (Goergen et al. 2010) and limited liability companies have 
to meet society’s expectations and play by the rules as a compensation for the privilege 
(of limited liability) (“Corporate Governance Update” 1996, Tricker 2011). 
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Stakeholder theory is an unlimited source of managerial prescriptions 14  (Phillips, 
Freeman, and Wicks 2003) and directs managers’ operations to ensure the purpose of 
firms and the associated responsibility to stakeholders (Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar 
2004). Lorsch and MacIver (1989) and Westphal and Zajac (2013) found corporate 
directors engaging constituencies such as journalists, security analysts and institutional 
fund managers even when they were not required to do so by law, by means of 
symbolic management, ingratiation and rendering of favours. This behaviour is at 
variance with Berle’s belief that only regulations and enforcement can direct corporate 
interests to someone other than shareholders (Vinten 2001). The King Report (1994) 
in South Africa (Solomon 2007), the American Law Institute Corporate Governance 
Project Principles (Winfrey 1996), the UK Companies Act 1985 (Cadbury 2002) and 
the Royal Society Inquiry (Goyder 1993) all require and follow a stakeholder approach. 
Even 29 states in the United States had adopted non-shareholder stakeholder statutes 
by 1991 (Luoma and Goodstein 1999) and in Pennsylvania, the 1990 Act allows 
actions regardless of any groups for the best corporate interest (Monks and Minow 
1995). Sheridan and Kendall (1992) and Demb (1996) are supporters of stakeholders 
in their definition of corporate governance.15 The most developed structures of the 
stakeholder model are found in German two-tier boards of directors (Monks and 
Minow 1995). 
The theory is, however, under challenge from several scholars. The theory lacks clarity 
about who stakeholders are and imposes the impossible task of balancing conflicting 
                                                          
14 “Stakeholders’ participation in corporate decision-makings, long-term contractual associations between the 
firm and stakeholders, trust relationships and business ethics are the main proposals for stakeholding 
management” (Letza, Sun, and Kirkbride 2004, 243).   
15 Sheridan and Kendall (1992) note corporate governance is to achieve the goal of the owners, care for employees, 
past, present and future, environment and the local community, customers and suppliers and is to comply with all 
the applicable legal and regulatory requirements. Demb (1996) defines corporate governance as a process to make 
corporations responsive (or accountable) to the rights and wishes of stakeholders.  
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interests among stakeholders (Keay 2011). Tricker (2000a) considered stakeholder 
theory to be naïve and unachievable because he understood the theory as meaning that 
companies are responsible for everyone affected by their activities. However, this is 
not the core idea of stakeholder theory as proposed by Freeman. Sternberg (1997) 
vigorously attacked stakeholder theory in that it is fundamentally misguided, incapable 
of providing better performance, and incompatible with all substantive objectives and 
corporate governance, and that it undermines both private property (denying the 
owners’ rights) and accountability. Other authors agree with Sternberg: stakeholder 
theory does not explicitly take into account the possibility that the absence or 
ineffectiveness of external institutions can strain the ability of boards to direct and 
control firms (Chakrabarty and Bass 2014), and it does not provide a comprehensive 
research framework that links corporate governance with the broader context of 
different organisational environments (Filatotchev and Boyd 2009). However, 
Turnbull (1997) strongly opposed this view. Also, Phillips, Freeman and Wicks 
reviewed and rejected some critical distortions (such as the theory is an excuse for 
managerial opportunism, cannot provide a sufficiently specific objective function for 
the corporation, and is primarily concerned with distribution of financial outputs or 
sees all stakeholders equally) and misinterpretations (the theory requires change to 
current laws, is socialism and refers to the entire economy, is a comprehensive moral 
doctrine or applies only to corporations) (Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks 2003).  
Aguilera and Jackson (2010) predicted that market-oriented and shareholder-centred 
systems may get closer to stakeholder-oriented systems in the context where 
democratic financial markets are made accountable to the public interest.  
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2.1.2.4. Management Hegemony  
The development of firms from a factory-level organisation with one group of owner-
controllers through a national corporation to a multidivisional company with semi-
autonomous units produces a group of highly specialist managers (Pitelis 2004). 
Managerism may form when there is collective action by owners and workers or when 
firms are lobbyists, whose goals are controlled by managers who gain power in politics 
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Other sources of management hegemony are: diluted 
ownership, information asymmetry between non-executive directors and top 
management, reduced dependence on shareholders thanks to retained earnings, board 
members being handpicked by management, and the presence of executives on the 
board (Hendry and Kiel 2004). Where the ownership is so widely spread, management 
who can select their successors have control (Berle and Means 1933). 
The theory is mainly concerned with internal workings and institutional forces within 
firms (Chakrabarty and Bass 2014, Hung 1998). The tenet of managerial hegemony is 
that boards are a legal fiction dominated by management (Hendry and Kiel 2004) and 
“ornaments on the Christmas tree” (Mace 1971).  
Management hegemony is slightly different from class hegemony, in which directors 
perceive themselves as an elite group, and behave in an elite way, dominating both the 
company organisation and its external linkages (Tricker 2012). In more detail, boards 
as a means of perpetuating the powers of the ruling capitalist elites reflect a shared 
commitment among the ruling capitalists to control social and economic institutions 
and wealth; they are chosen from the most influential, prestigious individuals, 
excluding other social groups, to protect the values and interests of the ruling 
capitalists (Zahra and Pearce 1989).  
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2.1.2.5. Resource Dependency Theory 
In contrast to institutional theory, which argues that companies act in accordance with 
the norms of the surrounding context in order to gain legitimacy, the central idea of 
resource dependency theory is that corporations are in their environment and need to 
acquire resources from that environment to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and 
that corporate internal operations such as selection of managers and changes and 
strategies are influenced by the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Organisations within the environment are independent actors who try to maintain 
discretion in order to contain uncertainty as well as adapting to alter the external 
constraints through mergers, joint ventures, trade associations, cartels or politics 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), or they try to balance survival and autonomy (Parkinson 
1993). Corporate policy is a product of negotiation between a company’s leadership 
and major actors in the environment (Ong, Wan, and Ong 2003). Resources can be 
physical, human and organisational; valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
resources such as flexibility and good timing contribute to corporate sustainable 
competitive advantages (Zhang 2010). Other resources are prestige, legitimacy, 
financing, industrial/functional/geographic knowledge, and diversity (Terjesen, Sealy, 
and Singh 2009). 
Boards of directors play a crucial role in the theory. The theory specifies board function 
(Chakrabarty and Bass 2014), which includes the interlocking of directorates that 
connects firms with their competitors and stakeholders (Hendry and Kiel 2004, Hung 
1998) in order to exert control and coopt resources (Muth and Donaldson 1998). This 
interlocking is also called “resource picking” and it combines with capacity building 
to form two major ways of acquiring competitive advantage (Markarian and Parbonetti 
2007). Boards assume the advisory and strategic role (Li and Aguilera 2008) via a “co-
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optative” mechanism using personal and professional networks (Hendry and Kiel 
2004, Van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009) and a dense web of board members that 
allows the firm to acquire strategic information from outside (Colli and Colpan 2016). 
Board directors supply companies with advice and counsel, legitimacy, and 
communication channels, depending on whether they are “insiders”, “business 
experts”, “support specialists” or “influentials” (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009, 
Carter et al. 2010).  
Resource dependency theory is also challenged by scholars. Parkinson (1993) 
recognised resource dependency theory’s focus on the exercise of power in 
organisations through a series of political processes that replace rational actions with 
manipulative ruses. However, organisations are not as political as this, and they are 
more rational instruments for doing work (Parkinson 1993). There is little evidence 
that board appointments are typically made in order to reduce resource dependence as 
a cooptation strategy when the interlocked individuals serve their home organisation 
rather than the focal company, a tendency that would even increase dependency and 
reduce organisational autonomy (Westphal and Zajac 2013). The theory does not take 
into account the effect of the absence or ineffectiveness of external institutions on a 
board’s ability to supply resources for the firm (Chakrabarty and Bass 2014). Another 
limitation is that it accepts the managerial dominance premise and leads to complex 
structural relationships among corporations (Ong, Wan, and Ong 2003). 
2.1.2.6. Stewardship Theory 
Similarly to stakeholder theory, stewardship theory removes some restrictive 
assumptions of the agency approach (Filatotchev and Boyd 2009). It assumes that 
behaviours are rational and legal, and ignores the dynamics of boards, inter-personal 
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perceptions of roles and the effect of board leadership (Tricker 1994b). This 
perspective recognises a range of non-financial motives for managerial behaviour 
(Hendry and Kiel 2004), such as the desire for recognition and achievement, 
conformity to work ethics and authority, and performance-driven self-satisfaction 
(Muth and Donaldson 1998).  
Stewardship theory is based on assumptions that are the opposite of agency theory. 
The theory is rooted in the original belief (central to company law) that directors can 
be trusted (Tricker 2011, Castro et al. 2009), are just and honest (Tricker 1994c), and 
managers are loyal to companies (Muth and Donaldson 1998). Managers contribute 
“knowledge, expertise, and commitment to the firm” in a self-directed manner 
(Chakrabarty and Bass 2014, 370). Because managers voluntarily do a good job, there 
is no need for an executive rewards strategy (Psaros 2009).  
As in other theories, the boards of directors assume a central role. Stewardship theory 
emphasises the performance function or the strategic role of a governing board (Hung 
1998). The re-allocation of corporate control from owners to professional managers is 
positive for managing complexity and profit maximisation because of the board’s 
depth of knowledge, expertise, information, experience and commitment (Muth and 
Donaldson 1998). As result, boards, as a strategic asset, seek collaboration and 
partnership with management, and a balance between collaboration and monitoring 
(Anderson, Melanson, and Maly 2007). This finding demonstrates a potential for 
seeing stewardship as complementary to agency theory.  
The theory has won support in capitalist environments with a close relationship 
between managers and owners, such as family businesses in which family members 
act as responsible “stewards” for the other family members (Colli and Colpan 2016). 
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Executive-dominated boards will lead to higher corporate performance and shareholder 
returns (Donaldson and Davis 1994). However, some scholars have pointed out 
weaknesses in the theory. Tricker (2000c) thought the theory too simple in the context 
of the rich complexity of modern corporate networks and strategic alliances. The theory 
has not taken into account the absence or ineffectiveness of external institutions that 
might impair the board’s ability to facilitate and empower the managers of the firm 
(Chakrabarty and Bass 2014). Popular themes in this research stream have been how 
CEO characteristics (tenure and experience), social ties, demographic similarity, and 
timing of directors’ appointments affect power and politics in the upper echelon of the 
organisation (Van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009). 
Taking a further step, some researchers advocate using a mix of theories for empirical 
investigation: “A multitheoric approach to corporate governance is essential for 
recognizing the many mechanisms and structures that might reasonably enhance 
organizational functioning” (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella quoted by Clark 2007, 26). 
Studies that combine two or more theories are not uncommon. Luoma and Goodstein 
(1999) explored how stakeholder theory was applied to corporations via institutional 
theory and demonstrated how the two theories together can provide intellectual 
resources that help researchers gain insight into the rules and norms governing 
stakeholder representation on corporate boards of directors. Donaldson (1990) 
addressed the corporate governance topic by two rival theories, agency theory and 
stewardship theory, and saw that each theory may be valid within its own domain. The 
combination of theories accommodated seemingly antithetic propositions and hence 
resisted attempts at falsification.  
All theories of corporate governance highlight the importance of the position of the 
board of directors. The following section discusses board roles.  
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2.2. Roles of the Board of Directors 
Since the forming of joint stock companies, a board of directors of no less than three 
people has been supposed to “manage” the corporation’s affairs (Lorsch and MacIver 
1989, Mace 1971).  
Although there is a common opinion that board directors are just “ornaments on the 
Christmas tree” (Mace 1971) or only for public ceremonial purposes (Cadbury 2002), 
board directors do play a role in controlling corporations (Mizruchi 1983, Lorsch and 
MacIver 1989). The practical role comes from directors’ power, based on their legal 
authority, confidence in expressing their ideas and views, their control of the agenda 
and discussion process, and their knowledge of the matter under discussion (Lorsch 
and MacIver 1989).  
In terms of structure, Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) and Cadbury (2002) 
considered boards of directors to be the bridge between the shareholders, the 
management and the standing of the company in the community. However, directors 
are often associated with criminality, fraud, negligence and minimum standards rather 
than wealth creation (Hilmer 1994).  
What do people expect boards to be? Tricker (2011) suggested that boards add value 
to the company. To do so, they need to balance monitoring and entrepreneurial roles 
(Sheridan and Kendall 1992) and be proactive (Anderson, Melanson, and Maly 2007) 
and creative in thinking of growth opportunities (Tuggle, Schnatterly, and Johnson 
2010). Boards need cohesiveness (Forbes and Milliken 1999), and to have a critical 
chair to facilitate and give enough time for open and frank discussion (Demb and 
Neubauer 1992a).  
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Board roles are varied as shown through different lenses in a summary by Zahra and 
Pearce (1989, 293) detailed in Table 2.3. Academic research on boards is wide-ranging 
but still overlooks important points. Researchers have not touched on board-level 
activities, board leadership, directors’ behaviour rooted in basic values (morality, 
honesty, integrity, decency, concern for others, respect and trust) and corporate 
governance below board level (Tricker 2012); they have omitted the role of directors 
in theoretical and practical insights (Tricker 2011). The following section reviews the 
role of individual directors in corporate governance.  
2.2.1. Directors’ General Duties 
Most studies focus usually on the roles, responsibilities and duties of the board of 
directors as a whole, not on individual directors. Individual directors’ roles can be 
extrapolated from the collective roles of boards. 
The role of the board is set out in a variety of regulations, including statutes, laws and 
self-regulatory codes of practice (Brennan 2006). The general roles are: establishing a 
vision, mission and values, setting strategy and structure, delegating to management 
and exercising responsibility to shareholders and other interested parties (Institute of 
Directors 1995, Berenbeim 1996, Lorsch and MacIver 1989); risk management 
(Brown and Brown 1999); control over the activities of the organisation (Stiles and 
Taylor 2001, Cadbury 2002); securing of (financial) resources, advising and 
counselling top management, and representing the company to the public (Demb and 
Neubauer 1992a, b). Boards have both conformance and performance functions 
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In the literature, six board roles are identified, derived from the different theories of 
corporate governance: linking role (providing valuable resources and information, and 
inter-firm connections), coordinating role (negotiating and compromising with 
different stakeholders), control role (monitoring management and corporate 
performance), strategic role (taking decisions on strategic change), maintenance role 
(maintaining the status quo of the organisation) and support role (supporting the 
decisions of professional management) (Hung 1998). Bezemer et al. (2007) 
emphasises the service task16 of non-executive directors in the Netherlands, which 
resembles the linking role and coordination role (Hung 1998). Westphal (1999) 
identifies three board roles: an administrative role, a role in managing resource 
dependence and a role enhancing organisational legitimacy. These classifications have 
been ratified by a number of authors (Keenan 2004, Stiles and Taylor 2001, Machold 
and Farquhar 2013, Melkumov, Breit, and Khoreva 2015, Zhang 2010, Zona and 
Zattoni 2007, Mace 1971, McNulty and Pettigrew 1996). 
The roles of boards are the roles and duties of their members, the individual directors. 
Boards and directors have to make a trade-off between these roles because of time 
limits (Van den Berghe and Baelden 2005). Therefore, certain roles have to be given 
a degree of priority, depending on the context such as the type of firm, CEO tenure, 
and directors’ specific positions. For example, CEO leadership development is more 
important at the beginning of CEO tenure, but a shift to control of managerial 
opportunism is more suitable when the CEO’s tenure progresses (Shen 2003). Engaged 
and active directors are good for entrepreneurial firms, but they should do more 
monitoring in autonomous corporations (Van den Berghe and Baelden 2005). Even 
                                                          
16 There are two parts of the service task: an external service task (acquiring access to resources through external 
relations of non-executives) and an internal service task (provision of advice and counselling to executive directors 
relying on the knowledge and cognitive capabilities of non-executives) (Bezemer et al. 2007).  
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within the area of supervision, a board’s role varies from doing nothing to keeping 
alert, challenging or getting in the way, being a nuisance or supportive (Van Hamel et 
al. 1998b, 287). Board involvement in strategy can increase from (passive) legalistic 
to (more active) review and (most active) partnership (Stiles and Taylor 1996) with 
the top level of a strategic board (Howard 1996).    
Demb and Neubauer (1992a, b) and the Institute of Directors (1995) have identified 
the paradoxes and dilemmas17 in a director’s job; these complement each other to form 
a more complete picture of the difficulties for directors in balancing one aspect against 
another: commerce versus the broader society; long term versus short term; closeness 
versus detachment; involvement versus independence; authority versus powerlessness; 
and driving versus monitoring.  
Courts apply two broad principles against which to assess the conduct of directors: 
duty of care (to act in a reasonable, prudent and rational way) and fiduciary duty (to 
act honestly and in good faith) (Bezemer et al. 2007, Lorsch and MacIver 1989). 
Directors’ conduct is also judged according to the business judgement doctrine (Lorsch 
and MacIver 1989). 
Boards take active decision making roles in a crisis such as the sudden death of the 
CEO or president or unsatisfactory management performance (Mace 1971). Although 
board directors may appear to be inactive, they have the power to determine decision 
making premises (the limit on operations, selecting, evaluating or and removing the 
management), so they have real control power even when they are selected by 
                                                          
17 Demb and Neubauer (1992a, b) list three paradoxes: legal authority for board versus actual exercise of power by 
management, independent judgment versus in-depth knowledge and intimacy, and collective group strength versus 
strong independent personalities. The Institute of Directors (1995) specifies four classic directorial dilemmas: 
entrepreneurial versus controlling, internally knowledgeable versus objective, short-term local issues versus broad 




management (Mizruchi 1983). Boards can influence any activity where managers 
require their resources or expertise (Desai 2016). Those who have mistakenly assumed 
that boards are powerless did so because they misinterpreted Berle and Means’ concept 
of management; they read “a board of directors and the senior officers of the 
corporation” as a management of officers only, separated from the board of directors 
(Mizruchi 1983, 427-8). Boards are one of three organisational structural levels: the 
institutional level that mediates between the organisation and society, and the technical 
and managerial levels (Mizruchi 1983). 
The directors’ key roles18 are oversight of the CEO, determining the direction of 
strategy, and doing the right thing (assuring that the corporation’s affairs are conducted 
in an ethical, legal and socially responsible fashion) (Lorsch and MacIver 1989, 75-6). 
Smithson (2004), in research on non-executive directors, adds more to the literature of 
directors’ roles from “policeman” who monitors board processes to “mentor” who 
makes a contribution to the board. Non-executive directors’ most important role is to 
provide an independent viewpoint, then make a greater contribution to strategic 
development and monitoring (Dulewicz, Gay, and Taylor 2007). 
Directors’ duties vary depending on the particular role they assume, whether as 
insiders (managers, employees, owners), business experts (active or retired executives 
from other companies with expertise and knowledge of the markets and competition), 
support specialists (supporting strategy formulation, providing expertise in law, capital 
markets, insurance, public relations, technological know-how, industrial knowledge), 
or community influentials (with networking skills and a reputation, such as retired 
                                                          
18 Directors’ influence on issues ranging from most influential to least: selecting CEO; change in ownership; 
evaluating new board members; nominating board members; approval of capital requirements; corporate social 




politicians, academics, or members of social organisations) (Markarian and Parbonetti 
2007). Corporate boards perform different tasks at the same time depending on the 
characteristics of the companies and of their environment (Rindova 1999). 
2.2.2. The Chair’s Roles and Duties 
Most of the research on boards focuses on boards’ duties, roles and tasks in general. 
Cadbury went a further step to be specific about individuals on the board, in particular 
the chair’s role: the typical role of a chair is leadership and a representational role, a 
“ceremonial function”, representing the company by presenting a public image at 
events such as annual general meetings (Cadbury 2002). Van Hamel et al. (1998b) 
conducted interviews in the Netherlands about board chairs’ roles and the results were: 
keeping independence, taking an emotional and relational point of view, establishing 
a sounding board, being a mediator and being a coach of the CEO.  
In terms of operations, the primary task of a chair is to chair their boards in their 
meetings to ensure efficient meetings within the time limit and with members 
contributing  cooperatively (Cadbury 2002, Van Hamel et al. 1998b). They bind the 
supervisory team, and reconcile possible conflicts of interests, initiate appointment and 
assessment processes, are the first contact in personal and confidential matters, are the 
most senior ambassador and advocate and most senior negotiator in the case of mergers 
and acquisitions (Van Hamel et al. 1998b). 
As a key member of the board team, a chair must also ensure the interests of the 
shareholders, the monitoring and replacing of the chief executive, providing leadership, 
reporting to the shareholders, protecting the company’s values, and ensuring 
investment in corporate renewal (Cadbury 2002).  
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The most detailed list of chair duties was suggested by Leblanc (2005), an expert in 
qualitative research of boards, that covers most of the aforementioned chair roles and 
duties.  
2.2.3. The Board of Directors’ Role of Conformance 
Bob Tricker, a leading figure in the area of corporate governance research, proposed 
to summarise boards’ activities according to a time horizon and direction (inward to 
or outward from the company). The two main functions of the board are conformance 
and performance (Tricker 1993a, 61). The conformance function focuses on the past 
and present orientation with the two components of monitoring and supervising, and 
providing accountability. On the other hand, the performance function considers the 
future in formulating strategy and in policy making. Both functions cover outward and 
inward directions (in relation to the company). The two aspects, conformance and 
performance, make up a comprehensive system of corporate governance (Banaga, Ray, 
and Tomkins 1995). The conformance or performance debate is also called the 
Cadbury–Hilmer debate, because the Cadbury Report of 1992 proposed conformance 
as focus while the Hilmer Report (Hilmer 1993b) suggested performance and value 
creation (continuously and effectively striving for above average performance, taking 
account of risk) as the emphasis of corporate governance (Tricker 1994a). 
Conformance is about compliance with laws, regulations, and having a reliable 
reporting system to ensure board and management accountability (Banaga, Ray, and 
Tomkins 1995). It is monitoring in nature, requiring regular evaluation to ensure 
control, setting limits, delegation policy and monitoring the delegated tasks, 
establishing proper rules to prevent mismanagement, discouraging corruption, 
monitoring the evolution of the outcomes, and comparing these with the financial plans 
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(Van den Berghe and Levrau 2004). The controlling role of boards is widely 
recognised as of the greatest importance in both academic and professional practice, 
such as the Korn-Ferry survey or in shareholder proposals for reform (Fields 2007, 
Filatotchev and Boyd 2009). There are two main types of control: ex-ante control via 
long-term strategy and ex-post control via short-term financial oversight (Nielsen and 
Huse 2010a). The conformance function of the board is aimed at protecting 
shareholder investments and assets rather than creating, generating and enhancing 
shareholder value (Brennan 2006).  
2.2.4. The Board of Directors’ Role of Performance  
Is it reasonable to expect the board to contribute to performance? The performance 
function of the board means ensuring that managers strive for above-market-average 
corporate performance (Hilmer 1993b). Boards do so, not by taking over the 
managerial function (especially in large public corporations), but by focusing on a 
critical review of proposals for developing corporate strategy, culture, policy and 
major decisions (Hilmer 1993b), and by seeking to change or replace management by 
setting goals, performance indicators, a time frame, and benchmarks (Hilmer 1994).  
In small corporations, active and able board members are a source of assistance, advice 
and counsel when it is what the management requests (Mace 1971, 1-2). In the eyes of 
the CEO, the board’s contribution to performance ranges from active contribution 
(contributing to good strategic decisions, keeping managers alert, forcing them to 
clarify what they want) to light assistance (being the most trusted adviser) (Van Hamel 
et al. 1998b). The board can play several roles, such as innovator, the power-broker 
dealing in resources, the mentor for management, and the group facilitator (Banaga, 
Ray, and Tomkins 1995, 130). A summary of board roles in two dimensions of 
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timespan (short-term versus long-term) and direction (internal versus external) is 
shown in Figure 2.1. The central role is to appoint and reward the CEO, supported by 
the roles for corporate policy, supervision, accountability and strategic thinking.   








Source: Hilmer (1994, 172) 
 
How does a board contribute to corporate performance? To improve corporate 
performance, boards need to understand core business issues such as core units, 
performance drivers and core customers (Fahy, Roche, and Weiner 2005). They give 
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strategic options and tap strategic opportunities (Westphal 1999); they provide useful 
contacts, contribute to the development of the organisation’s missions and goals, 
monitor management, and create a corporate identity (Cravens and Wallace 2001); and 
they interlock into other boards for a continuing supply of resources (O'Neal and 
Thomas 1995). Boards manage succession and talent, decide on mergers, partnerships 
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(Taylor 2007, 1027) and risk management and the risk-taking culture19 (Srivastav and 
Hagendorff 2016). They govern CEOs by broadening the strategic options available to 
them and defining their discretion (Wirtz 2011). A board’s ability depends on 
individual directors’ knowledge, experience and capabilities (Howard 1996), their 
effective time management and their use of committees (Lorsch and MacIver 1989), 
as well as on having a diverse board, engaging experts, and implementing board self-
evaluation. 
2.2.5. Performance and the Board’s Capacity and Ability 
Directors’ (management) experience, knowledge of industry and decision making 
capabilities enhance their advice and counselling value, hence their value creation 
(Bezemer et al. 2007). They use their information, expertise and other cognitive 
resources to enhance the understanding, creativity and coherence of the firm’s 
decisions (Castro et al. 2009). Changes in strategy occur when there are substantial 
changes in the cognition of top managers (Fields 2007) and the effectiveness of a board 
depends on its accumulated human capital (average tenure, professional diversity or 
range of educational backgrounds) (Filatotchev and Boyd 2009). A board’s capability 
to add value depends on its intellectual capital (Nicholson and Kiel 2004), and its 
ability to deploy competencies and capabilities (Markarian and Parbonetti 2007). 
Stakeholder theory conceives of the firm as a new-wealth-creating team and directors 
as impartial corporate coordinators who are corporate fiduciaries. Outside directors 
bring knowledge that the board requires either for the firm’s value-creating capabilities 
or for its markets. The knowledge creates value when employees deploy directors 
                                                          
19 Firm policies on bank risk, evaluating whether current and future risk-exposure is consistent with risk appetite, 
and designing executive incentives to promote prudent risk-taking (Srivastav and Hagendorff 2016).  
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intelligently and when they reconfigure directors incrementally to be innovative in 
products and processes (Kaufman and Englander 2005).  
There is a process to enable directors’ knowledge to contribute to creating corporate 
value; the starting point is that directors have the knowledge necessary for the 
corporation and the next step is to put such knowledge to work in the board’s decision 
making.  
2.3. Board Processes and Directors’ Human Capital  
Group processes such as board processes are mediators between group composition 
and performance (Nielsen and Huse 2010a). When directors fulfil their conformance 
or performance role, they have to conduct it via board processes. Castro et al. (2009) 
cited Korac-Kakabadse et al. (2001) to define a board’s process as decision making 
activities, its style, the frequency and the length of board meetings, and the formality 
of board proceedings and board culture on the evaluation of directors’ performance. 
Examples of board processes are staff support, chairship, committees and lead 
directors (Ward 1997), the balance of power and responsibility, judgement capacity 
and board culture (Demb 1996), the behaviour and the involvement of directors (from 
minimal to maximum) (Srivastav and Hagendorff 2016), and critical board discussion, 
interaction and the exchange of information (Zona and Zattoni 2007). Some other 
board processes are delegation20 (Van den Berghe and Baelden 2005), self-evaluating 
and correcting procedures (Lorsch, Berlowitz, and Zelleke 2005), joint board meetings 
and board committees (Bezemer et al. 2007). All are aimed at corporate directing, an 
integrative process of governing, strategising and leading (Pye 2002). 
                                                          
20 Delegation is one of the main methods for board control, including four steps of initiation (generation and 
selection), ratification, implementation, and monitoring, that fails when management exceeds its authority without 
the board’s knowledge or consent (Van den Berghe and Baelden 2005).  
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The board creates value through the interactions of board members that involve trust, 
emotions and power (Huse 2007). Organisational theories (Melkumov, Breit, and 
Khoreva 2015) and a cognitive approach are part of the framework needed to 
understand corporate governance’s everyday situations, including board dynamics and 
decision making (Aguilera and Jackson 2010, Huse 2007). Board processes are the key 
to understanding board effectiveness (Leblanc 2005, Nielsen and Huse 2010a). 
Jonnergård and Svensson (1995) demonstrate board behaviour (emphasis and 
involvement) as the mechanisms that transform board inputs (tenure, background, 
attitudes, etc.) into output (board performance, board policies) as demonstrated in 
Figure 2.2.  







Source: Jonnergård and Svensson (1995, 70) 
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board network relations may be more influential than a formal network (Bezemer et al. 
2007). Boards act as a collective (Brennan 2006) via debate, teamwork and 
cohesiveness (Finkelstein and Mooney 2003) but members with large egos and strong 
opinions also play a critical role (Stiles and Taylor 2001). Personal will and character, 
rather than reasoned argument alone, often rule in the boardroom (Hilmer 1993a). 
Ways in which board members can wield influence are assertiveness, persuasion, 
coalition formation, pressure and blocking, consultation, manipulation, exchange and 
rational persuasion; the method chosen depends on the directors’ sources of power,21 
whether it is personal status and prestige, or the external legitimacy of groups (such as 
shareholders and regulators), knowledge of the host sector and/or business, the quality 
and extent of personal networks inside and outside the board, residual power to reward 
and sanction, and power derived from good quality relationships with the chair or chief 
executive (McNulty and Pettigrew 1996). Udueni (1999) classified four main types of 
power: structural, ownership, prestige and expert power.22 Board decision making is 
complex and cognitive in nature, so is strongly affected by cognitive conflict, effort 
norms and use of knowledge and skills (Zona and Zattoni 2007), that are a part of a 
board’s intellectual capital. 
Intellectual capital provides the board with attributes including human capital, social 
capital, structural capital and cultural capital, of which the board’s human capital is 
the individual knowledge, skills, and abilities possessed by directors (Nicholson and 
Kiel 2004). The board intellectual capital supports executing board roles, and that is 
                                                          
21  The methods of influence most used by non-executive directors are: persuasion, coalition formation; 
assertiveness; consultation and pressure. By contrast, the methods of influence most used by chairs are 
assertiveness; pressure; persuasion and blocking (McNulty and Pettigrew 1996). 
22 Structural power is based on a formal hierarchical position. Ownership power originates from equity ownership. 
Expert power is rooted in individual competence, experience and ability to drive the firm to success, prosperity and 




the transformational process that turn inputs into outputs (Nicholson and Kiel 2004, 
444).  
A director’s power is derived from their professional background, personality and 
expertise, the latter being the most important, especially when facing financial 
difficulties. To improve board process, the board needs to have members with 
appropriate expertise in different areas and with strong communication skills 
(Finkelstein and Mooney 2003). Without good communication, directors may fail to 
put their knowledge to board use, to bring in diverse views and opinions to improve 
the monitoring performance of the board (van Ees, van der Laan, and Postma 2008).   
The board’s decision making culture and its working structure are two elements that 
strongly influence information exchange and decision making (Nielsen and Huse 
2010a). However, there is a lack of research on such board processes (access to 
information, directors’ education, consulting by the board of outside advisers) (Van 
den Berghe and Levrau 2004, Institute of Directors 1995) and real boardroom life 
(information flow, meeting content and frequency, meeting conduct, delegation and 
other dimensions of the chair’s and the board’s relationship with management) 
(Machold and Farquhar 2013, Hilmer 1993a), and directors’ perceptions, values and 
beliefs (Tricker 1993b).  
2.4. Directors’ Competencies  
The review of board roles and processes highlights the influence of directors’ abilities on the 
board’s performance. The mechanism is that individual director and board attributes interact 
with company characteristics to form board responsibilities, which then result in the board’s 
eventual actions (Cravens and Wallace 2001, 3) as demonstrated in Figure 2.3 below. The use 
of directors’ knowledge and skills (which determine board effectiveness) is positively 
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associated with the board’s task performances (Zona and Zattoni 2007). In a capability-
building process, the primary task of the board is to provide specific knowledge in creating a 
competitive advantage (Markarian and Parbonetti 2007), which is one source of corporate 
capital (Keenan and Aggestam 2001). 











Source: Cravens and Wallace (2001, 3) 
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1993a), and several researchers (Kravatzky 2017, Mathew, Ibrahim, and Archbold 
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The United Kingdom was the first country to develop competency standards for board 
directors, led by the Institute of Directors (Tricker 1993b). The competencies needed 
differ according to the type of director, whether a chair or member or outside director. 
2.4.1. The Chair 
Van Hamel et al. (1998b) describe what people wish of a chair, whether very 
experienced or widely respected, or the most senior director of the entire company, 
with undisputed authority. The chair needs to be a strong leader without being 
dominant, an impartial person with drive and activeness in decision making (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau 2004). Outstanding chairs have great integrity, high ethical 
standards, and an acute critical faculty to take a lead on corporate governance matters 
(Dulewicz, Gay, and Taylor 2007). Leblanc (2005) also specifies competencies and 
behaviours expected from a chair. The chair should have extensive knowledge of the 
company’s business and the industry, the skills and kind of conduct to make the board 
a cohesive team and to build a healthy corporate governance culture, together with 
strong interpersonal skills, and an effective chair “style”. 
2.4.2. Members of the Board 
Good and effective board directors need to have analytic capabilities, assertiveness, 
effective communications, and collegial good manners as well as credibility and 
governing eligibility. They should be responsive to stakeholders and committed to self-
improvement and have continuing capacity to serve on the board (attendance, the 
number of boards they serve, independence) (Berenbeim 1996). They also need to be 
critical while maintaining a comfortable and constructive climate (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau 2004), and have business sense, integrity and decisiveness (Cravens and 
Wallace 2001). After comprehensive research on board directors’ competencies, 
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Dulewicz, Gay, and Taylor (2007) suggest a comprehensive list of desirable features, 
including integrity, a critical faculty, perspective and vision ability, willingness to 
change, listening ability, and good judgement.  
Technically, members of the board of directors must have a minimum level of 
knowledge about accountancy, law and the industry and also have corporate directing 
experience because board structures are “brought alive” by people (Van den Berghe 
and Levrau 2004). Skills necessary for directors are organisational awareness, good 
judgement, financial expertise (useful in evaluating financial policy and alternatives) 
(Cravens and Wallace 2001), and decision making capabilities (Bezemer et al. 2007). 
This covers the ability to plan, delegate, appraise and develop others, to focus on 
achievement when risk taking; resilience and independence are needed (Ingley and 
Van der Walt 2001). 
Directors serving on a board should be well matched in their personalities, education, 
occupation, function and experience (Van den Berghe and Levrau 2004) to encourage 
a cognitive fit (Bezemer et al. 2007). O'Neal and Thomas (1995) call it compatibility, 
including: of institutions, geographic constituencies, ages, contacts and leadership. 
They recommend selection of new members should be based on the specific 
knowledge and capabilities needed by the firm. 
Non-executive directors can bring to the board a breadth of knowledge and experience 
which the company’s own management may not possess, such as independence and 
objectivity in board decision making (Spira and Bender 2004). Among the 
qualifications of candidates to serve as outside directors, standing and title as leaders 
in their field are essential; the position of an outside director provides an opportunity 
to learn and earn prestige (Mace 1971). 
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Heracleous (1999) calls the qualities ‘traits’ and there are traits that can distinguish 
leaders, including physical traits, abilities and personality characteristics23 such as 
drive, leadership motivation, honesty and integrity, self-confidence, cognitive ability 
and knowledge of the business. Directors’ core competencies are those critical for 
success and the competencies do not cover all those required to carry out the role but 
are pointers for success as a director (Tricker and Lee 1997). 
 The Institute of Directors also specifies what knowledge directors need to have. This 
is the knowledge specific to boards (corporate governance, board roles, relationships 
and processes, board standards of good practice, corporate finance and accounting 
principles and practices), and specific to the company and the business environment 
(political, economic, social, cultural issues, key trends and development, public affairs 
and communication) (Tricker and Lee 1997, 92). 
Having access to a wide variety of information is likely to improve both the board’s 
current and future strategic performance of tasks. Effective information exchange 
among board members helps to create this diversity. Competent directors can avoid 
biases in information exchange. Only job-related diversity in functional, industrial and 
educational backgrounds contributes to this advantage (Zhang 2010). Effective boards 
require capable individuals who contribute wide company experience, financial 
expertise and credibility with shareholders (Long, Dulewicz, and Gay 2005). 
For example, in the banking industry, board diversity, prior banking experience and 
                                                          
23 “The leader is characterized by a strong drive for responsibility and task completion, vigor and persistence in 
pursuit of goals, venturesomeness and originality in problem solving, drive to exercise initiative social situations, 
self-confidence and sense of personal identity, willingness to accept consequences of decision and action, readiness 
to absorb interpersonal stress, willingness to accept frustration and delay, ability to influence other persons' 
behavior, and capacity to structure social interaction systems to the purpose at hand” (Stogdill 1974, quoted by 




financial expertise, appropriate board demographics and educational qualifications 
may allow board members to better assess the impact of bank policies.24 Financial 
expertise is essential to understand the complex workings of the firm and the risks 
associated with the firm’s policies, but many bank boards lacked sufficient financial 
expertise to identify and control exposure to risk in the years preceding the global 
financial crisis (Srivastav and Hagendorff 2016).  
2.4.3. Training 
Investors are looking for directors who will take intelligent risks and grow their 
businesses, so director training is important for investors and financial analysts 
(Cadbury 2000). Around the world, the demand for skilled directors is increasing while 
the supply is decreasing (Brown and Brown 1999, Linck, Jeffry and Yang 2009), so 
training for directors in professionalism and in the complexity of board tasks is in great 
demand (Van den Berghe and Levrau 2004). Board training should be mandatory; 
directors have to develop a sustainable and productive style of interaction, and relevant 
competencies (Heracleous 1999). They need to develop a broader mindset and new 
skills and general expertise 25  via education, work experience and functional 
background (Li and Aguilera 2008). 
However, directors have become less interested in learning, and there is a limit to their 
acquisition of knowledge if there is no incentive to put pressure on them (Shen 2003). 
On-job training appears to be the best way, by building up boards with people with 
differing work experiences and knowledge (Wirtz 2011) and with board orientation 
                                                          
24 Board demographics such as executive teams composed of younger members and more women increase bank 
risk, while boards with a higher representation of individuals with a doctorate are negatively related to bank risk 
(Srivastav and Hagendorff 2016). 
25 General human capital refers to an individual’s expertise that is useful in multiple contexts, whereas specific 
human capital refers to human capital that is embedded in the firm and will lose its value when separated from it 
(Li and Aguilera 2008). 
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programs for new members (Tricker and Lee 1997).  
2.4.4. Power  
The power of control means the power to exercise virtually all the rights of ownership 
(Mace 1971). It is the potential to carry out will even when facing resistance, or to get 
things done indirectly by using others. Power in a relationship consists of making other 
individuals or organisations dependent. Power is normally informal and structured 
around uncertainty; and elites, the powerful people, possess cross-organisation power 
(Fleming and Spicer 2014). 
Fleming and Spicer (2014) specify four faces of power (coercion, manipulation, 
domination and subjectification) 26  and four sites of power (power enacted “in”, 
“through”, “over” and “against” organisations). Coercion and manipulation are easily 
recognised because they are exposed in acts influencing others’ behaviours in 
particular situations, but domination and subjectification are systemic and invisibly 
expressed in mobilisation of institutional, ideological, and discursive resources to 
shape organisational activities.  
As a part of an elite group, directors’ power comes from sources such as their legal 
authority, their confidence in expressing their ideas and views, their knowledge of the 
matter under discussion, their control over the agenda and the discussion process and 
unity. Their power may be limited due to minimal time available at meetings, lack of 
expertise, lack of information, little time for preparation, the dominance of the CEO 
                                                          
26 Coercion: having someone do something that the actor would have not done if not requested; manipulation: 
usually applying on agenda setting, by limiting the issues for discussion, establishing boundaries and anticipated 
outcomes of various behaviours, and influencing decision making processes; domination: influencing by 
constructing dominating ideological values; and subjectification: influencing by determining an actor’s sense of 




and other outsiders or inside directors. When there is a shortfall such as this, many 
directors remain silent to save face, which makes them powerless (Lorsch and MacIver 
1989). In fact, boards of directors do often lack in-depth know-how in auditing, risk 
management and communication (Hilb 2005a). 
As reviewed above, directors’ expertise, especially financial knowledge, must be 
possessed by directors of all types, as it is essential for board decisions on policies. It 
is the source of power that determines directors’ influence over the board in general. 
Because of the importance of this expertise, this thesis explores board directors’ 
understanding of one aspect of finance, financial derivatives. 
2.5. Financial Derivatives 
2.5.1. Overview  
A derivative can be defined as the sale of a promised asset at an agreed price and at a 
future time by a method among agreed alternatives;27 the promised asset can be cash, 
commodities or something else, and the agreed price can be referred to as any standard 
of measure (Hull 2014, Swan 2000, Kolb and Overdahl 2010, Swan and McKenna 
1999). The agreed settlement alternatives may be expressed or implied by market 
practice (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). Derivatives are an instrument whose value is based 
upon, or derived from, some underlying index, reference rate (for example interest 
rates or currency exchange rates), security, commodity or other assets (Swan 2000, 
                                                          
27 The function of a derivative is to provide a “flexible” choice of possible settlement, that is performance, 
opportunities including (1) delivery of the underlying asset (even though, at the time of making the agreement, 
neither party possesses the promised asset); (2) assignment of the derivative contract to another party; (3) 
substitution of another agreed asset (including cash) for the stated underlying asset (Swan and McKenna 1999). 
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10). Typical forms of financial derivatives are forwards, futures, options and swaps;28 
in addition to these, there are structured products29 (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). 
Derivatives are used for financing future activities, securing supplies, and managing 
risk and speculation, or are simply something to sell (Swan 2000). The true value of a 
derivative to the related parties is that the creation of a derivatives agreement triggers 
a time-limited opportunity to exploit a flexible range of commercial opportunities 
(Swan and McKenna 1999).  
Derivatives seems to be a natural form of life and business; they are nearly 4,000 years 
old, originating in ancient Mesopotamian times (Swan 2000). Since their initiation, 
commodities and financial derivatives experienced intermittent prohibition and 
acceptance, until finally they were recognised and enforced by laws across national 
boundaries. It has taken centuries for common law to conclude that derivatives and 
future delivery agreements should be enforceable. Finally, after the turn of the 
twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court began to make decisions 
recognising that future speculation was a legitimate part of commerce (Swan 2000).  
There is a recurring impulse to eliminate derivatives markets through legislative action 
(Kolb and Overdahl 2010). However, derivatives are now well recognised, accepted 
and legalised as a part of normal business in a number of economies, which 
demonstrates their substantive attractiveness to the business world.  
                                                          
28 A forward contract: a sale of a promise solely to deliver a commodity in the future. A futures contract: a sale of 
a promise either to deliver a commodity or pay its market value in the future. A contract for differences: a sale of 
promise solely to pay the market value of a commodity in the future. An option: a sale of a promise to keep open 
the opportunity to purchase one of the foregoing promises at an agreed price for a fixed period of time. A swap: a 
trade of one such promise for another (Swan and McKenna 1999). 
29 Structured products are financial instruments that combine cash assets and/or derivatives to provide a risk/reward 
profile not otherwise available or only available at high cost in the cash market (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). 
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2.5.2. Uses of Financial Derivatives  
The use, and understanding, of derivatives is still developing, as were stocks before 
1929, 30  and this is likely to cause trouble until regulations and training are 
implemented so that the marketplace can understand and manage these products (Zask 
1996). The business world has seen the gradual evolution of ever more creative risk 
management; from the family and private property to derivatives and structured 
financing arrangements, it is the story of the advances and retreats of prudent risk 
management expansions (Kolb and Overdahl 2010, 266–7). 
Financial derivatives are widely appreciated for their characteristics of leverage,31 
customisation and opportunities for making money from flows, positions-taking or 
arbitrage. A leveraged position is one where a change in a risk factor does not always 
produce a proportional change in profit or loss. With “customisation”, it is sometimes 
possible to achieve exactly the risks one wants and not those one does not want 
(Murphy 2008).  
In general, financial derivatives are for hedging and speculation (Kolb and Overdahl 
2010). During their history, derivatives have been used for financing future activities 
(for example Islamic armies, Italian cities, running city governments, expansion and 
maintenance of religious institutions and the commercial enterprises of the medieval 
Roman Catholic Church), securing supplies (of food, wool, naval stores, cotton, rye 
and forgiveness), managing risk32 and speculation, and being simply something to sell 
                                                          
30 Before 1929, stocks were widely considered to be extremely speculative while bonds were for the prudent 
investor. The Great Crash and events since have taught the financial community how to manage a stock market, 
and equities are now core holdings of pension funds and trusts (Zask 1996). 
31 If you are long £1000 of a single stock and it moves 2%, you make £20 because you are not leveraged. With 
derivatives, a £1000 investment could produce an investment that changes by any amount between nothing and 
thousands of pounds for a 2% move (Murphy 2008). 
32 Managing risk by two ways: fixing the prices of future assets; and shifting the risk to parties who wish to bear it 
for reasons of their own (Swan 2000). 
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– promises and intellectual capital (Swan 2000, 296-9). In addition to real hedging and 
speculation, two more uses of financial derivatives are tax optimisation33 and arbitrage 
including regulatory arbitrage,34 accounting or perception arbitrage,35 and funding 
arbitrage36 (Murphy 2008). 
At a social level, derivatives markets serve to mitigate risk (risk forecasting, 
transferring) in a non-intrusive, inexpensive manner;37 to allow price discovery; to 
promote the efficient allocation of resources to their most highly valued uses over time; 
and to enhance opportunities for investors to access alternative asset classes and 
mitigate “underinvestment problems” by creating opportunities for asset-based 
financing; and as a result, overall, reduce business failure rates. The wider availability 
of consumer products in high-risk markets increases opportunities for firms to invest 
in innovative but risky production technologies, and allows the redistribution of risks 
to those parties most willing and able to bear and manage them (Kolb and Overdahl 
2010). Such “social functions” make derivatives popular and overcome prohibitions, 
and people think they do more good than harm to society (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). 
People whose behaviour is most likely to be altered as a result of the various initiatives 
are more likely to criticise them than those parties who will benefit from the ideas 
(Solomon 2007, 72).   
                                                          
33 Tax optimisation. Derivatives may have a different tax treatment from other investments or they may permit tax 
liabilities to be transformed or relocated, enhancing the user’s tax position (Murphy 2008). 
34 Regulatory arbitrage. The capital required to take a position via a derivative may be significantly different from 
that via another route, or it may be possible to pass on an insignificant amount of risk via a derivative and yet make 
a significant change to the capital required (Murphy 2008).  
35 Accounting or perception arbitrage. Derivatives may permit a different accounting treatment for a risk, and they 
may reduce earnings volatility, or otherwise enhance the perceived attractiveness of an investment to third parties 
(Murphy 2008). 
36 Funding arbitrage. Derivatives may permit risks to be taken without a balance sheet being used, they may allow 
off-balance-sheet funding, or they may permit both (Murphy 2008). 
37  Derivative contract positions are unfunded today, are carried out off the balance sheet, and the financial 
requirements for initiating a derivative contract are just sufficient for a future performance guarantee of 
counterparty obligations (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). 
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2.5.2.1. Hedging  
Hedging is the shifting of the price risk from one party to a counterparty who enters 
into the opposite side of the contract to protect either a long or a short cash market 
position,38 or to minimise the risk of financial loss from an adverse price change (Kolb 
and Overdahl 2010). Derivatives contracts are zero sum in the sense that the buyer’s 
gains equal the seller’s losses, so that adding all gains and losses gives a total equal to 
zero (Kolb and Overdahl 2010, 333). Three kinds of hedging are straight hedge, 
options hedge and speculative hedge39 (Zask 1996). 
Hedging adds value to a firm by reducing expected taxes or financial distress costs, by 
mitigating underinvestment, or by allowing a firm to increase its debt capacity and 
take advantage of debt tax-shields without an increase in risk. It is valuable for firms 
with strong internal corporate governance and insignificant for firms with weak 
internal governance (Allayannis, Lel, and Miller 2012). 
2.5.2.2. Speculation 
Speculators trade with the objective of achieving profits through the successful 
anticipation of price movements, by taking on a financial risk that they previously did 
not possess (having no assets at risk) (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). Speculators are 
important for market liquidity and formation (the risk purchasing side) (Swan 2000). 
                                                          
38 A long cash market position (i.e. one owns the cash commodity) or a short cash market positions (i.e. one plans 
on buying the cash commodity in the future) (Kolb and Overdahl 2010). 
39 Straight hedge: Forwards, Futures. 
Options hedge: An option hedge is like buying insurance. The goal is to pay a price for protection from specific 
events. It is an attempt to keep a value above, below, or within a range, or outside of a price range for a finite period 
of time. The goal is to purchase the possibility of exposure without having to assume it unless it is needed.  
Speculative hedge: An attempt to protect the value of an asset by using a proxy when the hedging instrument is not 
a derivative of the asset or when the historical relationship between the hedging instrument and the underlying asset 




Derivatives are “fascinating, and they are in the process of changing our financial 
environment as a mechanism for ever increasing efficient allocation of capital” (Rulle 
1996, 48). As presented in derivatives scandals, to make sure that derivatives are used 
in a prudent manner, we need the education, involvement, and the support of senior 
management and directors (Seltzer 1996).  
2.5.3. Financial Derivatives Scandals  
The rapid growth of derivative markets, along with the failures of large derivatives 
users, including the American Insurance Group, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, 
has been accompanied by concerns about the risks these instruments pose not only to 
users but also to the financial system as a whole (Kolb and Overdahl 2010, 22). 
Another point of view is that derivatives markets pose an untold risk to users, are home 
to unbridled speculation, and are unchecked sources of systemic risk (Kolb and 
Overdahl 2010).  
Four factors common to all derivatives scandals are exceptionally large wagers based 
on faulty strategies or the wild speculative activities of rogue traders; significant 
exogenous shocks that are difficult to predict and extremely rare; dysfunctional risk 
management systems and the lack of access to reliable sources of liquidity when 
needed most (Kolb and Overdahl 2010, 313). High leverage is the advantage that 
derivatives have compared to the cash markets; however, it is also the root of virtually 
all derivative scandals and disasters (Kolb and Overdahl 2010, 314). 
An industrial conglomerate, Metallgesellschaft (MG), incurred significant losses in 
1993 because its German-based supervisors had a poor understanding of the cash flow 
risks associated with the stack-and-roll hedges used by American-based MGRM 
(Metallgesellschaft Refining and Marketing) and with its method for evaluating the 
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risks40 (Kolb and Overdahl 2010, 325). The €4.9 billion equity index trading loss at 
Société Generale in 2008 was blamed on the fragmented controls at the bank, which 
prevented a healthy overview of firm-wide risks (Kolb and Overdahl 2010, 326).  
Enron became famous for its dexterity in handling risk management derivatives, as 
well as for its abilities in the area of commodity trading derivatives; it transformed 
itself from an energy company to a predominantly financial and energy trading 
company, trading financial derivatives as well as energy contracts and effectively 
running a gas pipeline. The special purpose entities41 themselves led the company to 
financial collapse in 2001 (Solomon 2007, 33). In the case of Barings in 1995, the 
senior management did not understand the technicalities of derivatives trading. The 
Barings case channelled attention toward the area of risk management and internal 
control (Solomon 2007, 59). Granite Partners, a New York hedge fund, lost US$600 
million in mortgage derivatives when they distorted the term “hedge” for marketing 
needs and had problems with models (Zask 1996).  
The 2007–2008 financial crisis originated from sub-prime market failures and was 
boosted by financial engineering with financial derivatives. This raised the question of 
whether directors, especially independent non-executive directors, understand 
strategic models and sophisticated securitised instruments and the risks their 
companies can face (Tricker 2012).  
                                                          
40 Supervisors did not realise that the success or failure of these hedges cannot be evaluated by interim cash flows. 
MGRM’s German managers also failed to grasp that part of the problem was an accounting illusion, due to the 
difference between German rules, which required German-based companies to value their positions using the 
lower-of-cost-or-market (LCM) method, and US rules, which permitted hedge accounting (Kolb and Overdahl 
2010, 325). 
41 The non-consolidated, off-balance-sheet vehicles were used to hide a company’s liabilities from the balance sheet, 
in order to make the financial statements look much better than they really were (Solomon 2007, 33).  
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Human judgement42 determines the success of any risk-management plan. Risk is at 
the core of speculative hedging; poor judgement causes most financial disasters by 
letting one of the risks (correlation, ratio, execution, liquidity, model risks) get out of 
control. This occurs slowly, and the biggest losses normally follow the biggest 
successes43 (Zask 1996).  
The three best-known failures that lead to derivative losses are those of knowledge, 
accountability and judgement.44  Derivatives are likely to continue to cause more 
problems, since the knowledge and failures of accountability and judgement that 
caused the previous disasters still persist. The lack of knowledge is a matter of the 
board and management not properly understanding derivatives, and this can be 
remedied by training, reading and increasing experience. Most executives do not have 
time to study the derivatives positions until it is too late. The biggest derivatives risk 
does not come from the markets but from the people working with derivatives (Zask 
1996). 
2.6. Directors’ Knowledge of Financial Derivatives  
For the public at large, financial derivatives have long been the most mysterious and 
least understood of all financial instruments (Gordon, Hayt, and Marston 1996, Swan 
2000, Klein 1996, Schwimmer 1994, Masheane 1998, Kolb and Overdahl 2010, Zask 
1996). While some financial derivatives are fairly simple, others are quite complicated 
                                                          
42 Judgement is the ability to make good decisions (Zask 1996). 
43 A big win gives people the courage to make huge bets. Big bets are easy to make (and hide) with derivatives. 
Big bets cause disasters (Zask 1996). 
44 Accountability failure: That means the controls are not in place to have derivatives used in an organisation, there 
being no policy statement and evaluation procedures. 
- Policy statement: what derivatives are supposed to do, what kinds of risks can be managed if there is hedging, 
how much a firm is willing to lose if things go wrong, how derivatives are valued, and what kinds of instruments 
can be used. 
- Evaluation procedure: who is responsible for what and how tasks are supposed to be carried out. 
The third is judgement failure: overconfidence (Zask 1996). 
91 
 
and require considerable mathematical and statistical ability to understand fully (Kolb 
and Overdahl 2010). The very power of these financial derivatives makes them 
potential for accident and tools for mischief (Kolb and Overdahl 2010).  
Since the widely publicised derivative losses of the early 1990s, one of the most 
important aspects of control of derivatives among large United Kingdom companies is 
board-level approval (Marsden and Prevost 2005), since the board plays an important 
role in the decision to use derivatives (Marsden and Prevost 2005). 
Lel (2012) conducted an exhaustive survey and tests to find out whether corporate 
governance at both company level and country level significantly influences the 
decision by firms to use currency derivatives. Lel found that strongly governed firms 
tend to use derivatives to hedge currency exposure and overcome costly external 
financing; weakly governed firms appear to use derivatives mostly for managerial 
reasons. Derivative contracts are particularly appealing to managers for speculation 
purposes because of the leverage they can provide, and because of the complexity of 
interpreting the consequences of their use on firms’ operations; because of the limited 
disclosure requirements in many countries, managers perhaps feel less constrained by 
investor scrutiny (Lel 2012).  
Lel’s explanation is strongly supported by research by Buckley and Van Der Nat (2003) 
into the knowledge of and attitude to financial derivatives in 80 non-executive 
directors in the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The finding was that one-third of directors were reasonably knowledgeable about 
derivatives’ workings and the risks while two-thirds were not, and so relied on 
executives, auditors and the audit committee for reassurance; 75 per cent supported 
the use of derivatives in appropriate situations while 15 per cent were suspicious and 
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10 per cent were not sure. As result, only 75 per cent thought that derivatives deserved 
to be discussed by the board (Buckley and Van Der Nat 2003).  
In other research, Schwimmer (1994) found that 65 per cent of respondents 
(derivatives dealers) said their boards of directors had some knowledge but relied 
heavily on the next level of management on the use of derivatives, while 8 per cent 
admitted that their directors had little understanding of them. Among end-user 
companies, only 18 per cent of directors had a good understanding, while 29 per cent 
had little understanding, and 53 per cent had a sufficient understanding (Schwimmer 
1994). 
This is problematic because Attia (2012) had confirmed previous literature indicating 
that accounting manipulations and derivatives are complementary income-smoothing 
instruments. Accounting manipulations complement the lack of derivatives in 
managing operational risk, and derivatives can be used to cover up opportunistic 
accounting manipulations (Attia 2012). In other words, derivatives are as dangerous 
as accounting manipulation; and if directors are concerned about accounting 
manipulations, they should apply the same level of concern to financial derivatives. 
Therefore, if directors, especially non-executive directors, do not understand what 
executives are using derivatives for, they cannot impose the appropriate controls to 
ensure accounting outcomes that best benefit stakeholders. 
The board of directors, together with financial management and the external auditors, 
are the trio of good corporate governance (Psaros 2009). On the other hand, the 
company’s top directors are directly responsible for the use of creative accounting to 
conceal debt and massage reported profits, in order to bolster the company’s share 
price; whereas they are also responsible for detecting unethical practices and corporate 
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reputation risks (Solomon 2007, 40). The need for board-level authorisation and 
comprehension of derivatives trading policies by boards has long been a concern of 
the Group of Thirty (G30) – an international body of very senior representatives of the 
private and public sectors and academia, specialising in international economic and 
financial issues – which recommends that the board approve all the purposes and uses 
of derivatives, limits and control procedures (Little 1999). A board’s responsibility 
was even recognised by a court when an Indiana Court of Appeals case found that a 
board had breached its duty of care by failing to supervise the manager and by not 
becoming aware of the essentials of hedging in a way to allow it to monitor the 
business effectively. This was a situation where the board did not understand the 
products and their inherent risks, did not even want to know about them, and did not 
have the means to control the risks (Seltzer 1996). 
Lack of understanding about derivatives by directors occurs in most developed 
countries, as these studies make clear. Does the same situation exist in Vietnam? And 
is this lack of understanding reflected in current corporate governance policies on risk 
management, especially regarding derivatives? Answers to these questions are useful 
for financial market developers and the companies themselves. 
In mid-April 2013, the State Securities Commission of Vietnam announced its plan to 
issue a decree on financial derivatives at the end of the year. This is a signal for the 
opening of a new financial market in Vietnam. According to the experience of other 
emerging economies, the derivative markets usually start with index derivatives and 
then single-stock derivatives (Bhaumik and Bose 2009, Fernandez 2006, Lien and Mei 
2008, Martins, Singh, and Bhattacharya 2012, Nair 2011). Vietnam has finished its 
preparation for an index derivative market: in early 2012 the country’s two stock 
exchanges issued new indices (VN30-Index and HNX30-Index) in addition to the 
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long-standing VNI-Index and HNX-Index and UPCOM index. In October 2016, a 
general index for both markets was announced, the VNXALL index. There are now 
four indices, and the market that had been imminent in 2016 was actually opened in 
2017.  
By 2016, the Vietnamese government has nearly finished its preparation for opening 
the new financial derivatives markets in terms of a legal and regulatory basis (one 
Decree and two Circulars), central counter party, market members (banks, securities 
companies, funds) and training and communication for future investors. However, all 
the current communications from the Commission are targeted at professional 
financial investors; knowledge dissemination to corporate users and their leaders and 
staff has not started. The market is scheduled to start its operation in the second quarter 
of 2017 (State Securities Commission of Vietnam 2017b). The new market operators 
are likely to promote the participation of individual investors and institutional 
investors.  
How have directors and CEOs, especially those from non-financial companies, 
prepared for such a promotion and the accompanying pressure? How should they 
protect their companies in a new market context? What kind of policies do they think 
are needed? This thesis answers these questions in the context of Vietnam.  
Why Vietnam? Studies on corporate governance in Vietnam are abundant; however, 
the main focus is the regulatory framework, especially compared to benchmarks such 
as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (World Bank 2013, Centre for Asia 
Private Equity Research 2015, Freeman 2005, Le Minh and Walker 2008, McGee 2009, 
Nguyen 2005, Owoeye and Van der Pijl 2016), the causal relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance (Malesky, McCulloch, and Nhat 2015, 
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Nguyen 2013, Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy 2015b, Nguyen and van Dijk 2012, Okuda 
and Nhung 2012, Trinh, Duyen, and Thao 2015, Trong Tuan 2014, Van Tuan and Tuan 
2016, Vo and Nguyen 2014, Vo 2016, Xuan-Quang and Zhong-Xin 2013) and legal 
aspects of corporate governance (Hai 2006, Trong Dan 2005). Research on the board 
entity and its members is rare, but includes a little about board diversity and gender 
(Hoang, Abeysekera, and Ma 2016, Linh et al. 2016, Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy 
2015a). An overview of Vietnam’s corporate governance history is not evident and 
studies of individual directors are equally rare. 
2.7. Conclusion  
The literature review shows there is a dearth of research on individual directors, even 
though the broad field of corporate governance research has a collection of studies on 
boards of directors as an entity. Several studies have failed to link the board as an entity 
to corporate indicators such as financial performance, and researchers have suggested 
that board dynamics with regard to individual directors’ behaviour might be the 
linkages. 
For boards to be effective, board members need to be competent, but it is impossible 
to ensure that all directors on a board are similarly competent about all issues at hand. 
However, to make effective judgements, directors at least need to be informed fully 
about the critical issues. Financial derivatives are controversial but are attractive to 
businesses in many nations. The weaknesses of boards in general and directors in 
particular in dealing with derivatives are common in developed markets and have been 
exposed to the public in notorious scandals in a single company, in a single country 
and in nations. Do directors in other countries learn from these lessons? This thesis 
answers this in the context of an emerging economy, Vietnam. 
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In summary, there are gaps in the current literature on corporate governance in 
Vietnam, and on individual directors’ behaviour, especially in the area of financial 
derivatives. This thesis addresses a number of these gaps including:  
 a comprehensive understanding of fundamental corporate governance issues in 
Vietnam 
 the current awareness and understanding of directors of boards in Vietnam of 
financial derivatives 
 the relationship between directors’ understanding of financial derivatives and their 
attitude to the instruments, intention to use and potential impact on corporate 
governance policies including risk management. 
This thesis seeks to make progress in filling these gaps and aims to benefit regulators, 
directors, corporations and other investors in derivative markets, firstly with a picture 




Chapter 3 Corporate Governance in Vietnam 
 
Introduction  
During the literature review, no comprehensive published writing on corporate 
governance in Vietnam was found. Such a context is crucial to understanding and 
investigating the country’s board director behaviour in dealing with financial 
derivatives. This was the primary motivation for a study (as a part of this thesis) on 
Vietnamese corporate governance, and the results were published in a journal article: 
Lien, T. T. H., and D. A. Holloway. 2014. “Developments in corporate governance: 
The case of Vietnam”. Corporate Ownership and Control 11 (3 C):219-230. DOI: 
10.2307/30226006.  
This chapter is the excerpt from the journal, with an additional section on financial 
derivatives in Vietnam at the end and minor editorial changes, to establish the basis 
for the analysis and discussion in the following chapters.   
3.1. Corporate Governance – Country Assessment 
Corporate governance alternative systems are classified as Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, 
Latin and Japanese with acknowledged differences in their orientation, representative 
countries, prevailing concept of the firm, the board system, main stakeholders that 
exert influence on managerial decision making, importance of stock and bond markets, 
market for corporate control, ownership concentration, compensation based on 
performance and the time horizon of economic relationships (Clarke 2007). 
Researchers generally agree that the main categories of corporate governance in the 
world consist of models from Anglo-America, Continental Europe, Asia Pacific, 
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emerging markets and transition economies (Dallas 2004a, Clarke 2007, Lou 2007, 
Psaros 2009, Solomon 2007, Tricker 2012). 
Different countries start their corporate governance reforms in different ways. Many 
governance reformers have cited the Cadbury Report 1992 in the United Kingdom as 
a key development in the modern literature on corporate governance. This code, and 
the development of the UK Combined Code which was to follow, was formulated as 
a response to several visible UK corporate failures of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Dallas and Patel 2004). Similarly, regulatory reforms in the United States following 
the corporate failures in that country were an effort to stabilise the financial markets. 
In Europe, several countries’ corporate governance codes and other efforts were 
inspired by the code in the United Kingdom and the United States (Clarke 2007). “At 
the beginning probably there was a sense of simply matching the regulation of close 
economic neighbours by developing similar codes, however over time it is likely that 
the engagement in the codes became more real” (Clarke 2007, 175-6).  
In Asian countries: 
“A range of external agencies have an interest in sustaining the reform process 
including the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, and they have all 
engaged in major initiatives to facilitate and support the reform process. Moreover, 
international investors will not be sympathetic to economies that are not 
consistently raising their standards of corporate governance” (Clarke 2007, 207-8).  
In addition as Dallas argued: 
“Country factors can play important, even determining, roles in setting the 
environment for corporate governance practice at the individual company level. 
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Attitudes toward corporate governance can vary from country to country. Diverse 
country forces – legal, political, historical, cultural – come together to shape 
ownership structures, stakeholder priorities, and fundamental attitudes toward the 
role of the firm in the economy” (2004a, 138).  
Currently there are two major frameworks in use: one incorporates a rules-based 
approach and the second uses a principles-based approach. The main areas of focus 
are market infrastructure, legal infrastructure, regulatory infrastructure and 
information infrastructure (Dallas 2004b). Also, there are the two analytical processes 
of modelling and clinical/interactive approaches (Dallas 2004b). 
Finally, there are varying country perspectives and drivers on corporate governance 
initiatives such as Standard and Poor’s Sovereign Credit Ratings, World Bank’s Rule 
of Law Regulatory Indicators and Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Dallas 2004a). The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) is a major player in the area of country assessment with a 
system of national reports and regional roundtables (Asia, Eurasia, Latin America, 
Middle East and North Africa and South Africa). The assessment is also based on the 
main aspects of legal and regulatory systems and economic conditions. 
3.2. Corporate Governance in Vietnam 
Vietnam is still an under-researched country in the literature on corporate governance. 
For example, the book, Corporate Governance and Accountability (Solomon 2007), 
provides an analysis and overview of corporate governance developments in 36 
countries around the world, including not only developed countries but also developing 
or transition countries such as Hungary, Indonesia, Poland and Thailand. However, 
Vietnam is not included. 
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A similar omission occurs in some of the more highly cited papers on corporate 
governance, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Porta et al. (1998). For instance, 
in “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) investigated 
corporate governance through a major review of published studies mainly from Japan, 
Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States; they felt it “unfortunate” 
that there is little research from the rest of the world and, of course, there were no 
studies about Vietnamese corporate governance. In “Law and Finance”, Porta et al. 
(1998) used a sample including non-financial listed companies from 49 countries in 
Europe, North and South America, Africa, Asia and Australia; there were no socialist 
or transition economies and again, Vietnam was not included.  
In some studies focusing on the Asia-Pacific region, such as “Corporate Governance 
in Asia: A Survey” (Claessens and Fan 2003) and “Corporate Governance in Asia: A 
Comparative Perspective” (OECD 2001), the authors discussed and analysed 
Vietnam’s neighbouring countries such as China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand but not Vietnam itself. In addition, since 2006, the OECD has 
published a series of reports on corporate governance in the region (OECD 2011), in 
which Vietnam is more frequently mentioned as a participant in the surveys. The 
reports show progress in the region based on six main corporate governance principles 
recommended by the OECD; however, there are no major studies of corporate 
governance in Vietnam.    
What has led to this outcome and gap in the literature? Most of the leading international 
studies are based on previous studies published in leading journals, conferences, books 
and reports; these publications do not include the Vietnamese context. Therefore, a 
thorough investigation into the corporate governance policies and practices of listed 
companies in Vietnam should be of interest to different stakeholders, such as 
101 
 
international academics, policy makers, and investors and an effective contribution to 
closing this gap.  
In 2006, the World Bank issued a Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC) – Corporate Governance Country Assessment on Vietnam. The corporate 
governance frameworks were benchmarked against the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. The main areas for focus included ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework, the rights of shareholders and key ownership 
functions, the equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance, disclosure and transparency and the responsibilities of the board. The 
report analysed four key issues relating to investor protection, disclosure, enforcement 
and company oversight and the board. The report also made several policy 
recommendations (World Bank 2006).  
3.3. Analytical Overview of the Development of Corporate Governance in 
Vietnam 
On a narrow scope, corporate governance issues relate mainly to public companies. 
The definition of a public company is enshrined in Article 25, section 1, Law on 
Securities (Quốc Hội Khóa 11 2006):   
A public company means a shareholding company which belongs to one 
of the following three categories:  
  (a) A company which has made a public offer of shares;  
  (b) A company which has shares listed on the Stock Exchange or a 
Securities Trading Centre; 
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(c) A company which has shares owned by at least one hundred (100) 
investors excluding professional securities investors, and which has paid-
up charter capital of ten (10) billion Vietnamese dong45 or more.  
3.3.1. Securities Markets Development 
One critical feature of joint stock companies is that their shares can be transferred 
freely between different parties. This enables the number of shareholders to range from 
three to an unlimited number. When the number surpasses the threshold of 100, a 
company is designated as a public company.  
Traditionally, Vietnamese do business and trade with people they know personally; 
personal relationships are considered a requirement for ensuring credibility and trust 
among parties. When capital source funding from this group is not sufficient for a 
particular business, company owners and managers then look for investment funds 
from outsiders. These outsiders are also looking for credible partners in which to 
invest. The two parties then agree on a mechanism for ensuring credibility other than 
the usual personal relationship. Securities markets with prescribed financial functions 
of listing, public offering and share auction are such a mechanism since this 
mechanism is backed by the Vietnamese government. Both of the securities exchanges 
in Vietnam are one-member limited liabilities companies with 100 per cent State 
ownership with the government represented by the Ministry of Finance (Hochiminh 
Stock Exchange 2013).   
The first securities exchange of Vietnam was opened in Ho Chi Minh City in 2000; 
the second one in Hanoi came into operation in 2005. A central over-the-counter 
                                                          
45 Currency unit in Vietnam 
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exchange system (UPCoM) was also opened in 2009 under the management of Hanoi 
Stock Exchange. The Law on Securities was passed and promulgated by government 
in June 2006 and amended in November 2010. This provided the legal and enhanced 
framework for securities markets in general and markets for public companies in 
particular.  
At the start, there were only two companies listed on the Hochiminh Stock Exchange. 
By April 2013, there were 702 listed companies on both exchanges, accounting for 55 
per cent of all the public companies in Vietnam. This is evidence of the exchanges’ 
influence on the development and growth of public companies across the country.  
3.3.2. Equitisation of State-owned Enterprises and Formation of Public 
Companies 
The transformation of state-owned enterprises into joint stock companies in Vietnam 
was conducted via several careful steps including “test” (1990), “trial” (1992) then 
equitisation (in other words, privatisation) on a large scope (1996–1998) (Chính Phủ 
1996, Chủ tịch Hội đồng bộ trưởng 1992, Hội Đồng Bộ Trưởng 1990).  
From 1998 to 2007, equitisation was conducted on a large scale (Chính Phủ 1998, 
2002, 2004). Conditions were lowered to allow legal entities and natural persons to 
have rights to buy shares. All small and medium enterprises in industries that the 
government did not need to keep under 100 per cent government ownership were part 
of the equitisation scheme. However, the biggest corporations were not on the list. In 
2007, big corporations with 100 per cent state ownership were then put on the 
equitisation scheme considerations (Chính Phủ 2007, 2011). Some of the big 
corporations that were successfully equitised and listed were Vietcombank, Military 
Bank and Vietinbank. There are many other large entities that are expected to be part 
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of large initial public offerings in the future, such as Vinaphone, Mobiphone, Vietnam 
Airlines, BIDV and Agribank. 
In 2012, the Prime Minister approved a scheme for restructuring state-owned 
enterprises and corporations in the period up to 2015 with an important focus on 
classifying them into sub-categories in which the government maintains either 100 per 
cent, 75 per cent, 65 per cent or 50 per cent ownership (Thủ Tướng Chính Phủ 2012). 
The equitisations program should have been finished in 2010. However, the 
equitiszation process has slowed down because of the large scale and complexity of 
the remaining corporations. The scale of the new scheme means the equitisation and 
privatisation process is unlikely to be completed before 2020.  
The equitisation schemes have transformed a significant number of state-owned 
enterprises into joint stock companies including public companies. Thirty companies 
form the VN30 index and HNX30 index baskets of the Hanoi Stock Exchange and the 
Hochiminh Stock Exchange as at April 2013, with each basket containing 16 
companies that used to be state-owned enterprises that were privatised. VN30 and 
HNX30 indices are calculated based on the 30 top shares in terms of market values 
which account for about 80 per cent of total market value and 60 per cent of total 
trading value (Sở Giao Dịch Chứng Khoán Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh 2013). 
In addition, most of the listed companies outside the VN30 baskets were also formed 
as part of the equitisation process. This development provides evidence of the crucial 
nature of the contribution of equitisation schemes in helping to establish a robust group 
of public companies in Vietnam.  
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3.4. Typical Features of Corporate Governance of Public Companies in Vietnam  
As part of this development phase, the evolution of corporate governance in the public 
sphere in Vietnam highlights three key features that are analysed in the following sub-
sections.  
3.4.1. Leading Role of the Government 
The government of the day is the prime initiator in making laws that embed key 
corporate governance principles and practices. Governments around the world carry 
out this key role through the enactment of laws and through court processes that ensure 
a central role in creating principles and codes for corporate governance in all nations 
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). If the private “bonding mechanism” is effective, then 
the role of politics and laws are less important; if, however, this mechanism is not 
effective then solutions to such a problem require the enactment of effective laws 
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). 
In the 20-year development of public companies in Vietnam, the government opened 
the way for the creation of joint stock companies, and also supplied the markets with 
the very first public and listed companies and created the biggest public companies 
through the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. The government has also created 
the framework, and principles for corporate governance and guided the markets to 
conform with these codes.  
The establishment of a corporate governance framework has achieved significant 
progress in a medium time frame. In 2006, the “legal framework and institutional 
foundation for capital market in Vietnam is in its initial development” (World Bank 
2006, 1). The legal framework for corporate governance is regulated by the Law on 
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Enterprises enacted in 2005, the Model Charter 2002 and the Law on Securities 2006. 
Vietnam has had to confront major challenges in enforcing laws, enhancing institutions 
for administration, compulsory law enforcement, and market development as well as 
promoting good corporate governance. 
In 2012, six years after the previous comment, the institutional framework for effective 
corporate governance has been issued. In fact, administrative agencies have 
implemented active measures for the last years in issuing appropriate documents on 
enhancing corporate governance. In 2010, Law on Credit Institutions was approved. 
After Circular 09/201046, a new circular on information declaration was approved in 
April 2012 (Circular 52/2012 by Ministry of Finance), and Guidelines on corporate 
governance were issued in July 2012. All of these legal documents expose new 
challenges to companies in Vietnam with poor corporate governance quality (Tổ chức 
Tài chính Quốc tế (IFC) 2012, 23). 
Recognising the importance of the government in corporate governance in Vietnam, 
the International Finance Corporation warned that “The government must be ‘a 
pioneer’ in promoting good corporate governance practice. At least, the government 
needs to approve its representatives in companies with major part of state ownership, 
requires those companies to implement good corporate governance” (Tổ chức Tài 
chính Quốc tế (IFC) 2012, 24). In addition, “shareholders, especially state shareholders, 
need to more actively participate in corporate governance issues” (Tổ chức Tài chính 
Quốc tế (IFC) 2012, 25). Three years of Corporate Governance Scorecard reports 
reveal that corporate governance in Vietnam has been implemented in a top-down way, 
                                                          
46 Circular regulates information disclosure on securities markets by the Ministry of Finance 
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relying on a legal framework and penalty measures (Tổ chức Tài chính Quốc tế (IFC) 
2012, 23). 
The government can influence corporate governance practices in public companies in 
two major ways, either by establishing an appropriate institutional framework for these 
public companies or by directly participating in corporate governance as a key 
shareholder within these companies. A recent survey concluded that state ownership 
had a negligible impact on corporate governance scores and practices by comparison 
with foreign shareholders. This finding also identified that the government held a 
controlling ownership interest (50 per cent or over) in 31 per cent of all the companies 
surveyed (Tổ chức Tài chính Quốc tế (IFC) 2012, 20). 
The government plays a crucial role in the macro political environment; changes in the 
political environment and interactions among key stakeholders occur continuously and 
they can affect corporate governance. For example, the extension of pension funds 
(especially of Pillar 2 – Corporate funds, and Pillar 3 – Savings and investment of 
employees) acts as a direct driver for enhancing employee participation in corporate 
governance (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005, 23). These major stakeholders and 
shareholders include: financial institutions, banks, other firms; family or ethnic 
networks; and state ownership (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005, 5).  
In Vietnam, the government’s key role as a major shareholder in a range of public 
companies and its attention to employees’ benefits which is expressed through the 
participation of the trade union in corporate activities (a key feature of a socialist 
society) work relatively harmoniously. In addition, corporate managers are selected 
through the influence of key stakeholders especially the government. Therefore, in 
many public companies, a coalition exists that is similar to a corporatist compromise 
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coalition47. A similar situation occurs in those public companies without significant 
levels of state ownership. As a result, majority shareholders prevail and minority 
shareholder protection is weak. The average score of “Equitable treatment of 
shareholders” has continuously decreased in the International Finance Corporation’s 
Corporate Governance Scorecards in consecutive years from 2009 (65.1), 2010 (61.0) 
through to 2011 (57.8) (Tổ chức Tài chính Quốc tế (IFC) 2012, 13).  
In addition, pension savings of employees are almost all via social insurance funds that 
are mostly contributed to by the companies, with a minor part by the employees, and 
the funds are then managed by the government. This is considered Pillar 1 of the three 
pillars of the pension system. Corporate pension funds do not exist and private 
investment by employees is low because of low wage rates. Employees do not usually 
have direct input into the investment activities of the current government-managed 
pension funds, so they do not have incentives to participate in the corporate governance 
of public companies.  
Clearly, the impact and the influence of the political system over corporate governance 
of public companies in Vietnam are highly visible and pervasive. To sum up, the 
participation of the government in corporate governance policies and practices is 
substantial; however, the outcome is only positive in the area of the governance 
framework. While playing the role of a major shareholder, the government has not 
generated more positive outcomes in the Corporate Governance Scorecard results 
compared to the private sector, and especially to those companies with foreign 
ownership levels. 
                                                          
47 In a corporatist compromise coalition, managers and workers form a coalition that wins over the diffused owners. As a result, 
the owners form a blockholding to balance the relationship and protect their interest in companies (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005)  
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3.4.2. Active Participation of International Institutions  
Corporate governance frameworks have evolved and developed around the world via 
a process of dissemination from one country to another. Until the first half of the 2000s 
the “main propellants of thoughts and practices in corporate governance come from 
the United States. Institutional investors from U.S. influenced corporate governance 
practices in other countries where they invested in and required U.S. governance 
principles. The number of research and publications on corporate governance from the 
United States were bigger than that from the rest of the world” (Tricker 2012, 474). 
Together with the development and the emergence of other economies such as BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the Middle East countries, and diminishing 
importance and attractiveness of capital flows from the United States, initiatives in 
corporate governance frameworks have emerged in other countries. This started with 
the influential Cadbury report in 1992 investigating financial aspects of corporate 
governance in the United Kingdom, followed by OECD and World Bank principles 
(not through legislation) of corporate governance, and best practice models for 
corporate governance in family businesses in Asia (Tricker 2012). 
International financial institutions (International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS) and OECD) have a special interest in promoting good 
corporate governance; they act as intermediaries connecting good corporate 
governance with major shareholders and external investors, especially international 
investors. Development organisations such as the World Bank and the OECD are 
interested in enhancing the protection of minority shareholders in order to develop 
stronger and more effective capital markets, with the resulting market development, in 
its turn, promoting national and regional economic growth. The IMF and BIS have a 
vital interest in the reduction of ethical problems in financial corporations (Gourevitch 
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and Shinn 2005). In other words, these institutions are pioneers in the opening of 
national markets, establishing a level playing field favourable for national and 
international investors. This disseminating mechanism has been well demonstrated in 
outcomes embedded in Vietnam. The World Bank and IFC are the two institutions 
with the most credible activities in promoting the establishment of effective corporate 
governance practices in public companies in Vietnam.  
From 1999 to 2013, the World Bank financed Vietnam through the establishment of 
26 technical support projects that included components focusing on corporate 
governance with a total value of US$1,652,780,000. These projects focused on major 
issues such as renovating the management of state-owned enterprises, restructuring the 
banking system, and educating directors of boards about good corporate governance 
as well as projects aimed at alleviating poverty (Ngân Hàng Thế Giới 2013).  
In 2006, the World Bank published a report on corporate governance in Vietnam, 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) – Corporate Governance 
Country Assessment – Vietnam 2006. This is considered to be the first document that 
introduced the definition of modern corporate governance into Vietnam, and evaluated 
the observance of corporate governance codes and standards based on OECD 
principles. This report analyses the corporate governance framework in Vietnam, 
including components of relevant laws and regulations, supervisory and compulsory 
behaviour mechanisms and markets, especially the securities markets. The report 
highlighted major issues, summarised the context of observance and compliance with 
OECD corporate governance principles and recommended additional points for further 
improvement (Ngân Hàng Thế Giới 2006). Since this report, the term “corporate 
governance” has been disseminated widely from policy consultants to researchers and 
business people throughout Vietnam.  
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Following the initiatives of the World Bank, the IFC – a member of the World Bank 
Group – is implementing the “Vietnam Corporate Governance Project”. According to 
the IFC, this project aims to improve overall corporate governance practices in 
Vietnam via a specific range of activities such as: consulting corporations, institutional 
investors and banks about the implementation of good corporate governance practices; 
working with related state agencies in improving the legal framework for corporate 
governance; enhancing capability for corporate governance training and education 
organisations; and improving society’s understanding of the importance of corporate 
governance. The project has published a series of reports and books on corporate 
governance such as the Corporate Governance Scorecard (2010–2012), OECD 
corporate governance principles (2004), and a manual for board directors (2010). 
These empirical research outcomes and essential corporate governance knowledge 
need to be widely disseminated to all interested parties.  
3.4.3. Passiveness of Businesses 
How have businesses responded to these ranges of activities and promotion of good 
corporate governance by the government and the international institutions? The 
analysis in the first section of the three key features has demonstrated the degree of 
activity by the government in establishing and continuously improving the institutional 
system for corporate governance. However, from the perspective of business, there has 
been little progressive change, except for some minor cases (Tổ chức Tài chính Quốc 
tế (IFC) 2012). In 2012, the 100 biggest listed companies on the two exchanges of 
Vietnam showed a decrease in corporate governance score results referred to earlier; 
only one conclusion can be drawn from this. The companies themselves have not 
fulfilled their duties in developing a quality investment market in Vietnam (Tổ chức 
Tài chính Quốc tế (IFC) 2012). 
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Jay Lorsch (cited by Tricker 2012, 21-2) discovered that most current corporate 
collapses were due mostly to the increasing complexity of companies and this situation 
could only be solved by improving the role and functions of the boards of directors, 
not by direct intervention by government. Boards should develop appropriate 
structures, processes and practices. Muth and Donalson (cited by Tricker 2012, 62) 
recognised that a board with executive members operated better than a board that 
merely ‘ticked the boxes’ with respect to best practice corporate governance principles 
in using independent board members. This discovery goes against accepted ideas of 
good corporate governance; however, there is support for Lorsch’s argument that it is 
the effective performance of the board of directors itself, not the government, that can 
improve and deliver effective corporate governance.  
All companies need a charter that forms the foundation for the company’s corporate 
governance regime; however, many board members and committee members have 
never even read the charter (Tricker 2012). This situation also occurs in Vietnam, 
where almost all listed and unlisted companies have implemented the model charter 
for joint stock companies issued by the Ministry of Finance (Hải and Liên 2012), with 
only minor modification for individual company details and industry. This appears to 
mean that shareholders also do not consider the charter important for protecting their 
benefits.  
There may be two reasons behind this outcome. The first is that the shareholders may 
want to rely on external mechanisms such as the government to protect their benefits; 
the second is that they may choose to exit by selling off their shareholding instead of 
voicing their concerns when they recognise the companies are not performing 
effectively. In both cases, the shareholders do not invest resources in the development 
of private contracts such as the charter. In reality, the second choice is popular in 
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Vietnam because of a traditional viewpoint that until you get compensation, you have 
suffered more than that48. The government should pay special attention to this if they 
want to enhance good corporate governance; people need a solution to the problem 
that shareholders do not trust official bonding mechanisms, both private and 
government. 
3.4.4. Discussion 
Despite the efforts detailed above, the corporate governance performance of 
companies in Vietnam in general, and public companies in particular, are at the 
medium quality level on several scales. In a two-phase survey, Hải and Liên (2012) 
found that the quality of corporate governance of companies listed on the Hanoi Stock 
Exchange in 2010 was at the medium level (25.73/51) on the Gov-Score scale, meeting 
the minimum requirements of promulgated regulations and that there were only minor 
instances of progressive practices and improvement. This conclusion matches the 
results of the IFC’s “Corporate Governance Scorecard Report 2011” which was based 
on 2010 data. 
The report calculated that the average corporate governance score of all surveyed 
companies was 44.7 per cent, slightly higher than the score of 43.9 per cent in 2009 
(Tổ chức Tài chính Quốc tế (IFC) 2011). In general, the companies had made some 
improvement: there were no companies with a low score below 20 per cent, and the 
minimum score in 2010 was 29.3 per cent (Tổ chức Tài chính Quốc tế (IFC) 2011). 
However, this level of improvement was not maintained through to 2011. According 
to the currently accepted standards on good corporate governance practices, the score 
should be from 65 per cent to 74 per cent; however, none of the companies surveyed 
                                                          
48 An old saying in Vietnam 
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in Vietnam recorded such a score (Tổ chức Tài chính Quốc tế (IFC) 2012). In 2010, 
80 per cent of the companies scored from 40 per cent to 59 per cent; in 2011, this 
percentage had reduced to 73 per cent and there were more companies scoring from 
10 per cent to 29 per cent compared to the 2010 results (Tổ chức Tài chính Quốc tế 
(IFC) 2012). Even among the top 25 companies by market value, the average corporate 
governance score was only 46.5 per cent, which was only slightly higher than the 
overall average of 42.5 per cent (Tổ chức Tài chính Quốc tế (IFC) 2012). These results 
substantiate Hải and Liên’s conclusion that there was no difference in the corporate 
governance of companies listed in Hanoi Stock Exchange in 2010, with scores ranging 
from 24 to 28 (on a 51-point scale).  
Analysis of a 2011 survey of 107 public companies (either listed or unlisted) based on 
the Gov-Score criteria shows that the quality of corporate governance in public 
companies in Vietnam has only shown a minor improvement and there are no 
significant differences among corporate groups even though they differ in scale and 
their listing on separate exchanges. The 2011 Gov-Score was 24.6/51, slightly lower 
than the score 25.7 in 2010 (Hải and Liên 2013).  
The Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model and system has been developed 
specifically for a market based system with diffused equity ownership, strong minority 
protection and disclosure, and strong company law enforcement. European continental 
countries have corporate relationships based around bank finance and with business 
networks at the centre. Asian countries, on the other hand, used a corporate governance 
approach that is personal relationship based, with high levels of family control and a 
business networks perspective (Clarke 2007). Vietnam is closer to the Asia model with 
some minor differences.  
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In Asian countries, researchers call for stronger government intervention because they 
have seen the failure of voluntary efforts and lack of effective action by business itself. 
They also call for a stronger supervisory role by banks. However, in Vietnam, the 
reliance on banks for such purposes can also be suspect. The following section 
identifies a serious problem in one of Vietnam’s main banks and is an exemplar of the 
difficulties in Vietnam of embedding effective and good corporate governance 
practices in large companies. 
3.5. Fraud and the Forging of Documents at Vietinbank  
Vietinbank was the only Vietnamese enterprise listed in the Top 2000 world’s largest 
enterprises by Forbes Magazine in 2012. In 2012, the total assets of the bank were 
503.5 trillion Vietnam Dong (US$23.9 billion), with owners’ equity of 33.6 trillion 
(US$1.6 billion) and a charter capital of 26.2 trillion (US$1.2 billion) (Vietinbank 
2013). State ownership, represented by the State Bank of Vietnam, accounts for 89 per 
cent of the total ownership interests in the bank. In 2013, the charter capital was raised 
to 37.2 trillion (US$1.8 billion), with 35.5 per cent of the outstanding shares listed on 
the Hochiminh Stock Exchange.  
In the first month of 2014, observers in Vietnam became aware that an ex-official of 
Vietinbank, Nhu – the former manager of risk management division of a Vietinbank 
branch in Hochiminh City – had been convicted of illegally appropriating assets, 
forgery and defrauding personal clients and other banks of about 4,000 billion Vietnam 
dong (equivalent to US$200 million) (Hoàng Điệp 2014b, C.Mai 2014, Hải Duyên 
2014b) in a process depicted in Figure 3.1. Nhu had started by borrowing millions of 
dollars in 2007 from financial institutions and individuals with extremely high interest 
rates around 1 per cent to 3 per cent per day to finance her real estate deals. When she 
was unable to repay these loans, she started to forge documents to withdraw money 
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from Vietinbank accounts. Nhu carried out this fraudulent borrowing for more than a 
year, and all the transactions were between Vietinbank and other banks and individuals 
and conducted in Vietinbank premises. She claimed to be raising funds on the bank’s 
behalf. 







From March 2010 to September 2011, Nhu used similar fraudulent techniques to 
withdraw money from the accounts of nine companies, three banks and three 
individuals with a total value of nearly 4,000 billion Vietnam Dong (US$200 million). 
The banks included Navibank, Maritime Bank and the Asia Commercial Bank (Đoàn 
Nga 2014). 
From May 2010 to November 2011, Asia Commercial Bank had entrusted 19 staff 
members to make trust investment contracts with Vietinbank with a total value of 
VND719 billion (US$34 million). All those contracts were supposedly entitled to 
interest rates higher than the ceiling rate (14 per cent) set by the State Bank of Vietnam 
by 3.8 per cent to 4.5 per cent annually. In the same way, Maritime Bank had also 
entrusted Vietinbank with 2,500 billion (US$118.8 million), Navibank with 1,500 


















In the final count, Asia Commercial Bank had lost 716 million (US$34,000), and 
Navibank 200 billion (US$9.5 million) in this fraud (C.Mai 2014). 
After individual clients had deposited money into their Vietinbank accounts, Nhu then 
forged clients’ signatures and stamps to make saving books under the clients’ name. 
Then, she used those saving books as collateral to acquire loans from Vietinbank and 
other banks such as the Vietnam International Bank. When Vietinbank discovered that 
all the loan documents were forged, Vietinbank still withdrew money from the 
collateralised saving books to compensate for the loans it had made (Hoàng Điệp 
2014a, Hải Duyên 2014a).  
At first, Vietinbank rejected any obligations to the clients who had lost significant 
funds by arguing that all the trust investment contracts with Vietinbank were forged 
and all the money had not been put into the bank’s financial records, and all the 
transactions were not in Vietinbank premises. However, under pressure from the 
individual victims and organisations, the bank declared that it would be responsible 
for honouring the legal contracts in this case. Lawyers acting for the individual and 
corporate victims submitted bank statements to the court as evidence that all the money 
had already been put into Vietinbank system and was reflected in the bank’s accounts 
(Hoàng Điệp 2014a, Hải Duyên 2014a, C.Mai 2014).  
Ultimately Nhu was found guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment (Hải Duyên 
2014b). However, what angered people is the decision of the prosecutors to clear 
Vietinbank of any liability. This fraud scandal reflects badly on both micro and macro 
corporate governance issues in Vietinbank and other banks and Vietnam in general. 
The bank’s board of directors had failed to prevent the management implementing a 
deposit and saving policy that supplied interest rates higher than the legal ceiling rate. 
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In addition to failing to audit and detect weaknesses in the transaction system and 
procedures, the failure put the bank at a high risk of capital loss. In fact, Asia 
Commercial Bank and Navibank did lose a large amount of funds in this case.  
There had been illegal transactions not only between individuals and respective banks, 
but also between banks with other banks. This helped to unearth a significant failure 
of the legal interbank transaction system in meeting banks’ capital demand and a 
corresponding failure of policies. In addition, auditors, both private and state, had 
carried out several audits on the bank during the time of this major fraudulent activity, 
but they failed to discover anything amiss.  
This case of fraud highlighted that there are still major concerns and difficulties with 
corporate governance practices and processes across the corporate sector in Vietnam. 
There is still much work to do to embed best practice and effective corporate 
governance models that are capable of working as required in the Vietnamese context. 
The case of Vietinbank shows the general weakness of the corporate governance legal 
framework. This weakness also occurs in a specific area of financial derivatives.  
3.6. Financial Derivatives in Vietnam  
The very first regulatory document on a type of derivative product was issued by the 
State Bank of Vietnam in 1997 about swap of USD for Vietnam dong between the 
bank and commercial banks (Ngân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam 1997), and about the 
forward exchange rate in 1999 (Ngân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam 1999). The State Bank 
reserves the authority over derivatives products for banking services and commodities, 
because only qualified commercial banks (which are under the control of the State 
Bank) are permitted to provide such services. However, the State Bank has so far only 
regulated the area by administrative decisions, and there are no upper-level legal 
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regulations such as laws or decrees. Administrative decisions can be changed easily; 
and the State Bank has tightened and loosed the grip on derivatives products several 
times, demonstrating their lack of confidence in and suspicion of the market. Foreign 
commercial banks such as HSBC and CitiBank, which have ambitions for such a 
market in Vietnam, have lobbied for a long time, and even trained the State Bank on 
the products to raise the authority’s confidence to issue suitable policies (Global 
Banking News 2009, Asia News Monitor 2010). In terms of accounting, the most 
recent guide for recognising financial products by the Ministry of Finance classified 
the products as sellable assets, collectibles or loans; they have not had their own names 
on the balance sheet (Bộ Tài Chính 2009). In other words, there has been no transparent 
and stable legal framework for this sector. 
The history of derivatives products in Vietnam can be best described by three cases 
that reflect the inconsistent behaviours and poor knowledge of the state authorities 
over the instruments: the exchange rate case at ABN Amro in Exhibit 3.1, fuel hedging 
of Jetstar Pacific in Exhibit 3.2 and the coffee industry in Exhibit 3.3 below.    
Exhibit 1.1. Exchange Rate: ABN Amro vs. Incombank  
In March 2006, after an audit, Incombank (now renamed Vietinbank, one of the four 
biggest banks in Vietnam) discovered that its branch in Hai Phong city had incurred 
a loss of US$5.4 million over a three-year period (from 2003 to 2006) in speculative 
currency transactions with a leading world bank, ABN Amro from the Netherlands. 
Incombank filed a lawsuit against ABN Amro, seeking to recover the $5.4 million. 
The Police Investigation Agency took part, and in August 2006 five people were 
arrested: Nguyen Thi Quynh Van from Incombank and four from ABN Amro. All 
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of Van’s subordinate staff were dismissed. The case attracted significant attention 
from the global media.  
The Incombank Hai Phong branch’s deputy head of Trade Financing Division, 
Nguyen Thi Quynh Van, had authorised nearly 600 foreign currency transactions, 
of which 504 were said to be illegal because:  
1. They were oral agreements without any signed contracts. 
2. Van was not authorised to conduct such currency transactions; she had not 
registered with the State Bank of Vietnam to be a trader. She was charged 
with stealing computer passwords in order to complete these transactions.  
3. The exchange rates applied in the contracts sometimes were over the limit 
set by the State Bank (in about 20 transactions). In addition, on many spot 
delivery contracts, the two sides did not pay within the required two-day 
timeframe.  
4. The Police Investigation Agency’s charge was that the transactions were 
“unreal” because the two parties did not make payment in full contract value, 
they just made payment by a “netting” method, and the agency considered 
the traders “rogue” traders operating with the purpose of misappropriation 
of state money. 
Among 613 transactions between the two banks, the average contracted amount was 
US$5 million, ranging from US$500,000 to US$30 million. At one point, the total 
value of all contracts reached US$45 million, a very significant amount to banks in 
Vietnam at that time. Besides ABN Amro, Van also conducted foreign currency 
transactions with Standard Charter Bank and CitiBank. Total contract value reached 
US$3.62 billion.  
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Investigators also discovered ABN Amro Hanoi’s foreign exchange trades with 
another state-run bank, the Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development (Agribank), 
which caused losses of nearly 300 billion Vietnam dong (US$18.75 million) to the 
local bank. 
Despite the range of accusations levelled at ABN Amro, the foreign banking group 
in Vietnam had their own perspective of these events, believing that their trades with 
Incombank complied with common market practices as well as with the legal and 
regulatory framework being enforced by the relevant authorities at the time.  
While Vietnamese authorities also alleged that ABN Amro had been illegally using 
a foreign-exchange trading practice known as netting – reducing the transfer of 
funds between two parties to a net amount at the end of the trading day – the foreign 
banking community considered netting an international practice, which is still 
practised in Vietnam. 
Vietnamese authorities’ interpretation of what constitutes a foreign exchange 
contract is highly problematic for future foreign exchange transactions. The 
Ministry of Public Securities, in order to demonstrate that a “crime” had occurred, 
declared that oral contracts between traders by telephone are not valid and that only 
after the traders write up a paper contract and sign it, is it a lawful transaction. 
ABN Amro representatives noted that they repeatedly had to explain the nature of 
the foreign exchange market, the ways in which transactions balance out and the 
means by which profit is made. They even created a “dummy guide” to try to 
demonstrate to the Vietnamese police how these money flows operated. 
In another effort, CitiBank was a virtual training centre for the State Bank of 
Vietnam. The bank provided a 30-person team to train State Bank employees in such 
122 
 
matters as due diligence and on technical matters on trading issues.  
To conclude, it appeared that local business and the administrative group spoke a 
different business language from that of the foreign partners.  
Source: Anh Thư 2006, Hayton 2006, The New York Times 2006, BBC 2006, V.C 2006, Kazmin 
2006b, c, a, VoA 2010, Hookway 2006b, a, McCool 2006 
Exhibit 1.2. Fuel Hedging: Jetstar Pacific Airlines  
On 7 January 2010, the then former CEO of Jetstar Pacific, a joint venture between 
State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC, Vietnam) and Qantas (Australia), 
Luong Hoai Nam, was arrested by the Police Investigation Agency. Two other 
Jetstar Pacific top executives, Daniela Marsilli (Chief Operating Officer) and Tristan 
Freeman (Chief Financial Officer), were also prevented from leaving Vietnam for 
their Christmas holidays back home in Australia. Immediately, the event attracted 
the attention of world media. The BBC, Sydney Morning Herald, Bloomberg, 
Reuters, ABC News, Time and the Financial Times all ran analyses about the case.  
The trigger that set off the investigation was a US$31 million loss suffered by Jetstar 
Pacific; the executive board members were charged with mismanagement of their 
fuel hedging contracts. Fuel hedging is a normal operation for airlines worldwide 
because fuel accounts for a large proportion of total costs. The hedging process is 
used to stabilise input fuel prices. 
In January 2008, for the first time, Jetstar Pacific had discussed the possibilities 
associated with hedging. Because no local board members or executives had 
experience with hedging, the board of directors authorised two Australian 
executives to conduct transactions to protect the fuel price until the end of 2008. The 
authorisation was registered in the board’s Resolution 04/BOM-PA dated 15 
January 2008, and allowed the executives to hedge at least 15 per cent of total fuel 
demand for 2008 to a maximum of 70 per cent. On 30 May 2008, Daniela Marsilli 
and Tristan Freeman conducted the first transaction to buy futures of 69,180 barrels 
123 
 
at US$126 per barrel; delivery time was 30 November 2008. The second transaction 
was on 9 July 2008, to buy futures of 290,200 barrels at US$136 per barrel, with 
delivery on 31 May 2009.   
Both deals appeared very positive initially because, in August 2008, the oil price hit 
a historically high level of US$144.78 per barrel. At this point, almost all popular 
analyses predicted that oil prices would keep rising, to US$200. If the prediction 
had been true, Jetstar Pacific would have been well protected. However, against all 
the expected forecasts, in the subsequent months of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, 
the oil price fell significantly, down to around US$40 a barrel in February 2009. 
Subsequently, the hedging contracts resulted in a total loss of US$31 million. 
To the Vietnamese partner in the joint venture, this loss was judged to be 
unacceptable and the top executives were blamed. The partner considered that the 
second deal could not be part of the board resolution, since it had only allowed 
protection for 2008. The Police Investigation Agency came to the same conclusion 
resulting in a criminal investigation.  
After ten months of investigation, all the accusations levelled against the three 
executives were dropped, and they were all freed at the end of 2010. The conclusion 
was that the loss of US$31 million was due to objective and unavoidable 
occurrences on the world oil market. 
Source: Australianaviation.com.au 2010, BBC 2010a, b, McLeod 2010, Nguyên 2010, O'Sullivan 
2010, Shay 2010, Smith 2010, Taylor 2010, Thành 2010, Thomas 2010, Hà Nhân 2010, VEF 2010, 
AustraliaPlus.com 2012 
Exhibit 1.3. Vietnamese Coffee Industry 
In 2005, coffee futures were introduced into the Vietnamese market via 
Techcombank and the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV) 
and some other banks. At that time, some business people saw coffee futures as a 
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new way of selling, a risk management method and a good approach to the world 
market. They eagerly accepted the use of this particular instrument.  
Five years later, from 2010 to 2013, the Vietnam coffee industry faced the most 
difficult time in its history. Nearly 100 (from approximately 200) coffee companies 
were liable to either large bank debts, or went bankrupt or were forced to be de-
listed from the stock exchange. All of the companies in difficulty were locally based 
coffee exporters and processors. Foreign coffee companies in the market continued 
to prosper.   
Several reasons have been identified in an attempt to explain what occurred. First, 
local companies did not have adequate financial resources as did the foreign 
competitors; so the foreign companies “played” them up in order to dominate the 
market. Second, local companies had borrowed from banks at very high interest 
rates in the preceding years (in 2008 and 2009 annual rates reached a peak of 22 per 
cent) and the debts were still current. Third, the government did not do enough to 
support coffee companies as they had with companies in the rice industry. Fourth, 
local companies were trapped by international coffee traders via “price-to-be-fixed” 
selling contracts. 
“Price-to-be-fixed” is a popular pricing method with local coffee exporters. 
According to this method, the seller or buyer will finalise the price at some time in 
the future but before delivery time. Both parties arrive at an agreement on quantity, 
specifications and delivery month. Pricing will be either a “Minus” or “Plus” method 
on the basis of the futures price for the delivery month. The futures price is taken 
from the LIFFE (London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange, 
now ICE – Intercontinental Exchange).  
Together with signing the selling contract, local exporters would buy futures to fix 
their buying price. In the physical market, local exporters can buy in coffee, then 
wait until the LIFFE coffee futures price goes up and then finalise the contract price. 
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In theory, local exporters can wait until local prices are low enough to ensure a profit 
to buy in. However, in reality a number of problems emerged.  
Firstly, different local exporters could bargain different “minus” amounts, and 
companies with a bigger minus amount were weaker in competing for supplies.  
Secondly, local exporters had misused this pricing method. Large exporters with 
adequate funds usually buy and store coffee, then watch the market and finalise the 
selling price at an appropriate time. Their calculated risks generated enhanced 
profits. However, local exporters in Vietnam do not have such capacity. When the 
delivery time approached, they borrowed from banks in order to buy coffee. As a 
result, they experienced two negative consequences: to accept the (high) interest rate 
applied by the banks and to accept a rising purchase price (not the same as the futures 
price they were relying on). In delivery months, when exporters tended to purchase 
more, domestic prices usually far surpass the local exporters' expectations. 
Thirdly, local exporters tended to finalise the contract price when futures prices were 
going down. As result, they were subject to low prices and a much lower expected 
profit margin. 
Finally, when the futures price was favourable to the local exporters, they sold them 
to make an immediate profit, instead of keeping them as a form of price insurance.  
As the closest partners to the exporters, bank staff pointed out two reasons for the 
losses of local coffee exporters: they did not strictly follow their initial purpose for 
using coffee futures, and the futures were not tailored to the real quantity they 
needed for selling contracts. In other words, the companies switched from hedging 
the coffee price to trading futures for profit. The banks recommended to the local 
exporters that they should focus on hedging only. If they then traded without enough 
information, losses would be inevitable.  
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In the central highland province of Dak Lak, many individuals and companies who 
do not have any coffee inventories or real transactions still traded on the futures 
market. They called it “paper coffee”. 
Source: Nguyên 2006, VietnamNews 2010, The Saigon Times 2011, B.N 2012, Bình 2013, M.Trung 
2014, VietnamNews 2015 
 
In the area of securities financial derivatives, even the first Law on Securities 2006 
mentioned options, warrants, put options, call options and futures contracts (Quốc Hội 
Khóa 11 2006), however, there was no under-law guidance. As a tradition in the legal 
sector in Vietnam, a law needs a guidance decree and circular to be effective. The 
situation of lacking such guidance keeps occurring to the second version of Law on 
Securities 2010 (Quốc Hội Khóa 12 2010). At the beginning of 2013, the government 
expected to issue such a decree by the year end. However, such issuance was not made 
until mid 2015, but still needed a circular to guide it. Therefore, for a long time, a legal 
framework for financial derivatives, in both banking and securities, was not available 
in Vietnam.  
3.7. Conclusion  
Corporate governance frameworks are still evolving in both developed and developing 
nations. The common approach is not to take a legislative path to ensure effective 
reform, rather the process has been one of developing principles, guidelines and codes 
that effectively construct a ‘best practice model’ of corporate governance. However, it 
is also clear that a ‘one size fits all’ model is not applicable across the globe. There is 
a clear need to construct corporate governance frameworks that are situationally 
contextual and appropriate to different regions and nation states. In particular, the 
notion that a Western developed corporate governance model can be imported without 
change into the ASEAN region is problematic. 
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This chapter has highlighted a range of issues that have confronted decision makers, 
government and other major stakeholders in Vietnam when attempting to construct an 
appropriate corporate governance regime appropriate for this developing nation. The 
details of the fraudulent case in Vietinbank highlight a key point in the corporate 
governance debate. Ultimately, the approach required must enhance and promote 
effective performance and behaviour by board directors to help deliver effective and 
good corporate governance without using a big legislative stick as a threat. 
The underlying reality of corporate governance practices in Vietnam is that the quality 
of corporate governance is below international standards and is only currently at a 
medium level of quality. The Vietnamese government has actively developed an 
enhanced and more complete corporate governance framework, and international 
institutions in the country have actively supported these developments, but the passive 
attitude and nature of the companies themselves is slowing down the embedding of 
improved corporate governance practices. The roots of this problematic situation are 
due to the civil-law-originated legal system in Vietnam, the existence of an 
institutional system that over-prioritises the role of the government in the economy, 
and a socio-economic environment with opportunities that allow unprofessional 
business practices to prosper. These features weaken economic incentives created by 
contemporary policies and make it difficult for companies to practise good corporate 
governance.  
The next chapter, Chapter 4, clarifies the philosophical and methodological 
components of this thesis. The research design with two sub-studies, the quantitative 




Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
Introduction  
This chapter on methodology outlines the main empirical research. The overall 
philosophy that clearly became the most appropriate to guide this thesis is pragmatism; 
this approach draws on different sources to answer the research questions posed. On 
the basis of the philosophy, three research methods – quantitative, qualitative and 
mixed methods – are analysed and summarised, with mixed methods then determined 
as the most suitable for the research topic. Finally, a research paradigm specific to this 
research is detailed, with informing theories, research objectives and questions, and 
two research components – the quantitative and the qualitative approaches. The 
quantitative section presents the process from the objectives to hypotheses, 
measurement, questionnaire preparation, data collection and analysis. The qualitative 
section presents the objectives, questions, description of interviewees, data collection 
and analysis. 
4.1. Philosophy  
Both natural scientists and social science researchers have certain beliefs and 
worldviews that determine the underlying philosophy of their studies. There are three 
generally accepted components which comprise ontology (the nature of being), 
epistemology (the theory of knowledge, whether the being is apprehensible) and 
methodology (the system by which a study is undertaken) (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). 
Creswell (2013, 17-21) modified and upgraded Denzin’s research process and 
philosophical assumptions to include axiology (the role played by values) in addition 
to the three components. In their turn, these components are expressed in theoretical 
129 
 
paradigms, research designs, methods for data collection and analysis as well as the 
interpretation and presentation of results (Denzin 1994). Philosophical assumptions 
are embedded in interpretive frameworks. The most popular frameworks in social 
research are post-positivism, social constructivism, transformative frameworks, 
postmodern perspectives, pragmatism, critical theory and critical race theory, feminist 
theories,  queer theory and disability theory (Creswell 2013).  
Denzin and Lincoln summarised four of the most popular inquiry paradigms: 
positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1. Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms 
Item Positivism Post-positivism Critical Theory Constructivism 
Ontology Naïve realism – 
“real” reality but 
apprehendable 
Critical realism – 
“real” reality but 
only imperfectly and 
probabilistically 
apprehendable  
Historical realism – 
virtual reality shaped 
by social, political, 
cultural, economic, 
ethnic, and gender 
values; crystallised 
over time 



































Source: Denzin and Lincoln (1994, 109) 
 
This thesis relies on a combination of post-positivism and constructivism inquiry 
paradigms, which are reviewed below.  
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4.1.1. Positivism – Post-positivism 
Even though positivism is a scientific approach, it is applied to the social sciences, 
especially since the advances that have been made in the development and use of 
statistics. This is because social facts are believed to be like natural facts that can be 
discovered by scientific methods (Hughes 1990), and this philosophy has held a 
dominant position in social and behavioural research throughout most of the twentieth 
century (Tashakkori and Teddlie2003). This approach is aimed at generalisation and 
prediction based on discovering and confirming universal laws, that is, causal laws of 
human behaviour involving basic assumptions about rational human beings having 
free will (Neuman 2000). Positivism attempts to discover the truth that is the opposite 
of falsehood, through reasoning. Key characteristics of a good positivist argument are 
not having logical contradictions, and being consistent with facts and replicability; 
however, such knowledge can be supported but never proven (Neuman 2000). The 
weakness of positivism in the social sciences is that the idea of free will does not fully 
reflect the nature of human beings, who being context-based, can imagine, feel and 
learn, have a past, a present and a future, and have motives and reasons that cannot 
always be adequately discovered by scientific methods (Neuman 2000).  
Post-positivism modifies positivism in that researchers are value-laden and realities 
are probabilistic (Neuman 2000, Denzin 1994, Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003). Post-
positivism is reductionistic (reducing ideas into a small, discrete set of ideas to test) 
with key assumptions about conjectural and antifoundational knowledge. 49  Post-
positivist research is the process of making claims and then refining or abandoning 
some of them for more strongly warranted claims; data, evidence and rational 
                                                          
49 Truth is something sought, but not necessarily found with certainty, so a researcher might not be able 
to reject a hypothesis yet can never say that they can prove it (Creswell 2009, 7). 
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considerations shape knowledge; 50  and objectiveness, validity and reliability are 
crucial to research quality (Creswell 2009, 7). To understand human beings, we need 
to know the context around them, which is important in constructivism.  
4.1.2. Constructivism – Interpretive Social Science 
According to constructivists, the realities are constructed by researchers through their 
interaction with what belongs to these realities (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994, 
Neuman 2000, Creswell 2009). Reality is what people perceive it to be; it is not fixed 
(Neuman 2000). In contrast to the assumptions of positivism, in the constructivist point 
of view people do not have free will, rather they have reasons and motives behind their 
internal feelings and decisions (Neuman 2000). Human beings make sense of their 
world through their historical and social perspectives, and their interpretations are 
shaped by their own experiences and background (Creswell 2009, 8-9).  
Constructivism51 discovers realities by participant observations, field research and by 
examining texts (conversations, written words, pictures) (Neuman 2000). The realities 
of people’s inner worlds are discovered by analysing their point of view and feelings, 
on the assumption that no one analysis is better than another, and by developing 
propositions based on common perception (Neuman 2000). For example, 
ethnographers build up a picture of social actions and actors by using their literary skill 
(Atkinson and Hammersley 1994, 255). 
Despite its limitation in generalisation, constructivism is a powerful concept in 
exploring human inner reality and human experience. A strong constructivist theory is 
                                                          
50 Data and information are collected by instruments completed by participants or by researchers’ 
observations.  
51  A form of interpretive social science that includes varieties of hermeneutics, constructionism, 




one that makes sense to the people studied and penetrates deep into their inner reality 
(Neuman 2000).  
Post-positivism and constructivism are two extreme ends of a continuum; the bridge 
connecting post-positivism and constructivism is pragmatism. 
4.1.3. Pragmatism 
From the contradictions between positivism/post-positivism and constructivism comes 
an incompatibility thesis, which suggests there is no compatibility between positivism 
and constructivism, hence no compatibility between quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003, 7). In contrast, pragmatism argues that 
quantitative and qualitative methods are compatible, hence a combination of these 
methods in one piece of research is feasible (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003, 7).  
Pragmatists believe in an external world independent of the mind as well as that lodged 
in the mind. Pragmatism is not committed to any one system of philosophy of reality; 
its worldview arises out of actions, situations and consequences rather than antecedent 
conditions. The focal point is the problem in question and researchers use all 
approaches available to understand it. Thus, mixed methods research combines 
quantitative and qualitative components, following the researchers’ freedom of choice 
(Creswell 2009, 10-11).  
Pragmatists do not see the world as an absolute unity, and for them truth is what works 
at the time, in social, historical, political and other contexts. They look to the What 
and How in research, depending on the intended consequences. These summaries lead 
to the appropriateness of mixed methods in research and mean that researchers need 
to establish the purpose for their mixing in the first place (Creswell 2009).  
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This thesis follows the pragmatist approach in answering the research questions posed 
by the topic. A combination of quantitative and qualitative is intended to explore and 
explain directors’ understanding of using financial derivatives and their impacts in the 
developing nation context of Vietnam.  
4.2. Methodology 
Qualitative research is not bounded by specific techniques for data collection and 
analysis as people generally think; its nature is its strong focus on the issues or subjects 
being studied (Janesick 1994, 211). Things are studied in their living context; 
researchers interpret phenomena to find out what meaning people ascribe to them 
(Denzin 1994, 2).  
Qualitative research is flexible in selecting research tools and practices appropriate to 
the research questions, and triangulation is popular as a means of validation and to 
collect the most relevant information (Denzin 1994). The match between an 
explanation and the description of persons, places and events confers validation on a 
finding (Janesick 1994, 216). Data collection and analysis are parallel processes 
undertaken until a saturation point is reached where no more pertinent information can 
be extracted (Morse 1994, 229).  
If flexibility is the advantage of qualitative study, access and entry are its great 
disadvantages because it is a sensitive matter to establish trust and rapport with 
participants in order to initiate open discussions (Janesick 1994, 216) and gather 
authentic data.  
While qualitative research emphasises the importance of common sense and the 
meaning people give things in the context of daily life, the focus of quantitative study 
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is the causal relationship between variables, measurement and analysis in a supposedly 
value-free framework (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 4). The foundation of quantitative 
research is positivism. Quantitative research condenses data to produce a big picture 
of phenomena while qualitative research enhances data to identify and explore key 
aspects and cases as well as the process (Neuman 2000).  
The mixed methods approach lies between the two approaches and pragmatically 
employs their strengths to effectively deal with the problems under study (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie 2003). The integration of the two fundamental methods to form the third, 
of mixed methods, is illustrated in Figure 4.1.  








*Note: QUAN: Quantitative; QUAL: Qualitative; MM: Mixed Methods 
Zone C represents totally integrated MM (mixed methods) research. The arrow 
represents the QUAL – MM – QUAN continuum. The movement toward the middle 
of the continuum indicates a greater integration of research methods and sampling. 
Movement away from the centre (and toward either end) indicates that research 
methods are more separated or distinct. 
Source: Adapted from Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, 28) 
A B C D E 
QUAL MM QUAN 
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In the mixed methods research design, qualitative and qualitative methods are 
intertwined in every step, from identifying research questions to methods for data 
collection, analysis and result interpretation (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). A truly 
mixed approach methodology also transforms data from one approach to the other and 
carries out a deeper level of analysis (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003).  
Mixing the two methods is a further step after data source triangulation, and is based 
on the assumption that the biases of the two will be captured or neutralised so that the 
limitations of each will be cancelled out (Creswell 2009, 14). 
A mixed methods researcher can choose from three strategies: a sequential mixed 
method, concurrent mixed methods and transformative mixed methods (Creswell 2009, 
14). For example, Sonenshein, DeCelles, and Dutton (2014) used a mixed methods 
design to examine the role of self-evaluations in influencing support for environmental 
issues, with two steps: a qualitative study to develop theory, and then a quantitative, 
observational study to empirically validate key constructs from step one.  
The above analysis and summary of key philosophical and methodological issues is 
the foundation on which a specific paradigm for this thesis is established in the 
following sections.  
4.3. Research Paradigm  
The position of a researcher in a large field of knowledge can be specified when the 
researcher is explicit about relevant key concepts and assumptions of the theory in use 
which will guide research questions and analysis (Neuman 2000, 6). A research design 
should then be clarified with details of the paradigm that deals with who or what will 
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be studied, strategies of inquiry, methods, and tools for collecting and analysing data 
(Denzin 1994, 200).  
4.3.1. Informing Theories 
The primary topic and investigation in this thesis is directors’ understanding of the use 
of financial derivatives and their potential impact on corporate governance policies in 
Vietnam. Two theoretical lenses are needed to investigate this particular topic: the 
corporate governance lens and the personal cognitive and decision making process lens. 
The first lens puts directors into the bigger picture of corporate governance, which 
covers individual, corporate and national aspects. The second lens is crucial in 
understanding the extent of directors’ knowledge, what factors affect that knowledge, 
the consequences of this (lack of) knowledge, and how they may occur. Consequently, 
the investigation and analysis in this thesis is guided by two theoretical lenses: 
stakeholder theory and the theory of planned behaviour and also aided by the model 
of board attributes and roles. 
4.3.1.1 Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Governance  
Among the proliferation of corporate governance theories (agency, institutional, 
resource dependence, managerial hegemony and stewardship which were discussed 
earlier in Chapter 2) stakeholder theory agrees with the others in that corporate 
governance consists of structures and processes that ensure companies are 
appropriately controlled and directed (Solomon 2007). However, it extends the scope 
of corporate governance to cover more than just shareholders and management and 
executives. The stakeholders also include regulators, employees, institutional investors 
and society in general. Aguilera and Jackson (2010) predicted that market-oriented and 
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shareholder-centred systems may become closer to stakeholder-oriented systems in the 
context of democratic financial markets being made accountable to the public interest.   
Stakeholder theory supports pragmatism and pluralism (Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar 
2004), accepting a collection of interacting, reinforcing and contradicting theories of 
business strategy instead of absolute objective definitions (Hitt, Freeman, and Harrison 
2001, Hutton 1997). Therefore, a mixed methods approach comes under, and is 
appropriate to, this theoretical framework.  
Stakeholder theory contributes to value creation by attending to the powerless ones 
among stakeholders to create value for them and for companies, and dealing with 
stakeholders on the basis of their partially shared interests in avoiding trade-offs and 
destruction of value (Freeman 2009). Stakeholder-oriented strategies will distribute 
both benefits and harms between different groups, which ensures their long-term 
support even when the results are not favourable (Hitt, Freeman, and Harrison 2001). 
The sharing of both favourable and unfavourable conditions among stakeholders 
creates trust and cooperation, which facilitate socially efficient exchange, leading to 
better outcomes (Amess and Howcroft 2001) and improving everyone’s circumstances 
(Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar 2004), such as enhanced profits and greater shareholder 
wealth (Donaldson and Davis 1994).   
A more detailed description of stakeholder theory was analysed and discussed in 
Section 2.1.2.3 in Chapter 2.  
4.3.1.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Originating in the discipline of psychology, the theory of planned behaviour predicts 
personal intentions on the basis of the antecedents of beliefs and attitudes, subjective 
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norms and perceptions of behavioural control, and the impact of such intentions on 
behaviour (Ajzen 2011, 1115). Human attitudes, intentions and behaviours are 
generated by corresponding human beliefs that are not necessarily rational or unbiased 
(Ajzen 2011, 1116).  
In the theory of planned behaviour model, “attitude” is the kind of favourable or 
unfavourable feeling toward behaviours; “subjective norm” is the perceived social 
pressure; and “perceived behavioural control” is the perceived ease or difficulty of 
performing the behaviour. They are respectively affected by “behavioural beliefs” 
(beliefs about the likely consequences or other attributes of the behaviour), “normative 
beliefs” (beliefs about the normative expectations of other people) and “control beliefs” 
(beliefs about the presence of factors that may further or hinder the performance of the 
behaviour). All are predictors of behavioural intention (Ajzen 2002, 665).  
Figure 4.2. The Theory of Planned Behaviour 
 
Source: Ajzen (1991, 182) 
 
In terms of empirical support, the theory’s clear mechanisms of interactions among the 
constructs, generalisation capacity, intervention techniques and limitations are well-
139 
 
validated (Rauch and Hulsink 2015). This also has the advantages of testability, 
parsimony and specificity in various research areas (Flannery and May 2000). Since 
1985, the theory of planned behaviour has received considerable attention (Armitage 
and Conner 2001) and has become one of the most frequently cited and influential 
models for the prediction of human social behaviour (Ajzen 2011, 1114). This theory 
is more robust in explaining human intentions than in predicting behaviour (Flannery 
and May 2000). 
Attitudinal and behavioural entities in theory of planned behaviour are divided into 
four components: the action, the target of the action, the context of the action and the 
time of action, of which action and target correspondence is the minimum condition 
for high attitude-to-behaviour association (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977, 889).  
Perceived behavioural control (PBC) was added to the reasoned action theory and 
turned it into theory of planned behaviour to predict actions that are not under complete 
volitional control. A meta-analytic review summarised that theory of planned 
behaviour accounted for 39 per cent of the variance in intention, of which the perceived 
behavioural control accounted for a significant amount and the subjective norm 
construct contributed weakly, owing to poor measurement (by a single item instead of 
more reliable multi-item scales) (Armitage and Conner 2001). In its turn, intention 
represents motivation of behaviour; it indicates people’s will and effort to carry out 
such behaviour (Armitage and Conner 2001, 477).  
Self-reporting refers to the situation in which data on individuals are supplied by 
themselves, and this can threaten the validity and reliability of research. Like other 
behavioural decision making models, theory of planned behaviour depends on self-
reports for data collection (Armitage and Conner 2001, 475). In a meta-analysis of 161 
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articles containing 185 independent empirical tests of the theory of planned behaviour, 
a significant part (44) studied self-reported behaviour, and only 19 studied behaviour 
reported objectively (Armitage and Conner 2001, 479). The undesirable effect of self-
reporting is its exaggeration of behavioural variance explained by up to 11 per cent 
(Armitage and Conner 2001). 
In business and management, theory of planned behaviour is popularly used for studies 
of investment decisions (Warsame and Ireri 2016, East 1993, Paetzold and Busch 2014, 
Koropp et al. 2014, Hansson et al. 2012, Southey 2011, Lynne et al. 1995), human 
resource management (Biswas et al. 2016, Sawang and Kivits 2014, Ho, Tsai, and Day 
2011, Gagné 2009, Ang, Ramayah, and Amin 2015), marketing – customer behaviour 
(Kalafatis et al. 1999, Ramamonjiarivelo, Martin, and Martin 2015, Gabisch 2010, Han 
and Stoel 2016, Nocella et al. 2012, Curras-Perez, Ruiz-Mafe, and Sanz-Blas 2014), 
accounting (Thoradeniya et al. 2015, Buchan 2005) and management (Jimmieson, 
Peach, and White 2008).  
In top management, Flannery and May (2000) applied theory of planned behaviour to 
the study of what guides managers’ and other employees’ sustainability-oriented 
decisions and behaviours in a modified model of attitude, subjective norm, perceived 
behavioural control and personal moral obligation about the environmental 
consequences, and the influence of these components over intention of environmental 
ethical decisions.  
Rauch and Hulsink (2015) used theory of planned behaviour to test the effectiveness 
of entrepreneurship education on entrepreneurship behaviours. They found that 
students participating in entrepreneurship education improved in their attitudes and 
perceived behavioural control, and had higher entrepreneurial intentions at the end of 
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the program, subsequently creating more new business ventures than students who did 
not take part in the program. Liang, Farh, and Farh (2012) drew on theory of planned 
behaviour to study employee voice action (voicing their opinions) and had immediate 
supervisors assess all voice behaviours to reduce bias in self-reporting. They 
hypothesised that employee voice action is explained by three psychological factors: 
psychological safety, felt obligation for constructive change, and organisation-based 
self-esteem, which respectively influence employees’ attitude, subjective norm and 
perceived behavioural control, and they subsequently found support for this hypothesis. 
Lee (2004) applied the theory of planned behaviour to identify what determined 
consumers’ intention to use online financial services and found those with positive 
attitudes toward credit markets are more likely to have the intention to use online 
financial services; factor analysis was used to reduce the number of independent 
variables. 
4.3.1.3 Model of Board Attributes and Roles  
Combining four approaches of the links between boards and company performance 
(the legalistic approach, the resource dependency perspective, the class hegemony 
model and agency theory), Zahra and Pearce (1989) proposed the model of board 
attributes and roles, shown in Figure 4.3.  
The effectiveness of boards in conducting the three roles of service, strategy and 
control depends on the board’s attributes, which include composition, characteristics 
or personality, structure and process, as discussed in Chapter 2. Composition refers to 
size, and the mix of different types of director (insiders versus outsiders). 
Characteristics refer to the directors’ experience, functional background, 
independence, age, education, values, experience, stock ownership, and similar 
variables that influence their interest in and performance of their tasks. Board 
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personality is their distinctive styles or modes of operations, such as a focus on either 
internal or external issues, the level of directors’ independence from management 
influence and stock ownership. Structure refers to board organisation, the division of 
labour among standing committees and the efficiency of its operations. Process refers 
to activities related to decision making by the board (Zahra and Pearce 1989). Past 
research focused on the direct association between board attributes and corporate 
performance without an indirect path through board roles. Zahra and Pearce urged 
researchers to discover the indirect link and to include directors’ views in the study of 
board behaviours, as well as direct observation and secondary data. 


























































In other words, board characteristics and individual directors’ attributes have a 
potential impact on board process and decision making in general. In spite of the way 
that board personality may persist for some time, a considerable change in board 
composition and its members’ backgrounds can transform a board (Zahra and Pearce 
1989).  
The potential impact of directors’ and boards’ attributes on board decision making and 
final effectiveness is also suggested by the integrative model of board role performance 
(Babic, Nikolic, and Eric 2011, 157), the conclusions of research on  directors’ sources 
of authority and powers (Lorsch and MacIver 1989, McNulty and Pettigrew 1996), 
and on directors’ competencies and traits (O'Neal and Thomas 1995, Dulewicz, Gay, 
and Taylor 2007, Ingley and Van der Walt 2001).   
Individual directors’ attributes help create human capital. Human capital theory 
emphasises the role of education and training in improving people’s knowledge and 
skills, which increase productivity at work (Tan 2014).  
4.3.2. Research Objectives, Questions and the Necessity of Mixed Methods 
This thesis is an analysis of how directors of boards in Vietnam understand the use of 
financial derivatives (both the upside potential and downside risk), their attitudes 
towards using derivatives, and the subsequent effects on corporate governance. The 
thesis aims to answer the following research questions:  
RQ 1. What is the level of perceived knowledge of directors of boards in Vietnam about 
the benefits and risks associated with using financial derivatives? 




RQ 2a. Does such perceived level of knowledge and attitudes impact boards’ policies 
on risk management, especially on financial derivatives? 
RQ 2b. What is the mechanism channelling the impact of directors’ perceived 
knowledge on the board’s policies? 
RQ 3. Who are the key stakeholders in the board directors’ consideration of using 
financial derivatives for corporate purposes and what are their roles? 
There has been no database available on the use of these instruments so collection of 
primary data has been necessary. To assess directors’ general attitude to, and 
knowledge of, financial derivatives, it is appropriate to survey a relatively large 
population. The survey should be restricted to common issues, such as general 
knowledge of the instruments, the perceived benefits and risks of derivatives, and 
whether directors want to use the instruments or not. It is then easier for participants 
to answer such questions in a reasonable time frame.  
However, expressing and discussing opinions on, and deeper understandings of, 
financial derivatives and related corporate governance policies is complicated, because 
of the complex nature of the instruments themselves. In addition, directors of boards 
are usually not prepared to complete a long and detailed questionnaire, even though 
they might talk about the same issues. In this case, personal interviews need to be 
conducted with individual participants. Figure 4.4 outlines the basic research 
philosophy and the methods applied in this thesis. 
To discover the extent of directors’ understanding of financial derivatives and the 
relationship between this and their intention to use them, a mixed methods approach, 
using both qualitative and quantitative methods, was chosen because of the mix of 
research questions listed above. This thesis intersects the middle of the qualitative – 
mixed methods – quantitative continuum in Figure 4.1. In more detail: 
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- Research questions 1 and 2, use quantitative analysis.  
- Research questions 2a, 2.b. and 3 use qualitative analysis. 













Triangulation is achieved by using a combination of different techniques, such as a 
survey instrument and personal interviews, archival analysis, and mini case study 
analysis. Specific techniques used were a survey and semi-structured interviewing for 
the main study on directors and archive mining for the review of the Vietnamese 
context, and mini case studies for both. The thesis followed the sequence of 
quantitative followed by qualitative (QUAN  QUAL). The survey aimed to establish 
a “global picture” of the situation, then the interviews were used to more thoroughly 
investigate issues arising from the global picture.  
Pragmatism
Archival                                         Survey and Testing              






The main challenge was that the “elites”— the directors of boards – had to be 
interviewed. The difficulties were: directors’ tight business schedules, their sensitivity 
to the feeling of public disclosure, their high awareness of trust and social connections, 
and pressure on interviewers in discussions with knowledgeable counterparties 
(Neuman 2000).  
To understand value creation in an organisation, there is a need to investigate the 
human side of boards (Huse 2007). Research on board actions rather than structure is 
more operationally relevant (Cadbury 2000); statistical methods cannot effectively 
describe and explain the reality of the boardroom (Hilmer 1994). The failure of the 
statistical approach is due to data not being readily available on board action in a time 
of crisis, when the board is most active; also, board members are hesitant to express 
their opinions honestly, even in normal times (Hilmer 1993a). Instead, a more 
appropriate approach to researching the boardroom is case-based (not variable-based), 
with a dynamic and historical orientation, and an actor-centred view of institutions 
(Aguilera and Jackson 2010). The weaknesses of each approach makes it necessary to 
combine them in a single research project in order to extract and analyse the most 
pertinent information. 
Stiles and Taylor (2001), in a study of board directors, used data from a combination 
of interviews, company documentation and secondary material (company annual 
reports, mission statements, policy documents, reserved powers statements, public 
relations material, analysts’ reports and press cuttings). Judge and Dobbins (1995) 
used a two-step design, multiple and moderated regression analyses, to test the 
hypothesised relationships between individual directors and the CEO, and then 
qualitative data to interpret the results to gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
outside director awareness of CEO decision style.   
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Brennan and Solomon (2008) suggested widening perspectives in corporate 
governance research beyond the traditional approaches of agency theory and 
positivism. This thesis follows some of Brennan and Solomon’s recommendations in 
using stakeholder theory, investigating boards’ risk management and adopting the 
mixed method approach of qualitative and quantitative approaches on the developing 
economy of Vietnam.  
4.3.3. Quantitative Inquiry 
4.3.3.1. Objectives  
The aim of the quantitative inquiry was to answer the first two research questions 
RQ1 and RQ2, and a part of RQ2a.  
Research Questions 
RQ 1. What is the level of perceived knowledge of directors of boards in Vietnam 
about the benefits and risks associated with using financial derivatives? 
RQ 2. Does their perceived level of knowledge affect their attitude towards using 
financial derivatives? 
RQ 2a. Does such perceived level of knowledge and attitudes impact boards’ 
policies on risk management, especially on financial derivatives? 
 
 
4.3.3.2. Hypotheses  
Directors’ Understanding  
As strategic management and corporate governance share a common research interest 
in top corporate leaders including boards of directors, the experience from the strategic 
management domain lends insight and guidance for studying corporate governance. 
There is a separation between strategic content and strategic processes in strategic 
management research, in which the former investigates strategic decisions and the 
latter focuses on actions leading to and supporting these decisions (Huff and Reger 
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1987). Similarly, there is a separation between structure and processes in corporate 
governance studies. Top decision makers do not always appear well-informed and 
rational, and may seem unable to make use of what information they have in a 
corporate political context (Huff and Reger 1987). Under time pressure, boards must 
balance making unbiased decisions when necessary against the time needed to gather 
enough information to be properly strategic (Judge and Dobbins 1995). Nevertheless, 
people can still make complicated decisions using the long-established conventions of 
their environment, even in the absence of full information, through a top-down or 
theory-driven approach rather than a bottom-up or data-driven approach (Carpenter 
and Westphal 2001).  
Strategic management processes need to reflect individual, organisational 
characteristics and political circumstances. Cognitive, perceptual and other 
psychological impacts on strategic decision making processes are unavoidable, so 
board decision making should make use of a combination of viewpoints: from 
organisation theory and organisation behaviour, psychology, sociology, political 
science, international relations and education (Huff and Reger 1987). In terms of 
methodology, Huff and Reger suggest that research into strategic processes should 
combine qualitative and quantitative methods, comprehensive and focused studies, and 
distinguish between rational and political assumptions. Taking the idea from strategic 
management research, this thesis focuses on capturing the extent of directors’ 
understanding in a dynamic context, that is, as they are in the midst of forming 
intentions and making policy.  
Among personal characteristics influencing the choice of strategy, the knowledge that 
decision makers have (about available strategies and their relative chances of success) 
is the most influential factor; the nature and extent of their experience is  one source 
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of their knowledge (Beach and Mitchell 1978). Whether many directors have suitable 
judgement or information to contribute meaningfully to decisions is one of the 
challenges they face in making constructive contributions to corporate strategy 
(Carpenter and Westphal 2001). Nielsen and Huse (2010b) cited Rindova (1999) to 
say it is important that individual board members have the knowledge and expertise to 
involve them in forming strategies. If necessary, it is quite possible to improve 
members’ understanding of the problems facing them (Huff and Reger 1987). 
Director Traits and Attributes 
Methodological individualism in economics states that economic phenomena should 
be analysed at the level of individual action rather than at corporate level (Donaldson 
1990). Stakeholders put more weight on corporate leaders’ individual integrity than on 
that of companies because they need to trust the leaders before they engage with the 
business (Six, de Bakker, and Huberts 2007). Forbes and Milliken (1999) call for 
research on the actual behaviour of boards or actual board processes to explore the 
group dynamics that may be the currently missing link between board demographic 
characteristics and board outcomes. Study of individual directors is crucial because 
individual director attitudes are better predictors of organisational outcomes than are 
board structure and composition (Judge and Dobbins 1995). The research for this 
thesis responds to that call and has focused on individual directors. 
To be effective, boards require a high degree of specialised knowledge and skill (either 
firm-specific or functional, such as in accounting, finance, marketing and law), to be 
provided either by directors possessing the necessary knowledge and skills or through 




In the case of Eurotunnel, at the outset, the board of directors mainly included 
representatives from banks and construction companies. The former were at a 
disadvantage by lacking information and relevant expertise and they suffered when the 
construction representatives left the board, because they still did not fully understand 
the business (Vilanova 2007). Directors need to be explicit about their own expertise 
and respect the expertise of others, and seek to make a common contribution through 
a creative and synergistic combination of their insights. The most influential directors 
are the most knowledgeable ones, when knowledge and responsibilities are well 
matched (Forbes and Milliken 1999). If female directors make up a significant 
proportion of a board, their professional experiences and values potentially bring a 
greater variety of strategic solutions for discussion, hence they are likely to improve 
board decision making (Nielsen and Huse 2010b). There are five attributes that make 
a good board: knowledge, information, power, rewards, and opportunity/time 
(Letendre 2004). The model of board attributes and roles (Zahra and Pearce 1989) 
suggests the importance of the influence of board and directors’ characteristics and 
their environment on the board’s performance in conducting its roles. Corporate 
industry, directors’ backgrounds and personalities are among the influential factors.   
From the above review of directors’ knowledge, its roles and determinants, it can be 
summarised that board members’ knowledge is crucial for their individual contribution 
and general board performance. With appropriate and relevant knowledge, directors 
can raise their voice, influence others and suggest solutions to problems. In turn, 
knowledge is normally derived from directors’ education and experience, and 
influenced by the industry they are in and the nature of the corporation, such as its 
scale. This applies to all kinds of knowledge, including the focus of this study on 
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understanding use of financial derivatives. This is the foundation for the four 
hypotheses below. 
Hypothesis 1a, b: Directors’ educational background (a. level of education, b. 
specialisation within their education) influences their knowledge of using financial 
derivatives.  
Hypothesis 2: Directors’ working experience affects their knowledge of using 
financial derivatives.  
Hypothesis 3: The type of directors’ corporate industry influences their 
knowledge of using financial derivatives. 
Hypothesis 4a, b: Corporation size (a. number of employees, b. annual turnover) 
influences directors’ knowledge of using financial derivatives.  
The theory of planned behaviour applies to freely made choices and actions and is 
unsuitable for a decision that is involuntary or compulsory under personal commitment 
or social convention (East 1993). Financial investment and other savings decisions are 
where theory of planned behaviour applies, and in addition to the three normal factors 
(attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control), past experience (range 
of previous investment or reading of financial news) affects intention (East 1993). 
Since knowledge contributes to directors’ decision making, it is added to the theory of 
planned behaviour model to see how it interacts with other factors determining 
directors’ intention to use financial derivatives.  
Directors’ Decision Making  
Investment decisions depend on investors’ attitude. Attitudes, subjective norms, 
perceived behavioural control and risk propensity are significant predictors of 
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investment intentions, among which risk propensity is a direct predictor, not a 
moderator of the others (Alleyne and Broome 2011). Furthermore, investors’ 
investment horizons are associated with their attitude toward a regulated environment 
for corporate risk disclosure (Solomon et al. 2000).  
Hypothesis 5 a, b, c, d: Directors’ (a) risk propensity, (b) attitude, (c) 
subjective norms, (d) perceived behavioural control are directly associated with their 
intention to use financial derivatives.  
Mediated by perceived risk and uncertainty, investors’ product knowledge, product 
involvement and tendency to avoid risk and uncertainty impact on their investment 
intentions; these factors explain more than 60 per cent of the variation in intentions 
(Lim, Soutar, and Lee 2013). Similarly, people’s intentions are derived from four 
sources: risk propensity, attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control 
(Alleyne and Broome 2011), the impact of directors’ knowledge on their intention may 
go through these four channels. 
Hypothesis 6: Directors’ knowledge of the use of financial derivatives affects 
their intention to use them. 
Hypothesis 7 a, b, c, d: Directors’ knowledge of using financial derivatives 
affects their (a) risk propensity, (b) attitudes, (c) subjective norms, (d) perceived 
behavioural control over their use.  
Age and gender may also affect people’s learning and information acquiring. To 
complete the list, more hypotheses have been added. 
Hypothesis 8a, b: Directors’ (a) age and (b) gender influences their knowledge 
of using financial derivatives.  
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Associations among the three main predictors of intention are suggested in the theory 
of planned behaviour model. All the interactions between source of knowledge, risk 
propensity and the components of the theory of planned behaviours lead to the research 
hypothesis model that follows and is tested in Chapter 5, in addition to some further 
correlation tests.  
4.3.3.3. Measurements 
Hypotheses 1 through 8 in Section 4.3.3.2 established constructs for measurement as 
presented in the model in Figure 4.5. They are knowledge (Directors’ knowledge of 
using financial derivatives), risk propensity (Directors’ personal risk propensity), 
attitude (Attitudes toward using financial derivatives), subjective norm (Subjective 
norms on using financial derivatives), perceived behavioural control (Perceived 
behavioural control over using financial derivatives) and intention (Intention to use 
financial derivatives).   
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In a study of the role of individual environmental managers on corporate pollution 
prevention, Cordano and Frieze (2000) used multi-item scales with the responses 
ranging from “strongly disagree” 1 to “strongly agree” 7. Managers’ attitude to 
pollution prevention was assessed by seven descriptive terms, such as “necessary”, 
“important”, “ineffective”, “desirable” and “worthwhile” (composite reliability 0.73). 
The subjective norms for environmental regulation scale (reliability 0.74) followed the 
format of “People in this organization who are important to me think …”. The 
managers’ perceived behavioural control scale (reliability 0.79) covered the ideas of 
“within my control”, “sufficient to implement”, “have the authority”, “can obtain the 
resource” and “support” (Cordano and Frieze 2000, 628).  
Flannery and May (2000) measured managers’ environmental ethical decision 
intention by asking participants about their likelihood of action, in the range from 
“extremely unlikely” (1) to “extremely likely” (7). Their attitude to environmental 
behaviour was designated by three terms: “bad, negative, harmful” (1), and “good, 
positive, beneficial” (7) (Cronbach’s alpha 0.73); subjective norms about 
environmental behaviour by two terms: “Most people who are important to me would 
think …” and “I should …” (alpha 0.60); and perceived behavioural control (in term 
of self-efficacy) by “confident”, “qualified” (alpha 0.89).  
The norm of a similar multi-item scale is also followed by other researchers such as 
Konradt, Warszta, and Ellwart (2013), Driver and Dowrick (1997), Ramayah et al. 
(2009), Wittkowski, Moeller, and Wirtz (2013), and Um, Chon, and Ro (2006) in 
measuring similar constructs.  
East (1993) studied theory of planned behaviour in the context of an investment choice, 
that is, the application for shares. East suggested original multi-item scales measuring 
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the constructs in the theory of planned behaviour model; however, no Cronbach’s 
alpha was reported. Intention was measured by “I will …”, “I intend to …”; attitude 
to behaviour was expressed by adjectives such as “bad/good”, “nice/nasty”, 
“rewarding/punishing”, “unpleasant/pleasant”; the subjective norm was measured by 
the phrases “Most people who are important to me think that ...” and “People who 
influence what I do think …”, and finally perceived control by “If  I want to …”, “I 
can …” and “There is plenty of opportunity to …”. All are on a bipolar seven-point 
Likert scale by semantic levels of Extremely 
bad/quite/slightly/neither/slightly/quite/extremely good.  
The measurement of constructs in this thesis follows the literature reviewed above.  
Knowledge 
The knowledge and skills present on the board can be assessed by asking board 
members questions using a Likert-type scale including items (either weighted or 
unweighted) that can be summed to obtain a composite score (Forbes and Milliken 
1999). For this thesis, the survey questionnaire section on directors’ understanding of 
financial derivatives included 13 items on basic topics expected to be known by 
directors (Kline 2001, Dubofsky and Miller 2003, Fabozzi 2013, Hull 2014). Each 
topic was matched to one question, and there were technical aspects on each product 
(forwards, swaps, futures, and options), risk specifications and valuation, purposes of 
use, pricing and transaction procedures, information supply and search. The final 
questions asked the participants to re-confirm their general assessment of their 
understanding (see Appendix 3 for the questionnaire). Some of the items are adapted 
from the Laroche, Bergeron, and Goutaland (2003) scale of knowledge which includes 
seven terms (alpha 0.85), such as “My knowledge is …” (weak/strong), “informed” 
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(very uninformed/very informed), “information search” (weak/strong) and “I don’t 
have experience making this kind of decision” (strongly disagree/strongly agree – 
reversed).  
Risk Propensity   
Risk propensity is a person’s present tendency to accept or avoid risks; the tendency 
is changeable and can be learned. Risk propensity influences the making of risky 
decisions which are exposed to the uncertainty of considerably positive versus 
negative, or an even more extreme outcome (Sitkin and Weingart 1995, 1575-6). Using 
financial derivatives is highly risky, owing to the nature of the instruments as described 
in Chapter 2.  
Sitkin and Weingart (1995) suggested a five-item scale measuring risk propensity, 
which has Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86. This research applied their five-point scale, from 
extremely unlikely to extremely likely; specific questions are in Appendix 3.  
Alleyne and Broome (2011) developed the East (1993) scales for attitude, subjective 
norm, perceived behavioural control and intention, and applied the Sitkin and 
Weingart (1995) scale for risk propensity in their study, with the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients of all scales ranging from 0.72 to 0.94, which satisfied the desirable level 
of 0.70. The items were combined to form an average score. The hypothesis testing 
confirmed that all four predictors were accurate about the investment intentions.  
Questions on directors’ attitude, risk propensity, subjective norm, perceived 




Intentions can be measured by either behavioural intentions (“I intend to perform 
behaviour x”) or self-predictions (“It is likely that I will perform x”); subjective norms 
accounted for more of the variance in behavioural intentions than self-predictions 
(Armitage and Conner 2001, 477).  
The scale in this study was taken from Soderlund and Ohman (2003), and measures 
intentions as expectations (“I will …”), plans (“I will choose to … at some point in 
time”; “I will try to …”; “I will make efforts to …”, “I plan to …”, “I intend to …”, “I 
intend to try to …”) and wants (“I want to …”).  
This thesis measured intention by multi-item scales including “I would like to use 
financial derivatives for my business in the near future”, “I intend to use financial 
derivatives for my business in the near future”, “I plan to use financial derivatives for 
my business in the near future”, “I will make an effort to prepare my company to use 
financial derivatives in the near future”, with five-point Likert responses ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The questions were arranged in order of 
increasing likelihood.  
Attitude  
The attitude construct was measured by eight items on a five-point scale. The items 
were “Using financial derivatives is … for managing business” (bad/good); “Using 
futures contracts is … for controlling overall business risks” (useless/useful); “It is ... 
to use forward contracts for controlling accounting records” (harmful/beneficial); 
“Pricing a SWAP contract is …” (unpleasant/pleasant); “Selecting appropriate options 
is …” (difficult/easy); “Putting money into financial derivatives is …” (foolish/wise); 
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“Managing financial derivatives is …” (boring/interesting); “Outcomes from using 
financial derivatives are …” (unprofitable/profitable).  
Subjective Norm  
The construct was measured by six items with five-point responses (strongly disagree 
to strongly agree), as listed below.  
1.  Most people who are important to me would think that using financial 
derivatives is a wise idea.  
2.  Most people who are important to me would think I should use financial 
derivatives.  
3.  My subordinates would think that using financial derivatives is a wise idea.  
4.  Company shareholders who are important to me would think that using financial 
derivatives is a good idea.  
5.  Business partners who are important to me would think that using financial 
derivatives is a good idea.  
6.  My family who are important to me would think I should use financial 
derivatives.  
The sixth question about support from family members is relevant because directors 
of boards usually belong to families with business traditions, so family members stand 
a good chance of knowing about financial derivatives. 
Perceived Behavioural Control  
Perceived behavioural control refers to people's expectations of their ability to 
complete an action by their own assessment of their available resources and any 
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potential obstacles (Ajzen 2002, 675). The directors’ perception of control in this thesis 
was measured by nine questions as in Appendix 3.  
These items were adapted from the scale summarised by Ajzen (2002, 670-3), which 
has high reliability (0.74 to 0.90). Examples of the Ajzen’s items were “For me … it 
would be very easy/very difficult”, “The number of external influences …”, “How 
much control do you have over ...”, and “I feel I would be capable of convincing my 
new partner of …”. Perceived control could be either self-efficacy (ease or difficulty 
of performing an action) or controllability (beliefs about the extent to which the 
behaviour is up to the actor). Self-efficacy is a better predictor of intention while 
controllability is stronger at predicting behaviour (Ajzen 2002). This thesis combines 
both content types in the measurement. 
Finally, directors’ education was measured by two questions about the highest 
qualification they had achieved (from high school level to doctorate level), and the 
major subject of their qualification (General Management, Accounting, Finance or 
other). Their working experience was expressed in the area they spent the longest time 
(General Management, Accounting, Finance or other). Directors were also asked about 
their age, gender, corporate scale (the number of employees and the previous year’s 
turnover) and their company’s industry. The corporate industry list was from the 
official list by the Vietnam State Securities Commission accessed in November 2014 
(Ủy ban chứng khoán nhà nước 2014). 
4.3.3.4. Questionnaire Preparation 
The questionnaire was initially drafted in English and then translated into Vietnamese 
to suit all Vietnamese participants. To ensure that the questionnaire was 
understandable to people whether with or without financial expertise, three people 
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were consulted: one with a PhD in Finance, one Vietnamese PhD candidate in Finance 
and one Vietnamese PhD candidate in English Language. The holder of the PhD was 
asked to read the whole English questionnaire and assess if it was understandable and 
reasonable for a variety of people and its suitability was confirmed. The PhD candidate 
in Finance was asked to translate the Vietnamese version into English, and the other 
candidate was asked to do the opposite with the English version. The questionnaires 
in each language were compared and minor variation was recognised and then 
corrected. Therefore, the questionnaire, in both languages, was used for the next step; 
the English version was used for directors with non-Vietnamese names. 
The link to the pilot questionnaire was sent to 46 testers including directors, senior 
business people and business students: 29 answered and of these 14 gave full answers. 
The testers were asked the time they had needed to answer, how well they understood 
the questions, and for other comments. Of the 14 testers, 83.33 per cent said it was 
understandable. On the basis of their comments, the order of sections was revised, and 
the questions were shortened to encourage people to answer as fully as they could. The 
revised questionnaire was used for the official survey. This advance testing is a 
common way to increase the validity of a method (Westphal 1999, Westphal and Shani 
2016); for example, McDonald and Westphal (2010) pre-tested their questionnaire by 
interviewing 20 top managers.   
4.3.3.5. Data Collection 
Lists of potential participants with contact details were collected from databases on the 
official websites of State Securities Commissions, the Hanoi Stock Exchange and Ho 
Chi Minh City Stock Exchange. The three databases were cross-checked for accuracy 
to form the final list. 
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The official questionnaires were sent out via an online channel 
(www.surveymonkey.com) and by ordinary post, and targeted at the directors of 
boards of public (joint stock) companies. Emails were sent to a total of 812 public 
companies belonging to three groups: companies listed on Ho Chi Minh City stock 
exchange, companies listed on Hanoi Exchange and companies transacted on UPCom 
market. The number of email-accessed directors was approximately the number of 
corporate emails accessible (624).  
The response rate for the survey was 19.07 per cent: 216 responses were received, of 
which 119 were usable questionnaires. This rate is low but acceptable considering the 
nature of the research topic (financial derivatives) and the elite nature of the targeted 
subjects (directors of boards). The tendency of the elite to avoid public scrutiny meant 
that random sampling was not applicable (Neuman 2000, 152). A low response rate of 
below 25 per cent is common (Carpenter and Westphal 2001, Westphal 1999) and it 
could be even lower, at 5.1 per cent (Van Ees, van der Laan, and Postma 2008). To 
increase the response rate, a survey should be supported by well-respected people and 
delivered repeatedly (McDonald and Westphal 2010, Westphal and Graebner 2010, 
Flannery and May 2000). During the data collection, reminder emails were sent 
repeatedly: five times in five consecutive weeks after the first sending. After that, 
paper-based mailings were sent out with a post-paid envelope inside. Each email or 
posted mail included a covering letter (see Appendix 1) introducing the purpose of the 
survey, its main content and the researchers; a consent form clarifying risks and asking 
for the participant’s agreement; and the main questionnaire that passed that human 
ethics procedures (see Appendix 2).   
The selection of sample size is aimed at achieving the desired level of precision 
balanced against costs, error and the availability of data  (Schmidt 1977). In addition 
162 
 
to the issue of size, samples of unique features are important (O'Connell and O'Sullivan 
2014). In contrast to previous research that collected information on directors via 
another source and that usually focused on non-executives, this survey was aimed 
directly not only at non-executives but also at executive directors. The data were 
collected from the end of 2014 to the middle of 2015. 
4.3.3.6. Analysis  
As described in Section 4.3.3.3, all the main constructs were measured by a multi-item 
Likert scale with five different levels. To create a single score for each construct, the 
first step was to conduct factor analysis for all the constructs to make sure that they 
were measured in a consistent and reliable manner. Component analysis was used. It 
is a factor model based on the total variance (Hair et al. 2014, 90), used to summarise 
most of the original information (variance) in a minimum number of factors, while 
common factor analysis is used primarily to identify unknown underlying factors. Also 
known as principal component analysis, component factors analysis is most 
appropriate for data reduction and when prior knowledge is available about small 
specific and error variance (Hair et al. 2014, 105-6). The two conditions of objective 
and prior knowledge are met in this thesis, hence component analysis was selected. 
When each construct was confirmed, all item scores were summed to be the construct 
score. More complex analyses were done using those constructs. 
Besides direct associations, the mediation effect was also assessed to study the 
relationships of the constructs. Mediation is supposed to exist if there is a chain of 
causal relationships: in four steps by Baron and Kenny (1986) or two steps by Kenny, 
Kashy, and Bolger (1998) cited by Williams, Vandenberg, and Edwards (2009, 567). 
The four-step chain includes: (a) the independent variable is related to the dependent 
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variable; (b) the independent variable is related to the mediator variable; (c) the 
mediator variable is related to the dependent variable; and (d) when the mediator 
variable is statistically controlled, the independent variable is no longer related to the 
dependent variable. When the first (a) and fourth (d) steps are removed, the remainder 
is the set of two (Williams, Vandenberg, and Edwards 2009, 567). It is different from 
moderation, in which the effect of one variable on another varies in accordance with 
the level of a third variable (Williams, Vandenberg, and Edwards 2009, 570).  
After the associations were specified, the next step was to test whether they were 
statistically significant. Owing to the limited sample size and the non-normal 
distributions of the final data, null hypothesis testing was used. 
Unlike the alternative hypothesis that measures the effect size of association, the null 
hypothesis focuses on assessing the existence or nonexistence of the relationship or 
the effect. Null hypothesis testing is used to establish sufficient evidence to support an 
ordinal claim with an appropriate level of probability significance of the testing, 
usually P < 0.05. A rejection of a null hypothesis is not an end, since it leads to testing 
the alternative hypothesis to quantitatively estimate the size of the effect of the 
association. If testing is unable to reject the null hypothesis, it does not mean the 




4.3.4. Qualitative Inquiry 
4.3.4.1. Objective  
The purpose of the qualitative inquiry part of this research was to seek an explanation 
for the results of the first two research questions and answers to the two remaining 
questions. 
Research Questions  
RQ 2a. Does such perceived level of knowledge and attitudes impact boards’ 
policies on risk management, especially on financial derivatives? 
RQ 2b. What is the mechanism channelling the impact of directors’ perceived 
knowledge on the board’s policies? 
RQ 3. Who are the key stakeholders in the board directors’ consideration of using 
financial derivatives for corporate purposes and what are their roles? 
 
 
4.3.4.2. Interview Questions  
All the interviews were semi-structured, with some predetermined questions followed 
by others emerging from answers to the former. Structured interviewing is used to 
collect codable data for pre-specified categories, while unstructured interviewing 
expands the understanding of complicated behaviours for which pre-categorisation 
could limit the investigation (Fontana and Frey 1994, 366). One general question may 
be enough to activate a long and information-rich conversation (O'Neal and Thomas 
1995). Questions for each section are listed in Exhibit 4.1 and Exhibit 4.2 below. 
Exhibit 4.1. Predetermined Interview Questions  
A. Explain survey results 
1. Are survey results reasonable according to your experience?  
- General scores  
- Differences among groups, products, areas of knowledge  
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2. What do you think about the gap in scores between directors’ knowledge, 
attitude and intention? 
3. Do other people have influence over directors’ decisions on such 
instruments as financial derivatives?  
B. Impacts of the survey results on companies  
4. What type of outcomes may these results lead to for companies?  
5. What are the risks when top directors have limited knowledge of 
technically complicated instruments and markets that companies want to 
enter?  
C. Solutions to problems  
6. What would be the motivation for directors to get to know more about 
financial derivatives? Market forces or something else?  
7. What is the best way to improve directors’ knowledge?  
8. What is the current use of outside consultants for complicated financial 
issues?  
9. What type of controls could board directors apply on operations of such 
instruments?  
10. What type of control should boards apply on financial derivatives? 
11. Do boards need to set up an ethics policy? Is an ethics policy feasible in 
your context?  
12. Besides the compulsory regulations on risk management, what can a 
company do to control the risks when the company enters the market? 
13. Do companies in sectors other than finance have a separate risk 
management/internal control policy?  
14. Some people suspect that the board may not want to set up a risk policy for 
financial derivatives because the members may benefit. What do you think 
about this? 
15. What is the best way for boards of directors to make decisions when they 
do not have the capability but do not want to use an outside consultant and 
it takes time to find staff? 
16. Do you see any company with a separate policy for financial derivatives 
(such as REPO-repurchase agreement)?  
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Exhibit 4.2. Emerging Interview Questions  
1. What do you think about the role of the government in market formation 
and operation?  
2. Did the Ministry of Finance request your comments on their drafted 
policies? How have you participated in the Ministry’s workshop?  
3. Do you see the board participating in REPO operations? (Approving 
contract values or anything else) 
4. What can boards of directors do to achieve good judgement in decisions 
about financial derivatives, without depending on managers? 
5. Should risk management for financial derivatives be separated or included 
in a general risk policy?  
6. What should the content of a separate risk policy on financial derivatives 
be?  
7. Should boards control transactions or a higher level controlling by policy?  
8. Do directors really need to be knowledgeable to make decisions? 
9. If directors do not have the ability to use financial derivatives, should they 
be excluded from decision making? Can we establish such a condition? 
How to prevent them from participating? 
10. In the context of our market, if transactions occur, how can the board 
control them? Can they exercise control or not?  
11. Do any private groups want to found a market?  
12. When and in what context will a standard financial derivatives market be 
formed?  
13. Do we need to wait for government action in the market establishment? 
14. What can directors do if they do not have appropriate knowledge?  
15. Does the psychology of considering financial derivatives as gambling 
affect people’s participation in financial derivatives markets?  
16. Is using financial derivatives only recommended for proactive directors?  
17. What type of directors have influence over the board? To what extent?  
18. What do you think about participation into the financial derivatives market 
by companies outside the finance sectors? How efficient is this?  
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19. How frequent should reports to boards be? What can boards do when 
companies have big value contracts when market values fluctuate 
considerably? 
 
4.3.4.3. Interviewees  
The very first interviewees were those participating in the survey who had consented 
to be interviewed as requested in the covering letter. These interviewees were then 
asked to recommend other directors with financial expertise whom they knew to join. 
The recommended directors were then asked to confirm if they had answered the 
survey and give their consent to be interviewed. This step was done because many 
directors answered the survey but did not express their interest in being interviewed as 
requested in the covering letter. However, when asked by a peer, they changed their 
mind and agreed to participate in the interview. This followed the method known as 
snowball sample selection, in which researchers identify cases of interest from people 
who know other people with rich information. The “criterion” (Creswell 2013) for 
selection in this case was that all interviewees had expertise in finance.  
There was a total of 19 interviewees with three females and 16 males. They were from 
various industries including securities, fund management, steel manufacturing, 
commodities import-export, banking, paper manufacturing and petroleum extractions, 
and all had expertise and extensive experience in finance. The interviewees were coded 
in the analysis to ensure anonymity. 
Selection of interviewees with expertise in finance was planned with the aim of 
collecting deep insight into the survey results, and only directors with financial 
expertise agreed to be interviewed as in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2. List of Interviewees  
Interviewee Code Industry Gender 
INT01 Finance (Securities)  Male 
INT02 Finance (Fund) Male 
INT03 Steel Manufacturing Male 
INT04 Commodities Male 
INT05 Finance (Banking) Female 
INT06 Finance (Banking) Male 
INT07 Finance (Securities) Male 
INT08 Finance (Banking) Male 
INT09 Finance (Banking) Male 
INT10 Electronics Manufacturing Male 
INT11 Finance (Banking)  Female 
INT12 Petroleum Extraction Male 
INT13 International Commerce Male 
INT14 Finance (Banking) Male 
INT15 Paper Manufacturing Male 
INT16 Finance (Securities) Male 
INT17 Finance (Securities)  Female 
INT18 Steel Manufacturing Male 
INT19 Finance (Banking)  Male  
 
To explore the unique features of the studied subjects, qualitative research follows the 
well accepted notion of reaching a saturation point with regard to the size of the sample: 
the best size is reached when no new information can be extracted from further 
investigation (Creswell 2013, 157). The final number of 19 interviewees satisfied this 
criterion. An equivalent sample size has been used by several researchers. Nineteen 
Norwegian female directors from public companies were selected by a theoretical 
sampling of a heterogeneous group, and then interviewed to enable rich data to be 
collected about their attitudes to, and the appropriateness of, the gender quota policy 
(Seierstad 2016). In the United States, O'Neal and Thomas (1995) conducted 
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interviews with 18 directors, with open-ended questions to explore their views of the 
role of director networks in board behaviour. 
4.3.4.4. Data Collection Procedures  
The essence of a qualitative study lies in the data collection process. Creswell (2013) 
suggests a circle model with steps that could be repeated until the study is completed: 
locating individuals, gaining access and establishing rapport, purposefully sampling, 
collecting data, recording, dealing with field issues and storing data.  
In this narrative-style study, Creswell’s recommended steps were followed. The 
interviews were semi-structured, with some planned questions and others developed 
in response to answers to previous questions. Initial questions were about whether 
interviewees agreed with the survey results on directors’ understanding of financial 
derivatives, the reasons for the results and the effect of this understanding on corporate 
governance.  
Locating Individuals and Purposeful Sampling 
Interviewees were located when they gave their consent in response to the survey 
questionnaire. The other interviewees, those located through recommendations, were 
contacted either by email or by mobile phone (provided by the recommenders) and 
were asked for their consent this way. When they replied with consent, the interview 
time and location was arranged. 
Gaining Access and Making Rapport 
It took some time to arrange each interview meeting because all the directors were 
busy. During the scheduling and re-scheduling, the interviewees became better 
acquainted with the interviewer, who gained their trust as they grew ready for the 
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interview. Most of the interviews (16) occurred in the director’s office and three took 
place out of the director’s office. 
Collecting Data and Recording Information 
All the interviews started with social talk, then moved to specific research questions, 
emerging questions, and ended with thanks and other social talk. The interviewees 
were asked about their personal views and experience on the issues being researched. 
Besides sharing their personal stories, interviewees also supplied corporate policy 
materials and referred to other sources of information. All interviewees gave consent 
to recording the interviews. Five were followed up by additional phone or email 
interviews. 
Storing Data 
All the recordings and emails were stored on the researcher’s personal storage device 
and accessed only by the researcher.  
Personal Experience with Board Directors 
The researcher had spent three years working as a personal assistant to the chair of a 
board of directors of a big private holding company. During that time, the researcher 
learned about the working style, habits and preferences of not only the chair but also 
the chair’s peers in and outside the company. This understanding helped in arranging 
meetings and facilitating interviews with the participating directors. To ensure the 
quality of research, qualitative researchers need to be explicit about their experience 




Transcription and Translation 
All the interviews were conducted by the researcher, who transcribed them in their 
original Vietnamese and then translated them into English for analysis. After 
translation, the interviews were coded using a template, to provide the possibility of 
combining a more structural conceptual approach with the emerging interpretations. 
The data were analysed and coded using the software product NVivo (version 11). 
Back and forth checking was made to ensure correct meaning, or semantic equivalence, 
which is essential for international and cross-cultural research data analysis (Seierstad 
2016).  
There are five common approaches to qualitative inquiry: narrative, case study, 
phenomenology, grounded theory and ethnography (Creswell 2013). Narrative 
research focuses on the life of one or more individuals, using their stories collected by 
interviews and documents; the data are analysed into themes (Creswell 2013, 104-6). 
The data collection process can follow several strategies depending on the person 
(convenient, politically important, typical, a critical case) to achieve different forms of 
data (documents and archival material, open-ended interviews, subject journaling, 
participant observation, casual chatting, typically a single individual) (Creswell 2013, 
148-9). Given the nature of exploring directors’ dealing with financial derivatives in 
their corporate operations, this research uses a narrative approach.  
4.3.4.5. Analysis  
Data for narrative studies come from personally lived and told experience stories 
which are analysed by themes (what was said), structure (the nature of telling) or 
dialogic and performance (how the story is produced and what the story is directed 
toward) in its situation or context (Creswell 2013, 70-2). 
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This research is the oral history type of narrative, in which personal reflections of 
several individuals were collected and analysed. Thematic analysis was applied. 
Sketching ideas and taking notes are conducted during data collection. After 
summarising field notes and working with words, researchers identify codes and 
reduce them into themes (Creswell 2013, 181). 
After all interview content was translated into English, the next step was working with 
words, identifying primary codes or nodes, adding emerging codes or nodes during 
coding, reducing codes to themes, relating the themes and displaying the data using 
NVivo 11 software.  
This process followed Creswell’s recommendations. Researchers start the qualitative 
data analysis method by immersing themselves in the transcripts, then setting out pre-
scheduled codes or nodes and new codes arising from the data, developing sub-nodes 
then combining them into bigger themes. The suggested number is about 25-30 nodes 
and five to seven themes (Creswell 2013, 183-6). 
Using personal hunches, insights and intuition, qualitative researchers extract further 
meaning from the themes and codes in their interpretation, which may be within a 
social science construct or idea, or, in contrast, derive from a combination of personal 
views (Creswell 2013, 187).  
In the final step, presentation of findings in a narrative study varies in format, such as 
literary orientation, five-elements plot structure52, incorporation of different elements 
that go into the story, and a three-dimensional space approach53 (Creswell 2013, 189). 
The presentation style mirrors the researchers’ interpretation as influenced by their 
                                                          
52 Characters, setting, problem, actions, and resolution (Creswell 2013, 189). 
53 Interaction – personal and social, continuity – past – present – future, and situation – physical places 
or the storyteller’s places (Creswell 2013, 189). 
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personal characteristics, such as gender, culture, class, sociality and political leaning 
and their perception of the potential impact on participants, the studied sites and reader 
cognition (Creswell 2013, 215). 
Validation is a normal procedure in quantitative research, but qualitative researchers 
vary in their positions about validation. Some suggest application of the same validity 
criteria as with the quantitative approach, others believe that understanding is more 
important than validity, while some propose unique criteria (Creswell 2013, 244-5). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985, quoted by Creswell 2013, 246) use unique terms, such as 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, as equivalents to the 
scientific concepts of internal validation, external validation, reliability and objectivity, 
and these unique qualities can be realised by long term field study, triangulation (of 
researchers, data sources and methods) and rich description (Creswell 2013, 246). 
Validation is more a process than a single step of verification and is an effort to 
appraise the accuracy of the findings (Creswell 2013, 249). This thesis used 
triangulation of data sources (archives, surveyed directors and interviewees) and 
methods (quantitative and qualitative) together with an effort to acquire the richest 
information in each aspect of the directors’ situation in relation to financial derivatives. 
The final issue is evaluation. To evaluate a qualitative study, the criteria used mainly 
assess the research in terms of its contribution to informing and improving practice, 
ensuring participants’ privacy, confidentiality and truth-telling, fairness (a balance of 
stakeholder views), disseminating knowledge, and promoting social action, aesthetic 
merit and reflexivity (Creswell 2013, 255). All these issues are clarified in Chapter 7.  
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4.4. Conclusion  
With the mixed nature of the research questions, the pragmatism philosophy is the 
most suitable for this thesis. This allows the combining of post-positivism and 
constructivism by using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The survey was 
designed to derive an overall picture of directors’ understanding of financial 
derivatives and relationship to the board members’ attitudes and intentions to use these 
instruments. Because intention is the predictor of real actions, the situation 
investigated is an issue that needs to be dealt with in corporate governance policies. 
The follow-up interviews were aimed at acquiring more detail, and depth of analysis, 
of the causes behind the big picture, whether this was reasonable in the view of experts, 
and the mechanisms through which this may affect corporate policies, as well as the 
main players in such mechanisms. This type of research design enables two 





Chapter 5 Survey Results 
Introduction 
The survey questionnaire in this thesis investigated the bigger picture of board 
directors’ understanding of using financial derivatives in Vietnam. The survey was 
based on a modified model of the theory of planned behaviour. This chapter starts with 
Section 5.1 Data Description and Variate Creation, which summarises the data 
collection process and characteristics of the respondents, and demonstrates how the 
main variables in the research model were created and calculated. This is in preparation 
for Section 5.2, an assessment of directors’ understanding of using financial 
derivatives and a descriptive analysis of other variables in the model. The follow-up is 
an analysis of the association between the directors’ understanding and their attitude 
to using financial derivatives, their intention, risk propensity, subjective norms and 
perceived behavioural control. The focus of the survey data analysis is not alternative 
hypothesis testing, but primarily descriptive statistics and null hypothesis testing to 
highlight issues of concern emerging from the questionnaire answers.  
5.1. Data Description and Variate Creation  
5.1.1. Data Description  
5.1.1.1. Sample and Responses  
Directors of all public companies (listed and unlisted) as specified by the State 
Securities Commission (SSC) were the targets. During the first mailing, emails with 
survey links, cover letters and consent form were sent to 785 corporate email addresses 
among a total of 812 public companies (the gap was the number of companies without 
email addresses listed on official databases), and of these, delivery failed for 289 
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companies. This failure was due to either incorrect addresses or the mailbox being too 
full to receive any more. After the first attempt, the corporate emails for the failure 
cases were collected and re-sent with the survey email, resulting in 128 successful new 
sendings (no “failed to be delivered” report). Repeated emails with a cover letter, 
consent form and questionnaire as well as the survey link were sent five times during 
the following five weeks. The follow-up paper-based survey letters were then sent to 
those companies where emailing had been successful (a total of 624). 
In both the survey emails and the posted mails, the mail account managers were asked 
to forward the communication to the appropriate board director, because only 4.55 per 
cent of directors work as corporate official spokespeople who normally keep the 
corporate email account. Customarily, corporate account managers, usually corporate 
secretaries, as subordinates, respect the directors and do not answer on their behalf. 
Instead, they forward emails addressed to directors to the most appropriate director.    
The number of email-accessed directors equalled approximately the number of the 624 
successful emails; which represents 14.17 per cent of the total number of individual 
board directors of public companies (4,405) in Vietnam at that time, November 2014. 
There were in total 216 responses, of which 119 were usable questionnaires. The 
unused responses were due to early failure to complete or too much data missing. 
Among the 216 responses, 27 (12.5 per cent) were not from directors. They might have 
been from email account managers, who would have needed to check the content 
before forwarding the email to the relevant director of the board.  
Among the remaining 189 participants who were directors, 14 (7.4 per cent) did not 
want to proceed with the survey after Question 2 (with “No” answer to this question). 
Up to this question, they had read the introduction with all the relevant information 
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about the content of the survey. The reason for stopping might be either that they 
simply did not want to spend time responding, or that they did not know enough about 
the surveyed issues so could not give their opinions. 
Among the 175 directors who agreed to go ahead, 33 (18.9 per cent) did not give any 
answers to the subsequent questions, which was the equivalent of failing to complete. 
This might originate from the same problems as above. Among the 142 cases with 
answers from directors, data was missing in 23 cases. The way missing data presented 
was noticeable. Among the total of 23 records with missing data, nine participants 
(39.1 per cent) quit the survey after the first section asking about their knowledge about 
using financial derivatives, five (21.7 per cent) quit after the next section, on their 
attitude to using the instruments. Fewer participants quit during subsequent questions. 
Only one participant answered that he/she did not know anything about financial 
derivatives. Little’s MCAR test showed that the thesis data set was with missing 
complete at random (Chi-square 333.53, DF = 322, sig. = .31 > .05). The result is 
effective even without question 1 and 2 about directors and their agreement to proceed 
(Chi-square = 333.53, DF = 30, sig. = .09 > .05). In other words, the data qualified for 
further multiple variate analysis. 
A comparison of directors’ knowledge scores between the quitting group and the full-
answer group shows the difference. The quitting group had higher scores for nine out 
of 15 questions. Was that because the quitters knew more about financial derivatives? 
Or because, lacking knowledge, they overstated their level of understanding and then 
quit because they could not assess other issues? The latter is the more likely answer.  
The final response rate of the survey was 19.07 per cent. This rate is relatively low, 




Table 5.1 summarises participants’ characteristics by qualification, experience, age 
and gender. Most of the directors had a degree: 63.0 per cent had a bachelor degree, 
28.6 per cent had a master’s degree and 5 per cent had a doctorate degree. Only 3.4 
per cent did not have a degree. This is a similar outcome to the qualification levels of 
directors in other countries, such as India (Vissa 2011). Participants mainly had 
degrees in general management (38.7 per cent), finance (26.9 per cent) and accounting 
(23.5 per cent). Only 10.9 per cent had studied other areas such as construction, law, 
technology, pharmacy, information technology, sales, customer care or international 
business. 
The primary areas of working experience in areas were general management (42.0 per 
cent), finance (31.9 per cent) and accounting (20.2 per cent). Other areas of experience 
were construction, law, technology, pharmacy, information technology, sales, and 
customer relations. This agrees with Kesner (1988) in that most directors were 
business executives.  
The participants’ companies were in industrial manufacturing (26.9 per cent), banking 
and finance (21 per cent), consumer goods (16.8 per cent) and others such as basic 
material (11.8 per cent), health care, consumer services and public services. A small 
percentage was from oil and gas, telecommunications and technologies (0.80 per cent 
each), which was unexpected because these industries have a tradition of using 




Table 5.1. Participants’ Qualification Specialisation, Primary Area of Working 
Experience, Age and Gender  
Highest Qualification Per cent 
 Vocational training 3.4 
Bachelor’s degree 63.0 
Master’s degree 28.6 
Doctorate or higher 5.0 
Total 100.0 
Qualification Specialisation Per cent 
 
Other 10.9 




Primary Area of Working Experience Per cent 
 
Other 5.9 




Age Per cent 
 
Under 30 2.5 
30 to 40 49.6 
40 to 50 34.5 
50 to 60 13.4 
Total 100.0 






In terms of age, nearly half (49.6 per cent) of the participants were aged from 30 to 40 
years old; 34.5 per cent were from 40 to 50, and 13.4 per cent were from 50 to 60 years 
old. A minor percentage (2.5 per cent) were under 30. This accords with the normal 
rule that it takes time for someone to accumulate the experience to qualify for work at 
the board level. 
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Sixteen per cent of participants were female and 84 per cent were male. This is 
congruent with 12.75 per cent women in the total population of directors (a statistic by 
the thesis researcher) and much higher than the rate of 3 per cent to 4 per cent in the 
America Fortune 1,000 directorships in 1986 (Kesner 1988), but is not a surprise 
because Vietnam has a left-leaning tradition that strongly promotes women’s 
participation in all social activities including business.  
5.1.2. Variate Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis was conducted to check the consistency of composite measures of the 
constructs (see Section 4.3.3.3) using the principal component analysis extraction 
method.  
5.1.2.1. Knowledge 
In the first factor analysis, Q3 to Q15 all belong to one Knowledge factor; however, 
the Q15 loading on the component was weakest, 0.63 (below 0.70) (Hair et al. 2014) 
and its communality was also weakest, 0.40 (below the recommended level of 0.50) 
(Hair et al. 2014), and cumulative extraction was 69.39 per cent. KMO and Bartlett’s 
test showed an adequate sample. 
In the next step, Q15 was removed, leaving Q3 to Q14. The KMO test was still 
significant, and Cronbach’s alpha was nearly the same. Cumulative extraction was 
72.08 per cent, and all loadings (above 0.75) and communalities (above 0.56) satisfied 
the recommended levels. The Knowledge variate was composed of Q3 to Q14. Total 




Initial factor analysis (covering Q16 to Q23) showed very low correlation between 
Q19, Q20 and other items (0.08 to 0.44) and the correlations were mostly insignificant 
(sig. 0.07 to 0.13 with Q16 to Q18, 0.05 and 0.12 with Q22, only significant with Q21 
and Q23, but correlations were well below 0.30). MSA (Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy) for Q19 and Q20 were low (0.60 and 0.61), much lower than the MSA of 
other items.  
After excluding Q19, Q20 correlations to other variables were still small (0.10 to 0.19) 
and mostly insignificant except for a minor correlation with Q23 (0.19, sig. 0.03). 
When Q20 was excluded, Q19 correlations were almost insignificant except with Q21 
(0.28, sig. 0.00) and Q23 (0.20, sig. 0.02). However, all the significant correlations 
were below the recommended level of 0.30 (Hair et al. 2014). Exclusion of either Q19 
or Q20 improved reliability statistics by increasing Cronbach’s alpha from 0.80 to 0.81.  
After excluding both Q19 and Q20, all correlations were above 0.30 and significant 
(sig. 0.00). In this final analysis, only one factor was extracted and only Q22 had 
communality (0.47) slightly below 0.50 but this level was acceptable for a sample of 
119. Cronbach’s alpha was up to 0.86. In addition, the KMO test improved after 
removing Q19 and Q20 (from 0.81 to 0.83). Attitude was measured by Q16, Q17, Q18, 
Q21, Q22 and Q23.  
Q19 and Q20 were not strongly related to other items. SWAPs and options may be less 
understood or popular with participants than other financial derivatives such as 
forwards and futures. In addition, people may have a general intuition about financial 
derivatives in general, but no understanding about some specific products. 
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5.1.2.3. Risk Propensity  
For Q24 to Q28, all correlations were above 0.30; MSA was from 0.73 to 0.81. 
Communalities were lower for Q24 (0.46) and Q28 (0.49). Loading of Q24 was the 
lowest (0.68) while other loadings were from 0.70 to 0.81. The variance explained was 
relatively low (57.00 per cent).  
After Q24 was excluded, MSA all became smaller, below 0.80 (0.71 to 0.75), but 
communalities improved (0.54 to 0.69) and all loadings increased (0.73 to 0.83). In 
particular, the explained variance increased to 62.20 per cent. Cronbach’s alpha was 
slightly reduced from 0.81 to 0.79; however, this was still well within the desired range. 
Risk Propensity was measured by Q25, Q26, Q27 and Q28.  
5.1.2.4. Subjective Norm  
For Q29 to Q34, all correlations coefficients were above 0.30 (from 0.34 to 0.71) and 
significant (sig. 0.00). MSA coefficients were good, from 0.74 to 0.86. Communalities 
were well above 0.50 (0.50 to 0.71) and all loadings were good (0.71 to 0.84). The 
variance explained was qualified (60.79 per cent) and Cronbach’s alpha was high at 
0.87. Therefore, Subjective Norm variate was covered by Q29, Q30, Q31, Q32, Q33 
and Q34.  
5.1.2.5. Perceived Behavioural Control  
In the analysis with full data from Q35 to Q43, correlations were relatively weaker for 
Q39, Q41 and Q43, some were insignificant for Q41 and Q43 (sig. greater than 0.05). 
MSAs were strong (above 0.73), and only weaker for Q36 (0.73) and Q41 (0.73). All 




When Q43 was excluded, Q41, then either Q41 or Q43 and Q36, tended to detach from 
the main component of other items. When Q36 was deleted, there was one factor 
extracted but loadings were very low for Q41 (0.43) and Q43 (0.54). However, a 
separate factor analysis for the three items (Q41, Q43, Q36) did not support the 
possibility that they belong to one factor (Cronbach’s alpha 0.38) with Q43 having the 
worst loading of 0.20. 
When both Q43 and Q36 were excluded, KMO was qualified (0.83) and MSAs were 
all greater than 0.80, but communalities were lowest for Q41 (0.20) and Q39 (0.40). 
One factor was extracted with variance explained of 47.89 per cent, and the lowest 
loading was to Q41 (0.45).  
When Q41 was added to the deletion list, KMO was still good (0.83, sig. 0.00), with 
MSAs from 0.79 to 0.89. One factor extracted with the lowest loading was Q39 (0.65) 
with higher variance explained of 53.32 per cent. 
After Q39 was deleted, KMO was good, all communalities were above 0.51 and all 
loadings improved to be greater (0.71 to 0.79). Variance explained was further 
improved to 57.28 per cent. Hence, the Perceived Behavioural Control variate included 
Q35, Q37, Q38, Q40 and Q42, with Cronbach’s alpha high at 0.81.  
5.1.2.6. Intention  
All correlations were large and significant (0.583 to 0.897); MSA coefficients were all 
around 0.70 or greater and communalities were all above 0.60 with the variance 
explained at 75.49 per cent. Loadings were all above 0.78. One factor was extracted 
with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89. Therefore, the Intention variate covered Q44, Q45, 
Q46 and Q47. 
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Table 5.2 summarises the results of the factor analyses with the variates with their 
corresponding original questions in the survey, the final questions used for score 
calculation, Cronbach’s alpha, variance explained, loadings and communalities.  











Knowledge 3 to 15 3 to 14 .96 72.08% > .75 > .56 




.86 59.74% > .68 >.47 
Risk 
Propensity 
24 to 28 25 to 28 .79 62.20% > .73 > .54 
Subjective 
Norm 








.81 57.28% > .71 > .51 
Intention  44 to 47 44 to 47 .89 75.49% > .78 > .60 
A double check on the factor analyses by covering all the selected items showed the 
variance explained at 71.36 per cent, significant KMO of 0.86 (sig. 0.00) with 
minimum communality of 0.61. Five separate factors equivalent to Knowledge, 
Attitude, Risk Propensity, Perceived Behavioural Control and Intention clearly 
emerged from the analysis. The exception was that Q29, Q30, Q31 and Q34 loaded 
onto one factor while Q32 and Q33 loaded on another factor, but they did not load on 
any of the factors mentioned above. In addition, the factor composed of Q32 and Q33 
added only 4.37 per cent more to the variance explained, so it was reasonable to 
combine these two sets into one factor, in accordance with the original design and 
meaning of Subjective Norm. Cronbach’s alpha of the check analysis was high at 0.93 
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(see Appendix 5). The overall check supported the single factor analyses to create the 
variates.   
The final variate data were the summate scale of the component items. Descriptive 
statistics, histograms and tests of normality showed that only the Knowledge variate 
met the requirement of normality (see Appendix 7). 
5.2. Directors’ Understanding of Using Financial Derivatives from Descriptive 
Analysis  
At first glance, Knowledge and Risk Propensity scores were relatively low on the five-
point Likert scale, while all the other sections scored highly, approaching 3.5, 
especially Attitude, which scored highest at nearly 4.0. Using the whole data set, mean 
scores for each question in each section were as follows: Knowledge around and below 
3; Attitude approaching 4; Risk Propensity ranging from 2 to 3; Subjective Norm 
approaching 3.5; Perceived Behavioural Control from 2.5 to 3.7 and Intention around 
3.5. However, distributions of all single items were not normal; they were skewed to 
the left for Risk Propensity items and to the right for all other groups of items. There 
were some cases exhibiting themselves as outliers for some single items, but deleting 
them caused more outliers. Furthermore, they represented that some participants had 
a certain pattern of thinking and understanding about financial derivative issues. Hence, 
they were kept for the subsequent analysis. 
The following descriptive analysis is presented by order in the questionnaire, including 





Director participants showed a low understanding of technical issues related to 
financial derivatives. The low levels were present in all single aspects. Mean scores of 
15 Knowledge items were consistently below 3.0 with 95 per cent confidence interval 
for mean and 5 per cent trimmed mean, as presented in Table 5.3. There were a few 
participants with the answer “Don't know” accounting for a minor percentage of 0.8 
per cent to 2.5 per cent of answers to each question. At the other extreme, the 
percentage of directors with “Extremely good/comprehensive” knowledge of financial 
derivatives was even smaller, from 0.0 per cent to 2.5 per cent. 
No one assessed themselves as having a comprehensive understanding of “Techniques 
for evaluating risks associated with using financial derivatives” (question 8, Table 5.3) 
and “Procedures in financial derivatives transactions” (question 11, Table 5.3), the 
worst rate among all the items. This result explains the low mean scores of 2.4 and 2.4 
respectively, the lowest among the means (as presented n Figure 5.1). It is clear that 
directors have a slightly better understanding of specific types of financial derivatives 
(for example forwards, futures, options, swaps) and the purpose of using them, but 
have the lowest understanding of risks, pricing methods, risk evaluation and 
transaction procedures.  
From 31.1 per cent to 48.7 per cent of directors said that they had moderate 
understanding of financial derivatives; only 10.9 per cent to 21.0 per cent had good 
knowledge. The imbalance happened because 18.5 per cent to 42.9 per cent of 
participants had limited knowledge, the second biggest percentage after the moderate 
level, and 8.4 per cent to 15.1 per cent had extremely limited understanding, the third 
biggest percentage. In line with the self-report phenomenon in surveys like this one, 
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nearly 80 per cent of directors did not have good knowledge of the instruments. This 
reflects their insufficient knowledge of financial derivatives in general. 
Table 5.3. Summary of Knowledge Item Scores and Frequency  
Items Mean       
  Very limited Limited Moderate Good Comprehensive Don’t know 
3. Technical issues related 
to forward contracts 
2.8 9.2 18.5 48.7 21.0 1.7 .8 
4. Technical issues related 
to futures contracts 
2.7 10.9 21.8 42.9 20.2 1.7 2.5 
5. Technical issues related 
to SWAP contracts 
2.7 10.9 21.0 47.9 14.3 3.4 2.5 
6. Technical issues related 
to Options 
2.7 8.4 22.7 48.7 16.8 1.7 1.7 
7. Methods for pricing 
financial derivatives 
2.5 10.9 34.5 41.2 10.9 1.7 .8 
8. Techniques for 
evaluating risks 
associated with using 
financial derivatives 
2.4 13.4 42.9 31.1 11.8 .00 .8 
9. Purpose(s) of using 
financial derivatives 
2.6 10.1 26.9 46.2 15.1 .8 .8 
10. The risks associated 
with using financial 
derivatives 
2.5 10.9 31.1 41.2 12.6 1.7 2.5 
11. Procedures in 
financial derivatives 
transactions 








12. In general, my 
knowledge of financial 
derivatives is ……… 
2.5 15.1 27.7 42.9 12.6 1.7  
14. The information 
search I have performed 
about financial derivatives 
is……. 








13. To what extent would 
you consider yourself 
informed about financial 
derivatives? 
2.5 11.8 36.1 37.0 12.6 2.5  








15. To what extent do you 
agree with this statement 
“I don't have much 
experience in making the 
decision about financial 
derivatives”? (Reversed) 





Figure 5.1. Mean Scores of Knowledge Items 
 
To get an initial view of the differences in knowledge amongst different groups of 
directors, the data were partitioned into two main groups of Finance and Accounting 
directors and Others (that included General Management and Others) for the two 
aspects of Qualification Specialisation and Working Experience. For convenience, 
“Don’t Know” answers were classified into the “Very limited” category. Item mean 
scores and percentages of each level for the four groups are detailed in Tables 5.4 and 
5.5. The tables show directors with Finance and Accounting qualification had higher 
mean item scores (2.5 to 2.9) than those with other specialisation (2.2 to 2.7) 
(significant at 95 per cent confidence level for items 8 through 14, 7 out of 13 items, 
sig. 0.005 to 0.04); those with working experience in Finance and Accounting also had 
better mean scores (2.5 to 2.9) than directors with experience in other sectors (2.1 to 
2.7) (significant at 95 per cent confidence level for 9 out of 13 items, item 6 through 
14, sig. 0.000 to 0.041). These were the outcomes of higher percentages for the group 
of Finance and Accounting directors falling into the middle (“Moderate”) and upper 















Types of Financial Derivatives
Mean Scores of Knowledge Items
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cent of directors with Finance and Accounting education had “Moderate” 
understanding, compared to 8.5 per cent to 47.5 per cent for the Other group. Similarly, 
only 5.3 per cent to 19.3 per cent of directors with experience in other sectors had 
“Good” understanding, while the rate of those with Finance and Accounting expertise 









Extremely weak (12, 14) 
Extremely Uninformed (13) 
(%) 
Limited 
Weak (12, 14) 
Uninformed (13) (%) 
Moderate (%) 
Good 
Strong (12, 14) 
Informed (13) (%) 
Comprehensive 
Extremely strong (12, 14) 




















  Very limited Limited Moderate Good Comprehensive 
3. Technical issues related to 
forward contracts 
2.7 2.9 11.9 8.3 20.3 16.7 47.5 50.0 18.6 23.3 1.7 1.7 
4. Technical issues related to 
futures contracts 
2.6 2.8 15.3 11.7 25.4 18.3 37.3 48.3 22.0 18.3  3.3 
5. Technical issues related to 
SWAP contracts? 
2.6 2.8 16.9 10.0 22.0 20.0 44.1 51.7 13.6 15.0 3.4 3.3 
6. Technical issues related to 
Options 
2.6 2.8 13.6 6.7 25.4 20.0 42.4 55.0 18.6 15.0  3.3 
7. Methods for pricing financial 
derivatives 
2.4 2.7 16.9 6.7 37.3 31.7 35.6 46.7 8.5 13.3 1.7 1.7 
8. Techniques for evaluating 
risks associated with using 
financial derivatives 
2.2 2.5 20.3 8.3 44.1 41.7 27.1 35.0 8.5 15.0   
9. Purpose(s) of using financial 
derivatives 
2.4 2.8 16.9 5.0 30.5 23.3 40.7 51.7 10.2 20.0 1.7  
10. The risks associated with 
using financial derivatives 





Extremely weak (12, 14) 
Extremely Uninformed (13) 
(%) 
Limited 
Weak (12, 14) 
Uninformed (13) (%) 
Moderate (%) 
Good 
Strong (12, 14) 
Informed (13) (%) 
Comprehensive 
Extremely strong (12, 14) 




















11. Procedures in financial 
derivatives transactions 
2.3 2.6 18.6 6.7 44.1 33.3 23.7 46.7 13.6 13.3   
  Extremely weak Weak Moderate Strong Extremely strong 
12. In general, my knowledge of 
financial derivatives is ……… 
2.3 2.8 23.7 6.7 33.9 21.7 32.2 53.3 8.5 16.7 1.7 1.7 
14. The information search I 
have performed about financial 
derivatives is……. 
2.3 2.7 16.9 10.0 37.3 20.0 39.0 53.3 6.8 15.0  1.7 
  Extremely uninformed Uninformed Moderate Informed Extremely informed 
13. To what extent would you 
consider yourself informed about 
financial derivatives? 
2.3 2.8 18.6 5.0 44.1 28.3 23.7 50.0 11.9 13.3 1.7 3.3 
  Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly disagree 
15. To what extent do you agree 
with this statement "I don't have 
much experience in making the 



















Extremely weak (12, 14) 
Extremely Uninformed (13) 
(%) 
Limited 
Weak (12, 14) 





Strong (12, 14) 
Informed (13)  
(%) 
Comprehensive 
Extremely strong (12, 14) 


























  Very limited Limited Moderate Good Comprehensive 
3. Technical issues related to 
forward contracts 2.7 2.9 
14.0 6.5 19.3 17.7 47.4 50.0 19.3 22.6  3.2 
4. Technical issues related to 
futures contracts 2.6 2.8 
17.5 9.7 24.6 19.4 38.6 46.8 17.5 22.6 1.8 1.6 
5. Technical issues related to 
SWAP contracts? 2.5 2.8 
21.1 6.5 21.1 21.0 43.9 51.6 8.8 19.4 5.3 1.6 
6. Technical issues related to 
Options 2.5 2.9 
17.5 3.2 22.8 22.6 43.9 53.2 14.0 19.4 1.8 1.6 
7. Methods for pricing financial 
derivatives 2.3 2.7 
19.3 4.8 40.4 29.0 29.8 51.6 7.0 14.5 3.5  
8. Techniques for evaluating 
risks associated with using 
financial derivatives 
2.1 2.5 22.8 6.5 43.9 41.9 24.6 37.1 8.8 14.5   
9. Purpose(s) of using financial 
derivatives 2.4 2.8 
17.5 4.8 29.8 24.2 40.4 51.6 10.5 19.4 1.8  
10. The risks associated with 
using financial derivatives 2.2 2.8 





Extremely weak (12, 14) 
Extremely Uninformed (13) 
(%) 
Limited 
Weak (12, 14) 





Strong (12, 14) 
Informed (13)  
(%) 
Comprehensive 
Extremely strong (12, 14) 


























11. Procedures in financial 
derivatives transactions 2.2 2.7 
21.1 4.8 43.9 33.9 26.3 43.5 8.8 17.7   
  Extremely weak Weak Moderate Strong Extremely strong 
12. In general, my knowledge of 
financial derivatives is ……… 2.2 2.9 
28.1 3.2 31.6 24.2 31.6 53.2 7.0 17.7 1.8 1.6 
14. The information search I 
have performed about financial 
derivatives is……. 
2.2 2.8 19.3 8.1 38.6 19.4 36.8 54.8 5.3 16.1  1.6 
  Extremely uninformed Uninformed Moderate Informed Extremely informed 
13. To what extent would you 
consider yourself informed about 
financial derivatives? 
2.2 2.8 19.3 4.8 43.9 29.0 26.3 46.8 8.8 16.1 1.8 3.2 
  Strongly agree Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly disagree 
15. To what extent do you agree 
with this statement “I don't have 
much experience in making the 
decision about financial 
derivatives”? (Reversed) 





Most of the mean attitude scores ranged from 3.5 to 3.9 (with 5 per cent Trimmed 
Mean and 95 per cent Confidence Interval for Mean approaching 4.0), except for 
attitudes toward pricing SWAP (3.0) and selecting options (2.9) as summarised in 
Table 5.6. The scores were much higher than knowledge scores. 
Four of the eight Attitude questions had no extremely negative answers, and the rates 
were minor (0.8 per cent to 1.7 per cent) in the other four questions. Extremely positive 
Attitude answers accounted for a much bigger percentage – from 3.4 per cent to 16.0 
per cent – and a majority of the answers were in neutral and positive categories. 
Negative answers were only from 3.4 per cent to 7.6 per cent, except for “Selecting 
appropriate options” (28.6 per cent) and “Pricing SWAP contracts” (28.6 per cent) (see 
Table 5.6). This explains why the distribution of data is highly skewed to the right.  
Directors demonstrated a highly positive attitude to using financial derivatives and 
thought that financial derivatives are good/useful/beneficial for managing the business 
and controlling overall business risks; it is pleasant/easy/interesting to make a decision 
on financial derivatives and using the instruments is wise/profitable. From 60 per cent 
to 80 per cent of participants presented a positive to very positive attitude on six out 
of eight aspects of financial derivatives. They were less positive about using SWAPs 
and options.  
In general, participants were highly positive in answering questions on the usefulness 


















16. Using financial derivatives is … 
for managing business. (Extremely 
Bad to Extremely good) 
3.9 .0 3.4 18.5 62.2 16.0 
17. Using futures contracts is … for 
control overall business risks. 
(Extremely Useless to Extremely 
Useful) 
3.8 .0 5.0 14.3 70.6 10.1 
18. It is … to use forward contracts 
for controlling accounting records. 
(Extremely Harmful to Extremely 
Beneficial) 
3.6 .8 7.6 21.0 65.5 5.0 
19. Pricing SWAP contract is … 
(Extremely Unpleasant to Extremely 
Pleasant) 
3.0 1.7 26.1 43.7 24.4 4.2 
20. Selecting appropriate options 
is … (Extremely Difficult to 
Extremely Easy) 
2.9 .8 28.6 45.4 21.0 4.2 
21. Putting money into financial 
derivatives is … (Extremely Foolish 
to Extremely Wise) 
3.5 .8 4.2 35.3 56.3 3.4 
22. Managing financial derivatives 
is … (Extremely Boring to 
Extremely Interesting) 
3.7 .0 7.6 21.0 62.2 9.2 
23. Outcomes from using financial 
derivatives are … (Extremely 
Unprofitable to Extremely 
Profitable) 
3.7 .0 5.9 16.8 68.9 8.4 
 
5.2.3. Risk Propensity 
Risk propensity scores were all either equal or lower than 3.0, with means ranging 
from 2.2 to 3.0, as shown in Table 5.7. Five questions asked participants about their 
likelihood of taking risky actions in situations with high uncertainty (see Appendix 3 
for the questions) similar to the context of using financial derivatives to assess their 
risk propensity in using such instruments. The percentage of directors who were 
“Extremely likely” to act in risky situations was very low, from 0.8 per cent to a 
maximum of 2.5 per cent, while at the opposite end of the scale, “Extremely unlikely” 
accounted for a much greater percentage: from 5.9 per cent to 17.6 per cent. A major 
portion had a neutral status (Neither unlikely nor likely): 21.0 per cent to 46.2 per cent. 
For the rest, “Unlikely” answers carried more weight than “Likely” ones. In general, 
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directors presented as having slightly risk-averse to risk-neutral propensity, with three 
of the five items’ mean scores around 3.0, and the other two mean scores from 2.2 to 
2.5 on a five-point scale. 
















24. How likely are you to choose riskier 
alternatives based on the assessment of 
others on whom you must rely on such as 
management board, financial officers, 
accounting officers or family members? 
2.9 5.0 21.8 46.2 25.2 1.7 
25. How likely are you to choose riskier 
alternatives which could have a major 
impact on your own future? 
2.9 6.7 25.2 35.3 31.9 .8 
26. How likely are you to choose riskier 
alternatives which rely upon analyses that 
are high in technical complexity? 
3.0 5.9 19.3 37.8 34.5 2.5 
27. How likely are you to initiate a 
financial action which has the potential to 
backfire? 
2.5 17.6 31.1 34.5 16.0 .8 
28. How likely are you to support a 
decision when you are aware that relevant 
analyses were done while missing several 
pieces of information? 
2.2 13.4 57.1 21.0 6.7 1.7 
 
5.2.4. Subjective Norm 
Subjective norm scores represented a slightly positive self-perceived support from 
related people to board directors. All the means were from 3.3 to 3.5 on a five-point 
scale as shown in Table 5.8.  
Only 7.5 per cent to 16.8 per cent of directors thought that people related to them 
would oppose their use of financial derivatives, meaning that more than 80 per cent 
thought the people related to them would either support or not protest about such use.  
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29. Most people who are important to 
me would think that using financial 
derivatives is a wise idea. 
3.3 2.5 12.6 35.3 45.4 4.2 
30. Most people who are important to 
me would think I should use financial 
derivatives. 
3.3 1.7 11.8 43.7 39.5 3.4 
31. My subordinates would think that 
using financial derivatives is a wise 
idea. 
3.3 .00 13.4 44.5 38.7 3.4 
32. Company shareholders who are 
important to me would think that 
using financial derivatives is a good 
idea. 
3.4 .00 8.4 37.8 49.6 4.2 
33. Business partners who are 
important to me would think that 
using financial derivatives is a good 
idea. 
3.5 .8 5.9 35.3 53.8 4.2 
34. My family who are important to 
me would think I should use financial 
derivatives. 
3.3 1.7 15.1 37.8 42.0 3.4 
 
No participant thought that corporate internal stakeholders (the subordinates and 
shareholders) would oppose strongly the use of financial derivatives (.0 per cent for 
“Extremely disagree”). The proportion of “Disagree” of 5.9 per cent to 15.1 per cent 
was considerably lower than the proportion of “Agree” (38.7 per cent to 53.8 per cent) 
combined with “Strongly agree” (3.4 per cent to 4.2 per cent).  
Directors had a strong belief that their peers, subordinates, shareholders, business 
partners and even family members would support their use of financial derivatives.  
5.2.5. Perceived Behavioural Control 
Most of the Perceived Behavioural Control scores were below 3.0, from 2.5 to 2.8 (six 
out of nine items), while only three scores were above 3 (3.1, 3.2 and 3.6) as presented 
in Table 5.9. The exceptionally high score of 3.6 related to directors’ belief that they 
can “find capable staff to conduct financial derivatives transactions”.  
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These results showed directors’ general confidence in the availability of financial 
derivatives suppliers. When put in the context of a company as a whole, not individual 
capacity, directors showed less expectation of control. Directors demonstrated a low 
confidence in their ability to control the corporate use of financial derivatives, with 
almost all mean scores being from 2.5 to 3.1, except for “ability to enforce a decision 
to use SWAP contracts when needed” (3.2) and “I believe that I can find capable staff 
to conduct financial derivatives transactions” (3.6).  















35. “For me to evaluate forward contracts 
is …”(Extremely difficult to Extremely easy) 
2.8 2.5 33.6 40.3 20.2 3.4 
36. “If I wanted to, it would be easy for me 
to select a supplier of futures contracts.” 
(Strongly disagree to Strongly agree) 
3.1 2.5 24.4 31.1 37.8 4.2 
37. “How much control do you have over 
the transaction of financial derivatives?” 
(Almost no control to Total control) 
2.6 10.1 32.8 42.9 10.9 3.4 
38. “I believe that I have the ability to 
enforce a decision to use SWAP contracts 
when needed.” (Strongly disagree to 
Strongly agree) 
3.2 2.5 17.6 31.9 46.2 1.7 
39. “I believe that I can find capable staff to 
conduct financial derivatives transactions.” 
(Strongly disagree to Strongly agree) 
3.6 .8 5.9 20.2 68.9 4.2 
40. “How confident are you that you will be 
able to persuade your companies to use 
options?” (Almost no confidence to Total 
confidence) 
2.6 11.8 30.3 45.4 9.2 3.4 
41. “Using financial derivatives is entirely 
up to me.” (Strongly disagree to Strongly 
agree) 
2.5 7.6 47.1 27.7 16.8 .8 
42. “To what extent do you feel that 
ordering management to use financial 
derivatives is within your control?” (Totally 
beyond my control to Totally within my 
control) 
2.7 5.9 23.5 58.0 10.9 1.7 
43. “The number of events outside my 
control which could prevent me from 
recommending company to use financial 
derivatives is: …” (Very few to Numerous) 
(Reversed) 




5.2.6. Intention to Use Financial Derivatives  
Intention mean scores were all high, around 3.5 as presented in Table 5.10. Four 
questions about Intention to use financial derivatives were arranged in an increasingly 
confirmative order. Directors had a strong Intention to use financial derivatives, with 
all mean scores approximately 3.5. Half (52.9 per cent) to 69.7 per cent of directors 
wanted to use financial derivatives at some point in the future (Agree to Strongly 
Agree), while the percentage of those who would not use them was low (0.8 per cent 
to 3.4 per cent for “Strongly disagree”), lower than the percentage of those who were 
sure about using them (2.5 per cent to 4.2 per cent for “Strongly agree”). The 
percentage of participants who “Agree” to use financial derivatives (50.4 per cent to 
67.2 per cent) far surpassed the percentage of those who “Disagree” (6.7 per cent to 
10.1 per cent), while 20.2 per cent to 36.1 per cent of participants were in a 
neutral/undecided position. This skewed the distributions of answers for each question.    
















44. I would like to use financial 
derivatives for my business in the 
near future. 
3.5 1.7 8.4 22.7 63.9 3.4 
45. I intend to use financial 
derivatives for my business in the 
near future. 
3.5 3.4 6.7 20.2 67.2 2.5 
46. I plan to use financial derivatives 
for my business in the near future. 
3.4 .8 10.1 36.1 50.4 2.5 
47. I will make an effort to prepare 
my company to use financial 
derivatives in the near future. 




5.3. Association between Directors’ Understanding with Attitude and Other 
Variables 
The six variates are components of the model, below, used to investigate directors’ 
understanding of financial derivatives. The survey data were included in the analysis 
to test if the suggested main relationships exist under the potential impact of certain 
environmental factors such as directors’ education, experience, gender, age, corporate 
industry and scale.   
5.3.1. Associations between Personal and Corporate Features and Variates 
5.3.1.1. Knowledge 
The Knowledge variate was normally distributed, hence appropriate for both 
parametric and non-parametric tests. The hypotheses for testing were that there is a 
difference in the levels of directors’ Knowledge depending on their personal 
(education, experience, age and gender) and corporate (size and industry) features. 
Two non-parametric tests were used. The non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis H-test is 
used to determine if more than two independent samples are significantly different. 
When the test results are significant, at least one of the samples is different from the 
other samples. However, the test does not identify how many and where the 
difference(s) occurs. To answer these two questions, sample contrasts such as the 
Mann–Whitney U-test is a useful method. The Kruskal–Wallis H-test statistic is 
computed by combining all of the samples and rank ordering the values together. The 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is the parametric equivalent to this test 
(Corder and Foreman 2014, 117-118). ANOVA is a statistical technique used to 
determine whether samples from two or more groups come from populations with 
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equal means (Hair et al. 2014, 666). The null hypothesis tested is the equality of a 
single dependent variable means across groups; however, the test does not locate 
where the significant differences are (Hair et al. 2014, 698).  
Kruskal–Wallis tests provided support for five of the eight hypotheses, H1a, H1b, H2, 
H3 and H4a, at the confidence level of 0.05 (see Appendix 8 for a summary of the 
tests). These differences are also confirmed by ANOVA tests between the Knowledge 
variate and other personal and corporate features: H1a (F 3.585, sig. 0.016, df 3), H1b 
(F 4.338, sig. 0.006, df 3), H2 (F 7.598, sig. 0.000, df 3), H3 (F 2.013, sig. 0.044, df 9) 
and H4a (F 2.885, sig. 0.026, df 4). 
Directors’ Knowledge about financial derivatives was associated with their education 
(levels and majors), working experience, corporate industry and corporate scale in 
terms of the number of employees. Directors’ age and gender had no effect on their 
level of understanding.  
To determine what type of education, experience and industry enable directors to have 
better knowledge about derivatives, Mann–Whitney tests were conducted and the 
results are reported below. The Mann−Whitney U-test is a non-parametric statistical 
procedure to compare two independent samples. The samples are combined and rank 
ordered together. If the values from the two samples are randomly mixed in the rank 
ordering, the samples are not different; if they are clustered at opposite ends when 
combined, there is a difference between them. The analysis is useful for determining 
if two sample are significantly different (Corder and Foreman 2014, 69-71).  
Difference among Highest Level of Qualifications 
Directors with a master’s degree had the best mean Knowledge score (mean 2.96), 
followed by those with a doctoral degree (mean 2.80), bachelor degree (mean 2.47) 
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and vocational training (mean 2.39). None of the groups exceeded the moderate 
knowledge level of 3.0.  
The Mann–Whitney test pointed out the difference between directors with a bachelor 
degree and those with a master’s degree; those with a master’s degree had better 
knowledge about financial derivatives (mean rank 67.19) than those with a bachelor 
degree (mean rank 49.47) (U 860.50, Z -2.71, sig. 0.00 (2-tailed)). 
Difference among Qualification Specialisations 
Directors who have a qualification in finance recorded the highest Knowledge score 
(mean 3.0026), and the only mean score above the moderate level of 3.0. Directors 
with either a general management or accounting qualification had a slightly lower 
score, mean 2.52 and 2.55 respectively, which was higher than that of directors with 
other qualifications (2.24).   
The Post Hoc test (used to confirm where the differences occurred between groups 
when an overall statistically significant difference in group means has been established) 
pointed out the difference between directors with a degree in Finance and General 
Management (sig. 0.01). The Mann–Whitney test agreed with the Post Hoc test in that 
directors with a major in Finance had a better understanding of financial derivatives 
than directors with a major in General Management (mean rank 48.23, 33.42, U 456.50, 
Z -2.84, sig. 0.00), Accounting (mean rank 35.61, 24.66, U 284.50, Z -2.42, sig. 0.01) 
and Others (mean rank 26.13, 15.31, U 108.00, Z -2.51, sig. 0.01) in a consistent 
manner.  
When the knowledge data were partitioned into two groups of directors with Finance 
and Accounting qualification and those with Other qualification, Two Independent-
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Samples T-Test demonstrated that Finance and Accounting directors had better 
knowledge of financial derivatives than the others (means of 33.51, 29.57 respectively, 
t -2.38, df 117, sig. 019) (see Appendix 10).  
Difference among Major Areas of Working Experience 
Directors with working experience in Finance had the best knowledge about financial 
derivatives and were the only group above the moderate level (mean 3.06 versus the 
moderate level of 3.0). Directors with expertise in General Management and 
Accounting had a similar knowledge level (mean 2.44 and 2.47 respectively), which 
was much higher than that of directors with other expertise (mean 2.09).  
In a Mann–Whitney test, directors with experience in Finance had better knowledge 
about financial derivatives than those with experience in General Management (mean 
rank 56.41, 35.45, U 497.500, Z -3.81, sig. 0.00), Accounting (mean rank 37.59, 21.85, 
U 224.50, Z -3.35, sig. 0.00) and Others (mean rank 25.04, 11.93, U 55.50, Z -2.43, 
sig. 0.01).  
When the data were re-arranged into two groups of those with Finance and Accounting 
working experience and those with other experience, the test showed that directors 
with Finance and Accounting experience had better knowledge than the other group 
(means of 34.06, 28.84 respectively, t -3.21, df 117, sig. 002). The mean difference 
(5.22) of these two groups of working experience was bigger than the difference 
between the two groups of qualifications in the previous section (see Appendix 10 for 
more details).  
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Difference between Directors’ Company Primary Industry 
Directors in the Banking and Finance sector had a better understanding of financial 
derivatives than directors in Basic Material (mean rank 23.34, 14.04, U 91.50, Z -2.49, 
sig. 0.01), Industrial Manufacturing (mean rank 35.86, 23.64, U 228.50, Z -2.76, sig. 
0.00), Consumer Goods (mean rank 29.08, 15.40, U 98.00, Z -3.47, sig. 0.00), and 
Public Service (mean rank 21.62, 11.41, U 59.50, Z -2.68, sig. 0.00). For other sectors, 
the number of participants is very low, so any comparison is not effective.   
Difference between Directors’ Company Scale (Number of Employees) 
Directors of big companies with more than 1,000 employees had a better knowledge 
of financial derivatives than either directors of the smallest companies (1 to 100 
employees) (mean rank 42.82, 27.48, U 163.50, Z -2.84, sig. 0.00) or companies with 
100 to 200 employees (mean rank 22.46, 15.02, U 84.50, Z -2.11, sig. 0.03).  
5.3.1.2. Risk Propensity  
The association between directors’ Risk Propensity and personal and corporate 
features was tested for the difference in the levels of directors’ Risk Propensity linked 
with their different levels of education, major areas of study, areas of working 
experience, corporate industries, age, gender, company’s number of employees and 
corporate turnover.  
Kruskal–Wallis tests did not support any of these correlations (all sig. > 0.05), and 
suggested that there was no evidence of an effect of directors’ education, experience, 
gender, age and their companies’ scale on their Risk Propensity.  
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5.3.1.3. Attitude  
The only feature that affected directors’ Attitude was their company scale in terms of 
turnover, as shown by the Kruskal–Wallis test (Chi-Square 10.664, df 3, sig. 0.014). 
Directors of the biggest companies (turnover of 15,000 billion Vietnam dong or more) 
had a more positive Attitude to using financial derivatives than directors from the 
smallest companies (0 to 5,000 billion VND) (mean rank 77.82, 49.51, U 233.00, Z -
2.98, sig. 0.00).  
5.3.1.4. Subjective Norm  
A series of Kruskal–Wallis tests did not support any correlations between the directors’ 
and company’s features and the directors’ Subjective Norm (all sig. insignificant > = 
0.05).  
5.3.1.5. Perceived Behavioural Control  
Kruskal–Wallis tests showed the effect of directors’ highest qualifications (Chi-Square 
12.96, df 3, sig. 0.00) and corporate scale in terms of turnover (Chi-Square 10.72, df 
3, sig. 0.01) on directors’ Perceived Behavioural Control.  
Mann–Whitney tests supported the proposition that directors with a master’s degree 
had higher Perceived Behavioural Control than those with a bachelor degree (mean 
rank 68.54, 48.86, U 814.50, Z -3.02, sig. 0.00) and directors with a doctorate had 
better perceived control than those with a bachelor degree (mean rank 61.92, 39.33, U 
99.50, Z -2.27, sig. 0.02).  
Directors of companies with a turnover 10,000 to 15,000 billion VND had higher 
perceived control than directors from companies with a smaller turnover, of up to 
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5,000 billion VND (mean rank 74.30, 48.17, U 108.50, Z -2.01, sig. 0.044). Directors 
from companies with over 15,000 billion VND annual turnover had better perceived 
control than directors from small companies with turnover up to 5,000 billion VND 
(mean rank 73.73, 49.99, U 278.00, Z -2.48, sig. 0.01). Directors from companies with 
annual turnover over 15,000 billion VND had higher perceived control than directors 
from companies with 5,000 to 10,000 billion VND (mean rank 13.82, 7.90, U 24.00, 
Z -2.19, sig. 0.02). Directors from bigger companies consistently had better Perceived 
Behavioural Control than those from smaller companies.  
5.3.1.6. Intention  
Kruskal–Wallis tests showed that directors’ level of qualifications (Chi-Square 9.90, 
df 3, sig. 0.01) and major area of study (Chi-Square 8.40, df 3, sig. 0.03) were 
associated with their Intention to use financial derivatives. 
Directors with vocational training had a greater Intention to use financial derivatives 
than those with a bachelor degree (mean rank 65.38, 38.65, U 48.50, Z -2.34, sig. 0.01) 
but directors with a bachelor degree had lower Intention than those with a master’s 
degree (50.85, 64.15, U 964.00, Z -2.12, sig. 0.03).  
Directors with a qualification in Finance had a stronger Intention than those in General 
Management (mean rank 45.75, 35.15, U 536.00, Z -2.15, sig. 0.03) and those in 
Accounting (35.77, 24.48, U 279.50, Z -2.62, sig. 0.00).  
The directors’ two personal characteristics of gender and age did not demonstrate any 
influence over all other variables in the main model.  
All the significant pairs of influence are summarised in Figure 5.2 below. Directors’ 
education, experience, and corporate scale and industry influenced their knowledge of 
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financial derivatives. Their education had further impact on their perceived 
behavioural control and intention. In addition, their corporate scale was associated 
with their attitude and perceived behavioural control.  
Figure 5.2. Significant Associations between Main Variates and Directors’ 














5.3.2. Variate Correlations 
As described in Section 5.1.2., five of the six variates as variables in the model did not 
meet the condition of approximate normal distribution (except for the Knowledge 
variate). Therefore, to assess their association, the non-parametric Spearman’s rho test 
of correlation was used. The focus of this thesis is to test if each pair of relationships 
in the model exists, not the causal dimension of the relations. As proposed in Section 



































In addition to these, other interactive relationships were tested: among directors’ 
Attitude, Subjective Norms, Perceived Behavioural Control and Risk Propensity as 
suggested in the original model of the theory of planned behaviour. 
The hypotheses for testing are shown in Table 5.11 below. 
Table 5.11. Hypotheses of Relationships among the Main Variables 
 Hypothesis 
1 H7a: Directors’ Knowledge of the use of financial derivatives is associated 
with their Risk Propensity. 
2 H7b: Directors’ Knowledge of the use of financial derivatives is associated 
with their Attitude toward the instruments. 
3 H7c: Directors’ Knowledge of the use of financial derivatives is associated 
with their Subjective Norm. 
4 H7d: Directors’ Knowledge of the use of financial derivatives is associated 
with their Perceived Behavioural Control. 
5 H6: Directors’ Knowledge of the use of financial derivatives is associated 
with their Intention to use the instruments.  
6 H5a: Directors’ Risk Propensity is associated with their Intention to use the 
instruments.   
7 H5b: Directors’ Attitude to the use of financial derivatives is associated with 
their Intention to use the instruments. 
8 H5c: Directors’ Subjective Norm is associated with their Intention to use the 
instruments.  
9 H5d: Directors’ Perceived Behavioural Control is associated with their 
Intention to use the instruments. 
 
To specify the relations among other pairs of variates, further tests of correlations were 
also conducted: Risk Propensity and Attitude; Risk Propensity and Subjective Norm, 
Risk Propensity and Perceived Behavioural Control, Attitude and Subjective Norm, 
Attitude and Perceived Behavioural Control, Subjective Norm and Perceived 
Behavioural Control.  
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Support for the existence of the associations was assessed by the appearance and 
strength of significant correlations in several tests, both uncontrolled and controlled at 
different levels. The initial test was the non-parametric Spearman’s rho with inputs of 
all six variates. The following partial correlation tests were conducted in SPSS syntax 
environment with a step of transforming rho.54 A total of 28 partial correlation tests 
were made.  
The first Spearman’s rho correlation tests (see Appendix 4) showed significant positive 
correlation between: 
-  Knowledge and Attitude, Risk Propensity, and Perceived Behavioural Control. 
- Risk Propensity and Knowledge, Attitude, Subjective Norm, Perceived 
Behavioural Control and Intention.  
- Attitude and Knowledge, Risk Propensity, Subjective Norm, Perceived 
Behavioural Control and Intention.  
- Subjective Norm and Attitude, Risk Propensity, Perceived Behavioural 
Control and Intention.  
- Perceived Behavioural Control and Knowledge, Attitude, Risk Propensity, 
Subjective Norm and Intention.  
- Intention and Attitude, Risk Propensity, Subjective Norm and Perceived 
Behavioural Control.  
                                                          
54 See IBM instruction at: http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21474822  
210 
 
All the correlations are positive, implying a positive relationship between the pairs. 
The important point is that knowledge about the use of financial derivatives does not 
present any correlation with directors’ intention to use the instruments. 
Knowledge and Risk Propensity widely had correlations with all other variables in the 
main proposed model. Partial correlation testing was used to check if there was any 
spurious effect caused by those two variables. 
Significant correlations and partial correlations are summarised in the two tables in 
Appendix 6. The maximum number of correlation and partial correlation tests that each 
pair of variables is involved in is summarised in Table 5.12. If a relationship is 
significantly correlated in at least 50 per cent of the total correlations, it is supported; 
otherwise, it is rejected. This criterion and the analysis in this section are taken from 
Schlegel (2015). Schlegel (2015, 209) used two thresholds to assess if an influencing 
factor was significant based on the number of significant relationships among a total 
of 43: “If there are at least ten significant relationships between an influencing factor 
variable and different cost-of-capital practices, the factor is considered to be supported 
[…] For five to nine significant relationships, the influencing factor is considered to 
be partially supported”. The equivalent rate of significant relationship is 23.25 per cent 
(10 divided by 43). To simplify and increase the confidence of assessing hypotheses 
in this thesis, a single but higher threshold of 50 per cent was used following the rule 
of majority. 
The tables show there is no significant correlation between directors’ Knowledge and 
their Intention to use financial derivatives (either normal or partial correlation). This 
supports the rejection of H6.  
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The second key point is that directors’ Risk Propensity and Intention is weakly 
correlated when uncontrolled (rho = 0.292, p = 0.001) or controlled for one variable 
(rho = 0.190 to 0.258, p = 0.005 to 0.039), almost insignificant when controlled for 
two variables or more, except when controlled for Subjective Norm – Perceived 
Control (.186, p = .045). However, overall, it is still significant in six out of nine tests 
which lends support for H5a.  
As predicted by the theory of planned behaviour, the associations between directors’ 
Intention with either of their Attitude, Subjective Norm or Perceived Behavioural 
Control were moderate and significant in all normal correlations and partial 
correlations. 
Attitude–Intention association was positive and moderate in strength in seven out of 
ten significant correlations (correlation of 0.437 to 0.516, p = 0.000). The other three 
correlations approached the moderate level (0.245 to 0.287, p = 0.002 to 0.008). 
Therefore H5b is supported.  
Even stronger is the association between directors’ Subjective Norm and their 
Intention, which was positive and moderate in eight out of ten correlations (0.346 to 
0.548, p = 0.000). The other two correlations were 0.206 (sig. 0.027) and 0.258 (sig. 
0.005). All these lend support for hypothesis H5c.  
Slightly weaker was the directors’ Perceived Behavioural Control and Intention 
correlation, positively significant and moderate for six out of ten correlations (0.344 
to 0.431, sig. 0.000). The other four partial correlations were from 0.202 (sig. 0.030) 
to 0.246 (sig. 0.008). This outcome lends support for hypothesis H5d.  
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Up to this point, the core model of the theory of planned behaviour is supported: 
directors’ Intention to use financial derivatives is significantly correlated with their 
Attitude to using them, their Subjective Norm or self-perceived support from related 
people and their Perceived Behavioural Control over the use of them. Other pairs of 
associations were assessed.  
Attitude and Subjective Norm were moderately correlated in all ten instances (0.424 
to 0.590, sig. 0.000), hence the two variables were significantly correlated.  
Similarly, Subjective Norm and Perceived Control were also significantly correlated 
in all ten cases, but to a weaker degree (0.284 to 0.497, sig. 0.000 to 0.002).  
The situation for Attitude and Perceived Control is different. They were significantly 
correlated in only four cases and all were weak associations (0.191 to 0.289, sig. 0.001 
to 0.038). Their association is not supported.  
Directors’ Risk Propensity and their Perceived Control over the use of financial 
derivatives were weakly significantly correlated in the initial Spearman’s rho test (rho 
= 0.206, p = 0.024), then insignificant in all partial correlations. Their association is 
not supported.  
Directors’ Risk Propensity and Subjective Norm were significantly correlated in only 
two cases. The association was weak: rho 0.222, sig. 0.015 when uncontrolled and 
partial rho 0.205, sig. 0.026 when controlled for Knowledge, and then non-significant 
when controlled for any of other variables. Their association is not supported.  
Risk Propensity and Attitude were only weakly correlated, in three cases (0.214 to 
0.261, sig. 0.004 to 0.021). Their association is not supported.  
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Directors’ Knowledge and Risk Propensity were positively but weakly significantly 
correlated in all possible 14 tests (0.183 to 0.259, sig. 0.005 to 0.49). H7a is supported.  
Knowledge and Attitude were significantly correlated in six cases, although weakly 
(0.182 to 0.272, sig. 0.003 to 0.049). H7b is supported.  
Directors’ Knowledge and Perceived Control is a special case, with all highly 
moderate and positive correlations (from 0.559 to 0.624, sig. 0.000) in all nine cases. 
This strongly supports H7d. The only negative correlation was between directors’ 
Knowledge and Subjective Norm. Although it was relatively weak (-0.216 to -0.338, 
sig. 0.000 to 0.019), it appeared in four out of eight cases. H7c is therefore supported.  
All the supported and unsupported hypotheses are summarised in Table 5.12. 
All the supported correlations are summarised in Figure 5.3. All the relationships 
between directors’ Intention to use financial derivatives and their Attitude, Subjective 
norms, Perceived behavioural control and personal Risk propensity were significant 
and positive; there were also positive correlations between attitude and subjective 
norms, and between subjective norms and perceived behavioural controls, consistent 
with the literature. Directors’ knowledge of financial derivatives had positive 
correlations with their risk propensity, attitude and perceived behavioural control, but 
negative correlation with their subjective norms. Directors’ education, experience, 
industries and corporate scale had influence over one or more variables of knowledge, 
attitude, perceived behavioural control and intention as summarised in Figure 5.2 in 











H7a: Directors’ Knowledge about the use of 
financial derivatives is associated with their Risk 
Propensity. 
16 14 Supported 
H7b: Directors’ Knowledge about the use of 
financial derivatives is associated with their 
Attitude to the instruments. 
9 6 Supported 
H7c: Directors’ Knowledge about the use of 
financial derivatives is associated with their 
Subjective Norm. 
8 4 Supported 
H7d: Directors’ Knowledge about the use of 
financial derivatives is associated with their 
Perceived Behavioural Control. 
9 9 Supported 
H6: Directors’ Knowledge about the use of 
financial derivatives is associated with their 
Intention to use the instruments.  
8 0 Rejected 
H5a: Directors’ Risk Propensity is associated with 
their Intention to use the instruments   
10 6 Supported 
H5b: Directors’ Attitude to the use of financial 
derivatives is associated with their Intention to use 
the instruments. 
10 10 Supported 
H5c: Directors’ Subjective Norm is associated with 
their Intention to use the instruments.  
10 10 Supported 
H5d: Directors’ Perceived Behavioural Control is 
associated with their Intention to use the 
instruments.  







Directors’ Risk Propensity and their Attitude to the 
use of financial derivatives  
8 3 Rejected 
Directors’ Risk Propensity and their Subjective 
Norm 
9 2 Rejected 
Directors’ Risk Propensity and their Perceived 
Behavioural Control 
9 1 Rejected 
Directors’ Attitude and their Subjective Norm 10 10 Supported 
Directors’ Attitude and their Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
10 4 Rejected 
Directors’ Subjective Norm and their Perceived 
Behavioural Control 
10 10 Supported 
 
5.4. Extensive Impact of Directors’ Knowledge of Financial Derivatives   
Owing to the limitations of the data, this thesis focused on null hypothesis testing 
rather than alternative testing. Even though the results are not causal link confirmation, 
they shed some light on the nature of the relationships. Directors’ understanding and 
knowledge of financial derivatives expresses itself as the factor that widely impacts on 
others in the model, with the exception of Intention to use financial derivatives. 
215 
 














Directors’ Knowledge is positively associated with their Risk Propensity, Attitude, and 
Perceived Behavioural Control. Directors who have greater understanding about using 
the instruments tend to be better at accepting risk, to have a more positive attitude to 
using financial derivatives and better self-perceived capacity to control them. Directors’ 
Knowledge has a negative association only with the Subjective Norm, or in other 
words, directors with more knowledge have less positive awareness of related people’s 
support of the use. 
According to the two steps to assess mediation effect by Kenny, Kashy and Bolger 
(1998) cited by Williams, Vandenberg, and Edwards (2009, 567), there could be a 
causal relationship between directors’ knowledge and intention if the associations 
above were themselves confirmed as causal. In this thesis, owing to the limited size of 
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Directors’ knowledge about the use of financial derivatives is significantly affected by 
their education, experience, corporate industry and corporate scale. People with 
education in finance and banking, working experience in the sector and from 
companies in the financial sector consistently demonstrate superior understanding to 
directors from other sectors.  
The master’s degree seems to be the optimum qualification for directors to gain the 
best understanding about using financial derivatives. Directors with a master’s degree 
have the best knowledge among the education groups, better than those with a 
vocational degree, bachelor degree, or even a doctoral degree. The result is 
understandable because a doctoral study specialises in a topic instead of the broader 
areas in a master’s degree.  
Corporate scale (in terms of the number of employees) also matters. Directors from 
the largest companies (more than 1,000 employees) have a better understanding of 
financial derivatives than those from either medium size or small companies. 
5.5. Connecting Directors’ Knowledge and Attitude with Corporate Policy  
Even if directors’ knowledge about financial derivatives is not directly associated with 
an intention to use them, it is significantly associated with all four factors (Attitude, 
Subjective Norm, Perceived Behavioural Control and Risk Propensity) that correlate 
with Intention, as detailed above. The correlation is especially strong between directors’ 
Knowledge and Perceived Behavioural Control, arguably a good indicator of both 
intention and behaviour. 
Understanding how to use financial derivatives encourages directors to be more 
comfortable in weighing up a good or bad outcome, to know what support to expect 
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from others, to determine an acceptable level of risk and to assess the degree of control 
they may have in using these instruments. In turn, those four factors strongly affect 
directors’ intentions to use financial derivatives in their businesses. 
As a component of the overall corporate governance framework, risk management 
policy partly reflects top leaders’ propensity for risk. In addition, when having an 
intention, directors, as normal actors, will set up the conditions to realise the intention. 
At the top leadership level, the conditions are set out in corporate policies. In an 
indirect way, with its extensive interactions with directors’ decision making 
considerations, directors’ knowledge about financial derivatives is likely to influence 
the way corporate policies are determined. 
This inference partly answers the last of the three research questions in this chapter. 
More answers about potential impacts and how they happen are drawn from further 
interviews with expert directors in the next chapter. 
5.6. Conclusion 
Board directors’ less-than-expected understanding of financial derivatives was clear 
from the survey results. However, there were differences in level of knowledge among 
different groups of participants. Directors with either qualification, experience and 
current working sector in finance consistently showed superior understanding of the 
instruments than those from general management, accounting and others. In addition, 
when combined together, directors with qualification or experience in finance and 
accounting had better knowledge than other directors. Similarly, their generally good 
attitude about the instruments, strong belief in support from related people, low 
confidence in their ability to control them, from being slightly risk-averse to risk-
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neutral, and their strong intention to use them, were all well demonstrated by the 
survey results.  
Further analysis demonstrates that Knowledge is significantly correlated with Risk 
Propensity, Subjective Norm, Attitude and Perceived Behavioural Control. In turn, 
these four factors are correlated with Intention to use financial derivatives. Knowledge 
is not directly correlated with Intention; potentially its effect is channelled through 
Risk Propensity, Attitude, Subjective Norm or Perceived Behavioural Control to arrive 
at Intention. However, consideration of even these factors has implications for 
corporate governance policies. The next chapter seeks explanations for these survey 




Chapter 6 Interview Results 
Introduction 
The survey results provide a clear picture of directors’ understanding of financial 
derivatives in Vietnam and the relationship between directors’ personal characteristics 
and their corporate features on one hand and, on the other, their knowledge, propensity 
to accept risk, self-perceived support from related people, self-perceived behavioural 
control and finally their intention to use the instruments for business purposes. 
Directors’ knowledge of financial derivatives is insufficient for effective decision 
making; they may have basic ideas about popular types of the instruments such as 
forwards, futures, options and swaps, but do not know the risks associated with them, 
the transaction procedures and purpose for using them. As expected, their knowledge 
is affected by their education, experience and their corporate industry background and 
the scale of the business. In turn, directors’ knowledge interacts with their attitude, 
subjective norm, perceived behavioural control and risk propensity which in concert 
interact with their intention. The follow-up personal one-on-one interviews with 19 
directors investigated and explained the mechanisms of all these interactions in the 
context of Vietnam.  
The following sections present findings based on themes and details from NVivo 
analysis.   
6.1. Directors’ Understanding of the Use of Financial Derivatives: An 
Explanation 
The survey questionnaire section on directors’ knowledge and subsequent findings 
showed corporate elites’ knowledge of financial derivatives. All 19 directors in the 
one-to-one interviews agreed with the situation as shown in Chapter 5. These 
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interviews added additional details about directors’ real perceptions of the instruments 
and the reasons underlying the situation.  
6.1.1. Perceived Benefits and Risks of Using Financial Derivatives   
6.1.1.1. Benefits 
The interviews identified clearly that mitigating risks, creating values and trading and 
speculating to earn significant profits were the main benefits from using financial 
derivatives. In more detail, financial derivatives were perceived by the interviewees to 
give protection, insurance, risk mitigation and management, enabling a business to 
succeed more effectively in the longer term, adding value to the business and 
investment and increasing overall profit. Interviewees expressed their strong interest 
in accessing the benefits of financial derivatives.  
One example of this set of benefits is in the area of commodities. Coffee businesses 
have participated in the forward or futures market, and as a result, Vietnam’s coffee 
market has followed the operations of the global coffee market with prices following 
the rhythm of the world market. Through the use of derivatives, many other businesses 
have avoided big losses in the export of textiles, and in the import of steel and cattle 
food when material prices have fluctuated considerably. Derivatives have provided 
insurance against changes in the exchange rate and commodities prices, and insurance 
against risks when a fund invests in corporate bonds and credit instruments. But they 
are not simply a method of insurance and risk mitigation; they have proved to be vital 
for some companies, even though a number of companies have incurred legal penalties 
for using financial derivatives such as Jetstar Pacific and ABN Amro Bank as detailed 
in Chapter 3. 
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INT05: “Financial derivatives are necessary for mitigating and diverting risks 
in corporate operations, meeting companies’ demands.”  
Financial derivatives have helped to create value. Investing or trading in financial 
derivatives is much more profitable than normal business in physical assets. When 
repurchase orders (REPOs) were exploding in the market, many banks were involved 
and the earnings were outstanding. If companies miss out on using derivatives, they 
lose the chance to create value. Now, there is an expectation that a market for securities 
derivatives will open because it will increase market size and supply additional 
opportunities for traders to make money. This represents a new set of business 
possibilities in the Vietnamese economy.  
INT16: “Securities derivatives bring added value for investors.”  
6.1.1.2. Risks 
What is the other side of financial derivatives? The biggest concern, raised by 
interviewees, is about the state’s legal environment. Following this were worries about 
the level of knowledge required, because these financial instruments are sophisticated. 
Some other secondary risks included an increased risk of potential losses, possible use 
of derivatives for inappropriate purposes, underlying asset risks and risks from 
counterparties.    
At the time of data collection for this thesis (mid-2015), there had been no effective 
and transparent government regulations or laws on financial derivatives set up or 
proposed. Decree 42/2015 about securities derivatives was issued in May 2015; 
however, additional financial circulars providing detailed advice and guidance for 
users have not been issued. State-owned enterprises have been very careful and 
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cautious about trading financial derivatives. If any loss occurred, it would be very 
damaging for those individuals who had authorised transactions using financial 
derivatives, since they could be penalised under criminal law provisions. There is a 
need for a legal framework to mitigate the degree of legal personal risk, and to avoid 
scandals that have already occurred. The legal risks are obvious, and the ambiguity of 
the current regulations on finance also exposes people to unacceptable levels of risk. 
Financial derivatives are based on underlying assets, so the risks of these assets are the 
risks associated with the instruments. Counterparty risks also add to this list, so an 
appropriate legal framework would bring the necessary assurance for the business 
community. 
INT11: “It is uncertain if banks and counterparties accept the products that 
companies want to use. A framework lets us know what to do.” 
Financial derivatives, especially securities derivatives, are new to an emerging market 
like Vietnam. The products are perceived to be “high-end”, sophisticated even for 
experts in finance. They are high-tech instruments that are much more complicated 
than the underlying securities. Therefore, they are not easy to use and understand and 
few Vietnamese businesses and private traders are currently able to do so. Financial 
derivatives are attractive primarily for investing institutions; for private investors, 
participation is limited because these investors do not have an adequate level of 
knowledge and capital.   
INT01: “Financial derivatives are sophisticated, not simple.”  
The underlying value at risk in derivatives transactions is large, even if the initial 
payment is small, around 1 per cent to 2 per cent of the value of the contract. Premiums 
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have to be paid for financial derivatives, so the final business efficiency may not be as 
expected. This applies to both hedging and trading: the possible risk of losing money 
is considerable. Some banks have sold REPOs and then were unable to collect the 
money due, leading to significant losses (INT11).  
Many companies have not used futures just for hedging and risk mitigation, but often 
for trading purposes. As a consequence, the companies have undertaken significant 
levels of risk and many have become bankrupt because of futures trading. Trading in 
financial derivatives can be from a speculative purpose, and speculation in and of itself 
is highly risky. When business people want to convert uncertainty into certainty, 
speculation is not suitable. If they considered financial derivatives to be profit-making 
tools, they would be taking on considerable levels of risk. Financial derivatives are 
only beneficial for businesses with a hedging purpose when unfavourable events occur.  
6.1.2. Reasons for Directors’ Poor Understanding of Financial Derivatives Use 
All 19 directors interviewed agreed with the survey results on directors’ poor 
knowledge of financial derivatives; they have perceptions about the basic types of 
financial derivatives, but they do not know how these products work.   
INT11: “I agree with the survey results. For Vietnam, the result that about 50 
per cent of participants have knowledge of financial derivatives is right, and the 
real rate is even slightly lower.”  
The survey result of an average score of 2.5 for knowledge of financial derivatives 
may be high for directors of boards in general, but for publicly listed companies, it is 
appropriate because directors of these large corporations are generally considered to 
be more professional and knowledgeable than those in the non-listed entities. The 
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stratification of knowledge among participants is suitable too, and reflects that 
directors know the concepts and definitions but not the operation and management of 
financial derivatives. As they do not understand the operation, they find it difficult to 
administer their use. More companies know about and use forwards and swaps, but 
few know about interest rate financial derivatives. Many interviewees believed the 
level of directorial understanding to be even lower, somewhere below 1 on a scale of 
1 to 5 for all directors in general, because of the complicated nature of financial 
derivatives.  
According to the interviewees, the primary cause of directors’ insufficient 
understanding is that they come from industries in which derivatives are not well 
known or used so they do not have any effective experience with these instruments. 
The second reason is that market demand for derivatives is not high in Vietnam. 
Thirdly, the current legal framework and regulations do not require that directors must 
have appropriate knowledge about derivatives. Fourthly, training courses on financial 
derivatives are not available.  
6.1.2.1. Working Experience not in Finance  
In Vietnam, corporate managers and directors who have acquired some knowledge of 
financial derivatives know that they are used mainly for risk mitigation, but their 
knowledge of the literature is very limited. In addition, they do not have any real 
experience in a financial derivatives market because no such market currently exists 
in the country, except for very limited transactions in the area of banking. Most of the 
directors of boards come from a range of different industries, such as property 
development and construction, and have not had any experience with or studied 
financial derivatives. Only those with financial expertise have any level of 
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understanding about derivatives; other people may have basic ideas about what these 
instruments are but no deeper level of understanding. 
INT10: “People in banking industry may know about financial derivatives; in 
other industries, people don’t, and even haven’t heard of the terminology 
“Financial derivatives’’.” 
Even directors of boards in banks and financial firms in Vietnam have usually come 
from other industries, so their understanding of financial derivatives can also be quite 
limited. For example, in securities companies, directors who are from the insurance 
industry (both life insurance and other insurance) have never used financial derivatives; 
some directors do not even know about securities, so they certainly do not know 
anything about financial derivatives. Companies in industries such as banking and 
import-export may have used the products in dealing with international suppliers, so 
they could have some understanding. Companies in other industries, such as real estate, 
manufacturing or consumer trading (home appliances, electronics, consumer goods), 
may well know nothing about financial derivatives. Directors may know more about 
the purpose of using financial derivatives than about pricing techniques; even 
professional finance staff still have some difficulty with pricing techniques. 
A market for financial derivatives is still emerging in Vietnam (at the time of data 
collection), so any real experience with financial derivatives is almost impossible. 
Only after business people interact with financial derivatives in a real, ongoing market 
would an assessment of their knowledge and understanding be more substantial. 
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6.1.2.2. No Urgent Demand 
In Vietnam, except for securities and finance companies, there is no real interest in 
financial derivatives for risk management, and instead business managers and directors 
focus on their main business of trading or manufacturing. The number of business 
people with knowledge about financial derivatives is very small. Even the top bank, 
Vietcombank, only first heard about securities derivatives in around 2007 (INT14). 
Although the securities industry has been established for over ten years, there are still 
companies that have never used financial derivatives and do not know how the market 
operates. 
INT19: “I used to represent ownership in a pepper company; Vietnam pepper 
accounts for the biggest share in the world market, but the company had never 
thought of hedging. People just think about hedging for coffee.”  
6.1.2.3. No Training and Insufficient Knowledge at the Top 
There are only a few business people in Vietnam who fully understand financial 
derivatives. In Vietnam, formal study in financial derivatives is not available. In 
university finance and business courses, financial derivatives have been included in 
some subjects such as risk management for about four years. Only people passing 
Chartered Financial Analyst courses and those educated in overseas countries have a 
better level of knowledge. The top state administration agencies such as State 
Securities Commission (SSC) have not acquired comprehensive knowledge and 
awareness about financial derivatives, so they are wary about the use of these 
instruments, and are only slowly preparing a legal framework to manage these 
instruments. In summary, financial derivatives are new to Vietnam, and there is an 
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urgent need for state policies and macro-economic policies to keep pace with 
international standards.  
INT01: “Staff of financial companies have joined some training courses by SSC, 
but their knowledge has not been improved much, because the training content 
was too concise, and SSC themselves have not deeply understood the financial 
derivatives yet.” 
6.2. Influence of Directors’ Knowledge on Attitude and Other Variables 
6.2.1. Positive Attitude 
What drives directors to have a positive attitude about using financial derivatives? The 
biggest drive is a demand for changes in the market and the second is the benefits 
directors perceive in the use of such instruments.  
Similar to interviewees’ comments about directors’ knowledge, all agreed with the 
survey results on attitude. Their comments were consistent with the survey answers, 
and generally interviewees had a positive feeling about the instruments. The 
interviewees repeatedly pointed out the benefits of financial derivatives as the reason 
for their support.  
INT16: “Financial derivatives bring a lot of benefits to companies. Financial 
derivatives create value for companies. Financial derivatives create value for 
future investors.”  
6.2.1.1. Benefits 
Many business people want to use financial derivatives, even those who do not 
understand the finance sector. Financial derivatives are perceived to be necessary for 
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mitigating and diverting risks in corporate operations. When financial and accounting 
staff explain why companies should use the instruments, most directors agree, because 
companies understand the need to mitigate risk in order to be profitable and derivatives 
are effective tools. In Vietnam, there have been simple securities derivatives, such as 
note, bill and bond REPOs. Using such derivatives has enabled business people to 
recognise the added value, so there is an underlying demand for a well-developed 
financial derivatives market.  
INT19: “The macro-economic context makes people need protection, and 
financial derivatives mean protection. It is beneficial for both markets and state 
administration to develop a financial derivatives market. When people don’t 
know all aspects offFinancial derivatives, they think that financial derivatives 
are new, and hear from somewhere that financial derivatives are good for 
companies, provide protection for companies. All is because of their incomplete 
knowledge.”  
6.2.1.2. Demand for Changes in the Market 
There is a positive trend of business people wanting effective change; they want to 
discover new products and trends. When there are novel products that are suitable for 
a developed market, there will be interest in using such products. When there is such 
interest in new products, that positive attitude is good for overall market development. 
Financial derivatives are just such products. 
INT11: “We need innovation. People are expecting new trends that may relate 
to securities financial derivatives, the trends are expected to promote 
companies’ development.”  
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In addition, a positive attitude amongst directors is affected by others via the crowd 
psychology mechanism.  
6.2.2. Strong Intention 
The survey results on intention to use financial derivatives were supported by the 
interviewees such as INT13 below. In areas such as interest rates, exchange rates and 
securities, business people expect to be allowed to use these instruments. They know 
that financial derivatives may be a new business approach or a legitimate method for 
mitigating risks. Those with experience in using simple securities derivatives, such as 
note, bill or bond REPOs, have had first-hand experience of their added value, and this 
has increased their intention to use financial derivatives when a well-developed market 
is available.  
INT13: “People usually agree with an [intention] score around 3.5 as your 
survey showed.”  
However, interviewees also pointed out that strong intention is just the result of 
respondents’ feelings or intuition. The responses do not reflect a real prediction of 
action because there is a significant time lag from intention to final action.  
One interviewee pointed out that the uniformly strong intention among the respondents 
is not necessarily good for market development. The current underlying asset market 
in Vietnam is still small, and crowd psychology is prevalent. In order to develop a 
financial derivatives market, there must be a developed underlying asset market with 
various products and information flows based on which people form their different 
observations, opinions and predictions then want to earn or protect in different ways. 
Such variety creates demand and supply sides to form a market (INT19).  
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6.2.3. Risk Propensity 
The interviewees agreed with the survey results about directors’ risk propensity that 
the medium level outcome for risk propensity accurately reflects directors’ low level 
of knowledge, and confusion.  
INT11: “Without information on the nature of the instruments, they cannot make 
a decision on whether using the instrument is right or wrong, so they just take 
the mid-point [on the risk propensity scale].” 
When business people do not clearly understand financial derivatives, they face 
enhanced risks in making decisions and will be hesitant in the decision making process. 
There is a need for further education and training in order to resolve this lack of 
understanding.  
There is a difference between the risk propensity of institutional investors and that of 
other individuals. In Vietnam, the number of institutional investors and professional 
investors, such as funds or investment companies, is small. These professional and 
institutional investors are those who have a more advanced knowledge of inherent risks. 
They are more interested in active risk management and have well-specified risk 
propensity. On the other hand, other investors or directors do not have any enhanced 
inclination for risk, or know what level would be acceptable. So, they just chose the 
mid-point when answering the survey.  
Interviewees also pointed out the difference between directors in the private sector and 
those in state-owned enterprises. In partly or wholly state-owned businesses, directors 
have a very low level of risk propensity. Directors in the private sector have a much 
higher risk propensity. This phenomenon derives from the difference in risk propensity 
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between those people with their own ownership and those who are representatives. 
Representatives must follow directions from their principals or the owners and act in 
accordance with their authority (how much money they are allowed to manage; how 
much profit they have to acquire), and on that basis they specify their risk preferences. 
General speaking, risk preference means how much money one person is ready to lose. 
If the money is in the decision makers’ ownership, and they manage it every day, they 
can quickly decide risk preference. This is not the case when they assign the money to 
another person; for example, if they are willing to lose 50 per cent of the money, they 
will tell the authorised person that they are ready to lose a much lower percentage, of 
30 per cent or 20 per cent. In other words, authorised representatives are always more 
conservative than actual owners.  
6.2.4. Limited Supply of Capable Human Resources for Financial Derivatives 
Market 
Respondents to the survey strongly believed that they could find capable staff to help 
them with financial derivatives transactions. However, directors who were interviewed, 
such as INT11 below, did not agree; they recognised that there was a limited supply 
of such capable staff.  
People can find staff who are able to complete transactions in basic financial 
derivatives in an import-export business, however, in Vietnam there are very few 
people who can participate fully in a financial derivatives market. Even state 
administrations do not have enough qualified staff and as a result struggle to issue 
effective policies and guidelines in this area. The survey respondents appeared to focus 
only on simple products such as REPOs and forwards. It is easier to find staff to handle 
these types of transactions, but not to handle more complicated products.   
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INT11: “People in your survey thought that they could find capable staff, maybe 
because they just thought about simple derivatives, not complicated ones, real 
ones. I know that on international markets, financial derivatives are very 
complicated, so it is not easy to find people to do that job in Vietnam.”  
The supply of capable staff is limited due to business education and the gap between 
learning and experience. Financial derivatives have only recently been included in 
economics, finance and business courses in the last few years in Vietnam. Even staff 
who have graduated from overseas universities need time to garner experience from 
real-life practice and cannot do their jobs effectively immediately after being recruited. 
Most staff enrich their knowledge through experience and their own practice; official 
training from entities such as the SSC plays a minor role. To sum up, training and 
working experience are the two factors determining capable staff in the area of 
financial derivatives.  
6.3. Gaps and Risks 
As detailed in Chapter 5, there are gaps in directors’ knowledge, attitude to using 
financial derivatives and intention to use them. The risks caused by these gaps are real 
but the potential impact is not immediate because directors’ intentions are not yet 
actions. Among the interviewees, a number worried about these risks while others did 
not.  
6.3.1. Reasons for Worry about the Gaps  
When decision makers know very little about these instruments, how can they use 
them? The risk is that financial derivatives may be mismanaged and businesses may 
be left with considerable costs and losses. According to the interviewees, the gaps 
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between low levels of knowledge, positive attitude and strong intention to use financial 
derivatives mean that companies will be exposed to greater risks, which could take a 
company in entirely the wrong direction. When business people do not have good 
knowledge, they risk either missing opportunities or underestimating threats. For 
example, they may wrongly approve proposals for over-risky transactions by 
subordinates. On the other hand, they may disallow otherwise sound proposals 
(INT16). 
At the time of the interviews, there was no comprehensive legal framework for 
financial derivatives. A framework issued by the SSC is needed to make clear what 
financial derivatives are and what the range of products are, so that appropriate 
transactions can be made in the markets. Another need is to train a range of business 
people; banks and financial institutions should commit to follow Basel III (a global, 
voluntary regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market 
liquidity risk), and should set appropriate safety limits. 
6.3.2. Reasons not to Worry about the Gaps  
There is a gap between positive attitude and intention to actual practice. When business 
people want to use financial derivatives without the appropriate level of knowledge, 
they will either try to educate themselves at that point or use qualified consultants and 
experts. The securities market in Vietnam is still in early development, where 
participants’ understanding about financial derivatives is relatively limited, so there is 
a need to take a gradual approach to these new financial products. Throughout this 
early phase, companies and their staff learn and understand more; such a 
developmental pathway is necessary to fill the gap that exists between knowledge, 
intention and practice, to minimise risks for companies and other participants. 
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INT05: “Even though I am in a securities company, I can’t say that I have 
comprehensive and deep knowledge of financial derivatives, my knowledge is 
limited. Knowledge can be acquired later.” 
In reality, when there is interest in using a specific product such as swaps or futures, 
serious consideration will be given by decision makers as to whether to participate and 
at what scale. They are expected to be cautious before using these new products. They 
are likely take incremental steps, from simple to more complicated ones; and are less 
likely to rush into the market even if there are initial high levels of interest. This interest 
is likely to be matched against the set of steps that will be taken by the government to 
open up a financial derivatives market.  
INT16: “The people with an interest in the market will firstly act as observers to 
see what institutional and professional investors do and what the efficiency is. 
Then, if they are persuaded, they will participate.”  
The survey results reflected directors’ perceived intention, not their final or actual 
decision to use financial derivatives. Before such a decision is made, they would go 
through a careful research process before committing to such an undertaking. Since 
there is significant time lag between intention in principle and the actual use of 
financial derivatives, a number of interviewees felt there is no apparent risk emerging 
from such a gap.  
6.4. Business Culture 
Business culture emerged from the interviewees as a key theme affecting corporate 
risk policy in general, and policy on financial derivatives in particular. Among the 
components of business culture, the personal feelings and intuition of owners or 
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founders is the most influential factor. This influence is present in specific aspects, 
including implied but not documented ideas, leaders’ decisive position in decision 
making, the lower level of care about preserving funds or mitigating losses, their 
concentration on the drive for additional profits, and an underlying distrust of the 
actions of employees.   
6.4.1. Low Levels of Trust in Employees 
Financial derivatives transactions are a highly professional field of endeavour, so even 
when directors have the requisite level of understanding, they must still rely on 
members of staff to process such transactions. A major barrier here is a custom of not 
easily trusting other people in the business environment. In Vietnam, there have been 
no underlying customs or prevailing workplace practices in employment and internal 
control. When entrepreneurs want to invest money in a business they are more likely 
to want to manage the business themselves. They worry about losing their investments 
if subordinate staff are given decision making responsibility. 
The owners are also inhibited by current laws when appointing executive management. 
In Vietnam, when a CEO is appointed, an issue arises as to who will be the legal 
representative of the company. If the newly employed CEO is the key legal 
representative, who has real authority in law to make corporate transactions valid, then 
the board of directors would have little effective authority. If the chair of a board is the 
legal representative, then the chair needs to authorise the CEO to undertake some 
actions to make the actions lawful. Therefore, the prevailing attitude in Vietnam is that 
entrepreneurs and investors are reluctant to hand control of money to others; they 
would rather manage a business themselves.  
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INT10: “If you hire someone to be the manager as well as legal representative 
while you have not had any control mechanism, you will worry that the manager 
will make decisions exceeding their authority.”  
Another concern is that the internal control system in Vietnam is not well established 
and not legislated effectively. Even where there are accounting regulations, the chief 
accountant is under the control of CEO, and is not independent. Especially in small 
and medium-sized companies, there is little concern about the lack of such internal 
controls. 
There is a well-known traditional saying in Vietnam: “Before you get compensated, 
you have suffered a great deal”. Therefore, the common practice is for a chair to have 
worked previously as a CEO. There is a cultural preference for senior executives to 
exercise all the power and authority in a business. At the operational level, the top 
leaders often participate in all daily decision making activities instead of concentrating 
primarily on planning and forming strategy. Thus, if for some reason they cannot work, 
the company operations halt; lower level staff members do not know what to do 
without specific instructions. Managing a business in that way over a long period 
means that when the business owner or leader retires or dies, the transition to the next 
generation of decision makers can be very difficult (INT10).  
Founders often believe that the ‘successful’ company is primarily the result of their 
own ‘blood, sweat and hard work’; they do not want to lose control, and so there is a 




6.4.2. Low Care about Avoiding Losses, Focusing on Making Money 
Companies in Vietnam often do not have an appropriate risk management culture and 
have not yet specified their risk propensity. They have not made risk management an 
important issue and instead focus primarily on trading to generate profits.  
In the initial period of a company’s life, the owners simply focus on moving it forward, 
and making as much money as they can; they are not concerned about protecting the 
money earned, so risk management is not considered to be important. Companies who 
survive their initial growth period then transition into a second phase in which they 
plan to make their company bigger; they need more capital, more security, and then 
they start thinking about risk management (INT14). The firm’s stage in its life cycle 
plays a part in its corporate risk managing policy. 
INT14: “In the past, many business owners started their business from zero, and 
when they saw an opportunity, they got it and formed a company… For such 
companies, they don’t care about risk management”.  
6.5. The Government’s Role in Establishing a Financial Derivatives Market  
Another topic that emerged during the interviews was the role of the government in 
forming and organising a financial derivatives market. Interviewees often referred to 
cases of corporate scandal that resulted in a demand for an enhanced role for 
government.  
There have been three well-known scandals related to financial derivatives in Vietnam 
involving Jetstar Pacific airline, ABN Amro bank and the coffee industry. In the first 
two cases, the government intervened, resulting in a business transaction being 
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classified as a criminal action. In the third case, the government was blamed for not 
providing effective direction and guidance to market participants. 
Business people expect the government to establish an appropriate legal framework, 
regulations and requirements for exchanges and the financial markets in general. Other 
specific expectations include the need to develop intermediaries, ensure transparency 
and compliance, and supply human and other resources as well as undertaking timely 
regulatory action.  
6.5.1. Setting up a Legal Framework  
There is an implicit expectation that the government should set up a legal framework 
for financial derivatives that covers accounting regulations, underlying markets and 
ethics. 
INT11: “We need play rules. We need to have a framework from the SSC, to 
make it clear what financial derivatives are, what the products are, then people 
can exchange the products in the markets.” 
The first element that such a framework needs is to recognise that financial derivatives 
are part of the normal modern business cycle, and companies and investors have the 
right to lose or make money using these instruments. No criminal laws should be 
applied as long as transactions are undertaken ethically and with a duty of care. 
Accounting regulations should treat financial derivatives as separate accounts in 
balance sheets, instead of considering them simply to be types of collectibles and 
receivables in Vietnamese companies. 
A framework would promote the formation of intermediaries for financial derivatives 
such as brokerages, clearing-house and consultants. Such third parties supply 
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appropriate assurance for both business and individual market participants. A 
framework also reduces potential participants’ concerns about judicial threats. Once 
financial derivatives are perceived to be normal business, business people will exploit 
their underlying advantages. 
INT19: “Direct trading without a legal framework, without a third party, is 
very hard and unattractive to companies.”  
Ethical requirements for financial derivatives staff in processing these transactions 
should be covered in the legal framework. These requirements need to be as tight and 
strict as in the securities sector. Both government agencies (Ministry of Finance and 
the State Securities Commission) and private firms should collaborate in setting and 
enforcing the ethics requirements via regulations and reward systems.  
6.5.2. Developing Underlying Markets  
The underlying markets are markets for commodities or financial products, based on 
which financial derivatives are engineered. Markets include coffee, interest rates, 
foreign exchange rates, corporate stocks, corporate bonds and treasury bonds. When 
such markets are well developed, participants’ demand will move to the next level in 
which financial derivatives are considered new products either for protecting their 
assets or gaining profit.  
Interviewees predicted that the government will be careful in opening the market for 
financial derivatives in step with developing the underlying markets. If all these 
markets were opened at the same time, neither the government, firms or traders would 
be able to control the resulting range of risks. Careful evolutionary steps by the 




INT16: “Financial derivatives require tight and synchronised state 
administration on software, human resources, knowledge as well as the financial 
capability of participants. Therefore, financial derivatives market development 
should be step-by-step, from infrastructure to financial capabilities, to limit 
risks.”  
6.5.3. Disseminating Knowledge and Training 
Directors expect the government to assume an active role in the dissemination of 
knowledge about, and training in, financial derivatives. When an issue is raised by a 
government agency, this does attract public attention. Frequently, market participants 
are concerned that any difference between their perception and understanding and that 
of the government could lead to trouble and legal sanctions.  
INT03: “People have not understood financial derivatives, so they have different 
interpretations. The government should play a role in widely spreading 
knowledge of financial derivatives, and introduce them into markets. Financial 
derivatives should be taught in schools.”  
Government actions are important signals for the foundation of a financial derivatives 
market in Vietnam.  
INT11: “I agree that in Vietnam the government is the market founder.” 
Regulators’ understanding about financial derivatives determines their judgement 
about the legitimacy of a business activity, as was ably demonstrated in the case of 
Jetstar Pacific airline detailed in Chapter 3. 
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Directors often stated during the interviews that the government was the key player in 
all critical events involved with financial derivatives market developments. 
6.6. The Market for Financial Derivatives in Vietnam 
6.6.1. Suppliers and Products 
Interviewees agreed that the initial use of financial derivatives can be traced back to 
the 1990s in Ho Chi Minh City through an over-the-counter market. The official 
market for financial derivatives in Vietnam started in 2005, when Techcombank 
commenced offering coffee futures, in cooperation with a Singapore company. 
Following banks in the market were BIDV (coffee futures), Eximbank (2008, Forex 
swaps), and Maritime Bank (2011, Forex options). All the banks acted as agents for 
foreign exchanges.  
INT06: “Before banks supplied commodities derivatives, companies in the 
coffee industry in Dak Lak and Hochiminh City had used the products via 
intermediaries who are agents of international exchanges. When local banks 
started financial derivatives business, they acted as agents for the international 
exchanges.”  
INT04: “Futures trade was started in Vietnam in 2005 by Techcombank through 
a broker in Singapore.” 
In the following years, additional banks participated in the market. Some of the banks 
specialised in commodities derivatives (Techcombank, BIDV), and most participated 
in exchange rate and interest rate derivatives as another element of banking business. 
There are two commodities exchanges (one is located in Ho Chi Minh City and the 
other in Buon Ma Thuot), but they are not very active. Foreign banks are more active 
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in providing financial derivatives including CitiBank, HSBC, ANZ and Standard 
Charter. Foreign banks are suppliers for multinational corporations and foreign direct 
investment companies; local banks are suppliers for local companies. 
INT19: “The difficulties for foreign banks are that they just trade financial 
derivatives based on USD and there is no legal framework. It is risky to trade 
financial derivatives case by case, banks need to get the permit from the Central 
Bank, and it is very hard to do so.”   
The most popular derivatives products are futures and swaps; options have limited use. 
The current products are for commodities such as coffee, rubber, fuel, metal, oil and 
cotton. By its nature, the current over-the-counter market is small, fragmented and not 
transparent.  
Because financial derivatives are not popular and banks are the main suppliers, banks 
are the main access point or source of recommendations for businesses. Usually, when 
businesses negotiate credit contracts with banks, the banks will recommend ways to 
earn the best interest rates. One method is to combine a credit contract with a financial 
derivatives contract to get a more favourable interest rate. Without bank suggestions, 
businesses (with the exception of financial firms) have not been proactive in 
discovering and using financial derivatives; so banks are producers, marketers and 
retailers. Here the banks act as a crucial catalyst for the financial derivatives market 
formation and operation.  
INT03: “The transaction was the first financial derivatives transaction of 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC) in Vietnam. We did not get much 
benefit from the financial derivatives contract, but as compensation we got a 
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better offer on the credit contract (better interest rate) and got real experience 
with financial derivatives”.  
6.6.2. Users and Purposes for Using Financial Derivatives  
Financial derivatives users in Vietnam are mainly two groups: export/import 
companies and companies who need to borrow in foreign currencies. 
6.6.2.1. Export/Import Businesses 
Those companies that make payments to their foreign counterparts in foreign 
currencies need protection against exchange rate fluctuations. Exports and imports are 
a crucial part of the Vietnamese economy, and almost all sectors have export and 
import activities including agriculture, manufacturing, textiles, mining, forestry, 
aquaculture and food processing. Traditionally, export/import companies just buy or 
sell spot foreign currencies. Only a few know about and have the expertise to use 
foreign exchange derivatives as an insurance or protection measure.  
6.6.2.2. Companies with Borrowing Requirements 
The dong, the local currency in Vietnam, is not a major currency. Its value and the 
interest rate applied to borrowing and lending activities are high and have fluctuated 
considerably over time, while the interest rate on the US dollar is generally much lower 
and more stable. Companies prefer to use borrowing rates at the lowest level possible. 
Interest rate derivatives are one way to convert the Vietnamese dong borrowing rate 
into the US dollar interest rate. 
INT07: “Major financial derivatives users are companies in import/export; 
they use financial derivatives in foreign exchange (FX). Other companies 
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(not import/export ones – so they are not allowed to borrow loans in FX) 
may use credit financial derivatives so that they can borrow VND at a low 
interest rate as if they were borrowing in USD. Commodities financial 
derivatives are mainly used by companies in the corresponding industries.”  
In the area of interest rate and currency derivatives, the main driver for businesses is 
the protection of assets, or hedging. Companies want to change the interest rate from 
floating to fixed, for a future buy or sell. Similarly, they want to switch the amount 
paid or received from one currency to another. All such transactions are based on their 
current open positions in physical contracts. 
The situation is different for commodity derivatives. Coffee futures are one of the most 
popular commodity derivatives in Vietnam. Coffee importers and exporters have used 
derivatives extensively, particularly in the period from 2005 to 2009. However, coffee 
futures have been used mainly for trading and not for hedging purposes. In theory, 
large companies with a high volume of transactions should be more active in the 
futures market. However, in Vietnam, the reverse applies; small companies are very 
active market participants. While such companies buy futures in large quantities they 
do not own or control the underlying commodities contracts or stock, and the primary 
driver for such transactions is speculation. The majority of the large companies in 
Vietnam are state-owned enterprises, which are deterred by the current policy 
framework from using such derivatives.  
INT09: “There is a fact that the most active participants in the financial 
derivatives market are small companies. When small companies are very active 
in financial derivatives that means they are trading, not hedging. It should be 
that big companies are more active than small ones. But you know most of big 
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companies in Vietnam are state-owned enterprises who hesitate to use financial 
derivatives”. 
INT12: “The main barrier is that in state-owned enterprises, decision making 
takes a long time. So, it is hard to make timely decisions. Decision makers don’t 
have enough authority; they also depend on others.”  
6.6.3. Market Development Predictions 
Interviewees expressed caution when talking about the future of the financial 
derivatives market in Vietnam. This level of caution and hesitation originated from 
their direct experiences. Ten years before the interviews, they had experienced a 
growing interest in financial derivatives, especially in coffee products, however, the 
market failed to develop because an appropriate legal framework did not exist. The 
legal framework has developed a little more from that earlier experience, but generally, 
the framework still does not meet the requirements for a developed financial 
derivatives market. 
The interviewees also experienced the formation, re-formation and then a stagnation 
of the two commodities markets: the coffee market in Buon Ma Thuot and the general 
commodities market in Ho Chi Minh City. The two markets failed to attract 
participants for a number of reasons including no flexibility in connecting storage 
policy and credit support policy and no commodity grading policy that harmonised 
farmers’ preference for easy to understand transactions with the strict requirements of 
international exchanges.  
INT09: “There are some commodity exchanges in Vietnam, but none of them is 
active. The coffee exchange in Buon Ma Thuot is almost dead… To trade on the 
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exchanges, traders are required to deposit their commodities into the exchanges’ 
warehouse, but trading companies don’t want to do that. Exchanges also issue 
standards for commodities; if the standards are too high, traders don’t like 
because it is different from their trading customs.” 
The interviewees argued that the fundamental impediments to the development of a 
functional financial derivatives market in the country were the absence of a legal 
framework by the government, the prevailing business culture and companies’ risk 
management policy. The most optimistic forecast for a market to form in the current 
context of Vietnam is five years, and a more pessimistic forecast is ten years. A 
common belief is that the market in Vietnam will be opened up step-by-step to reflect 
the caution and careful consideration by the government. 
INT02: “I think we need 2 years to establish the foundation, when the foundation 
is strong enough, we need 3 years to create a habit of transactions. Then we may 
have a market after 5 years.”  
INT09: “The prerequisite for the formation of a financial derivatives market is 
…a legal framework at the external bound, and compliance framework for 
internal bound. That’s what we need to develop a financial derivatives market 
in the next 5 to 10 years.”  
6.6.4. Reasons for not Using Financial Derivatives 
In explaining why companies do not use financial derivatives, interviewees specified 
three main reasons: the scale of businesses, the nature of the business cycle and the 
price of derivatives offered by the banks.  
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6.6.4.1. Scale of Business 
For hedging purposes, derivative contracts need to correspond to physical business 
contracts. For example, a standard contract size is 37,500 lbs for coffee, 100 troy 
ounces for gold (CMX), 1,000 barrels for crude oil (NYM), 500xIndex value for CME 
S&P500 index, US$100,000 for CBOT 10-year Treasury note or 30-year Treasury 
bonds, 12,500,000 yen for a Japanese yen contract, and 125,000 euros for a CME euro 
currency contract (Kline 2001). Recently, the Ministry of Finance introduced a 
government bond derivatives contract with a standard value of one billion Vietnam 
dong (equivalent to about US$45,000) and two securities index contracts of 
500,000VNDxVN30-Index and 1,000,000VNDxHNX30-Index (Saigon Securities Inc 
2017). When a business does not meet the scale of one or more contracts, the business 
cannot use the derivatives, and they do not expect to. 
INT03: “For the last few years our business scale is not big enough so we just 
do some research and have not actually used commodity financial derivatives.”  
6.6.4.2. Offering Prices Too High 
The interviewees perceived that they were being required to pay a premium for 
derivative products. The initial prices set by banks were perceived to be too high by a 
number of directors, and this acts as a significant impediment for companies that might 
be wanting to enter such contracts. They do not want to pay what they perceived to be 
a high price for a benefit they may or may not receive.  
INT15: “Why we don’t use financial derivatives? In fact there are some suppliers 
offering us financial derivatives, but they offer too high prices. That’s why we 
are not interested.” 
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6.6.4.3. Nature of Business Cycles 
Interviewees considered that financial derivatives were suitable for long-term 
management purposes. Hence, if the business cycle they experienced in their 
companies is less than a year, they suggested that such instruments should not be used. 
In other words, businesses do not use derivatives because their business cycle does not 
match the derivatives’ timeframe.   
INT18: “Why we can’t use futures contracts? Our business and trading is mainly 
short-term, a cycle is about 3 months. You know futures contracts operate in a 
different way, so they are not suitable for us. Futures are more suitable for 
manufacturers to stabilise prices for a year or more.”  
The three next sections are about the three most popular types of financial derivatives 
products in Vietnam: coffee futures, currency and interest rate derivatives, and 
securities derivatives. 
6.6.5. The Most Popular Types of Financial Derivatives in Vietnam 
6.6.5.1. Coffee Futures 
Coffee futures were one of the most dominant, early types of financial derivatives in 
Vietnam. The first use of these was in the 1990s, and the first official derivatives 
market in Vietnam for coffee futures was in 2005. In this market, participants are both 
businesses and individual traders. They use LIFFE (The London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange) coffee futures price as the base for actual 
price calculations through the “minus or plus” method. It is normal for businesses and 
traders to buy and stock coffee combined with buying futures to fix the buying price, 
and then wait for a favourable futures price to finalise the selling price. Troubles arose 
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when traders, instead of holding the futures that they had bought to fix the purchasing 
price, cleared them when markets became favourable for making gains. Without 
futures protection, their purchasing prices were then exposed to market risks. They had 
to follow the market to get enough coffee as the delivery dates approached, and often 
the market went against them. The gains they had earned from trading the futures could 
not compensate for the losses incurred in having to purchase subsequent coffee 
supplies. Hence, traders often incurred significant losses and a number became 
bankrupt.   
INT14: “In the coffee industry the participants did not suffer loss in trading 
coffee with growers, but they suffered when they traded financial derivatives.”  
The crucial action leading to these losses was that businesses and traders had switched 
the underlying purpose of using coffee futures from hedging to speculation.  
6.6.5.2. Currency and Interest Rate Financial Derivatives  
Financial derivatives in currencies and interest rates are the most popular and widely 
used derivatives in Vietnam. These products include IRS (interest rate swaps) and CCS 
(cross currency swaps), forward interest rate contracts and forward exchange rate 
contracts.  
The State Bank of Vietnam has issued circulars on interest rates and the exchange rate 
for foreign banks and for local banks (INT06). The regulations are very strict, in order 
to ensure that only hedging transactions are allowed. To use financial derivatives 
products, businesses must have current risk-bearing contracts with banks. Even though 
the banks allow options as one of the derivatives, options transactions are almost 
entirely absent because of the complicated approval process required by the State Bank. 
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6.6.5.3. Securities Derivatives  
In 2014, an official market for derivatives on stocks and treasury bonds was expected 
to be initiated in 2016. However, the deadline was missed, and the current plan is to 
have a market for treasury bonds in the third quarter of 2017 (Ủy ban chứng khoán nhà 
nước 2017). This will be managed by the two current stock exchanges, Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City. However, other primary forms of securities derivatives have been used 
in Vietnam for some time. The stock REPO is the most popular; another one is the 
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). The REPO was first used in Vietnam at the 
start of the securities market (in 2000) when there were assets such as stocks and all 
valued documents could be used as REPOs to acquire money for other investments 
(INT11). Currently, the Central Bank bans the use of REPO because of previous use 
as part of risk-taking activities in banks that were far from their initial purpose.  
When the official market was opened in August 2017 (Ủy ban chứng khoán nhà nước 
2017), this has been the first time that the government will have established a market 
with both trading participants and hedging participants in Vietnam.   
INT09: “Securities financial derivatives are mainly targeted at individual 
traders. For those traders, they do all transactions with their pocket money and 
just risk their own assets. It is different for companies in which some people 
make decisions but the risks are faced by the companies, not the decision makers.”  
6.7. Expected and Emerging Themes  
Among the six themes covered above, the first three were expected to be developed 
from the initial 14 planned nodes which correspond to the variables and relationships 
posited in the quantitative outcome model in Chapter 5. The initial nodes were 
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directors’ knowledge, attitude, risk propensity, intention, education and knowledge, 
knowledge and attitude. These nodes were the focus at the start of each interview and 
they have been combined into the three themes of directors’ understanding of financial 
derivatives, the influence of their understanding on directors’ features (attitude, 
subjective norm, risk propensity, perceived behavioural control) in the model, and the 
relationship between gaps, risks and corporate policy in the directors’ perceptions.  
As interviews progressed, directors spoke a lot about new issues that emerged in their 
concerns about the financial derivatives market in Vietnam, in which key players were 
identified, and the importance of the government’s roles and business culture were also 
identified as important elements. From these new nodes that emerged during the 
interviews, the three themes of business culture, the government’s role in setting up a 
financial derivatives market and the market for these instruments emerged as 
additional findings and themes. In addition, interviewees suggested ways to improve 
directors’ knowledge about financial derivatives and the urgency about the need for 
corporate risk policy with specific content. These recommendations are analysed and 
discussed further in Chapter 7.   
6.8. Conclusion  
Following the survey, face-to-face interviews were held with 19 of the respondents to 
explore in greater detail the outcomes from the survey results. Interviewees uniformly 
agreed with the results from the survey, especially on reasons for the directors’ 
insufficient knowledge, positive attitude, risk neutrality and strong intention. The only 
mismatch was that the interviewees believed and assessed that the real level of 
directors’ understanding might be even lower than the 2.5 on a five-point Likert scale 
that emerged from the survey.  
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Three additional topics emerging from the interviews were business culture, the 
government role and the market for financial derivatives. The additional issues of the 
business culture having no satisfactory targets, implied but not documented thoughts 
of owners, low attention to preserving wealth, focus on making money, and distrust of 
employees have all hindered directors and owners from establishing a clear corporate 
risk management policy and framework. As identified by directors, and in the 
information about suppliers and users, the government’s major role is most evident in 
subsections of the three most popular types of financial derivatives, specific market 
developments and especially corporate scandals. The directors interviewed concluded 
with a call for the government to set up a legal framework for financial derivatives, to 
develop the underlying markets and to take part in disseminating knowledge and 
training, especially for directors. The findings in this chapter are integrated with the 





Chapter 7 Analysis of Results 
 
Introduction 
This chapter draws on all the preceding chapters to analyse and answer the research 
questions. The issues are discussed from the two methodologies – the survey and the 
semi-structured interviews – in the context of Vietnam as described in Chapter 3 and 
the theoretical lenses identified in Chapters 2 and 4. The first section connects and 
discusses the findings on the research questions, followed by the directors’ range of 
recommendations to improve their knowledge of financial derivatives and the 
corporate risk management policies that they proposed to deal with the risks resulting 
from their lack of knowledge. The chapter then focuses on the resulting implications 
for the theories used in this thesis, government authorities, corporate boards, individual 
directors and training organisations.  
7.1. Combination of Qualitative and Quantitative Elements to Address 
Research Questions  
Three main and two sub-research questions have been addressed and analysed through 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative studies as summarised in Figure 7.1. The 
first two questions, 1 and 2, have been answered by the quantitative inquiry, with three 
major findings of directors’ low knowledge and status of their personal attributes, 
differences of knowledge levels among director groups, and their relationship between 
the attributes, and a part of the qualitative inquiry further investigating directors’ 
understanding and their self-explanation of the survey results. Responses to the two 
sub-questions of 2a and 2b and question 3 came from the interviews that unearthed the 
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connection between gaps, risk and corporate policies, the market of financial 
derivatives in Vietnam and the government’s role in the market.   
Figure 7.1. Coordination of Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in Answering 
















7.1.1. Directors’ Understanding of Using Financial Derivatives  
7.1.1.1. Current Status 
In the context of markets for financial derivatives that are emerging but do not 
officially exist in Vietnam, measuring directors’ understanding of financial 
instruments is a difficult task.  
Questions 
RQ 1. What is the level of 
perceived knowledge of directors 
of boards in Vietnam about the 
benefits and risks associated with 
using financial derivatives? 
RQ 2. Does directors’ perceived 
level of knowledge affect their 
attitude towards using financial 
derivatives? 
RQ 2a. Does such perceived level 
of knowledge and attitudes impact 
boards’ policies on risk 
management, especially on 
financial derivatives? 
RQ 2b. What is the mechanism 
channelling the impact of directors’ 
perceived knowledge on the 
board’s policies? 
RQ 3. Who are the key stakeholders 
in the board of directors’ 
consideration of using financial 
derivatives for corporate purposes 
and what are their roles?  
Quantitative 
- Low knowledge, 
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- Government roles 
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Directors have a poor level of knowledge of financial derivatives in general as evident 
from both the survey, and agreed in the follow-up interviews. This result is consistent 
with the situation in other developed economies, as evident in the literature (Ingley 
and Van der Walt 2001, Schwimmer 1994), and adds further confirmation of a 
transnational phenomenon: that board directors’ knowledge of financial derivatives is 
low. The issue was raised even before the Barings scandal in 1995; however, more 
than twenty years later, this deficiency still exists.  
Directors’ knowledge of financial derivatives is associated with a combination of 
factors: their education (level and major area of study), working experience, corporate 
industry and corporate scale in terms of the number of employees. Directors with a 
master’s degree have better knowledge than those with a bachelor degree. Those with 
a major or experience in finance consistently show a more advanced understanding 
about financial derivatives than directors in general management, accounting, or other 
subjects. When combined together, directors with either qualification or working 
experience in finance and accounting have a better level of knowledge than other 
directors (see Appendix 13 for a summary of mean knowledge scores across groups).  
These results (clearly identified in Chapter 5) agree with the interviewees’ judgement 
that actual practice and experience is the best way to improve knowledge about 
financial products. Remarkably, directors’ age and gender have no connection with 
their levels of understanding. The deeper level of diversity of board director 
background (functional, industrial and educational) (Torchia, Calabrò, and Morner 




The combination of multiple methods in one research project is known as triangulation, 
which is an alternative to validation, as reviewed in Chapter 4. This thesis uses both 
quantitative and qualitative methods to achieve that goal. The majority of interviewees 
agreed that directors’ understanding about financial derivatives was low, and that this 
outcome varied depending on specific issues and groups of directors.  
The interviewees, who were all directors with financial expertise, initially talked more 
about the benefits of financial derivatives, but finally, when a list of benefits and risks 
emerged, risks were mentioned more frequently. The results demonstrated that when 
people have a higher level of understanding about financial derivatives, they have a 
more balanced and cautious view of financial instruments. This outcome was different 
from the general survey results in which participants displayed a highly positive 
attitude towards such instruments. What is the reason for this difference? Survey 
participants were a mix of directors with different levels of education and experience, 
and from different sectors and companies, while the interviewees were all experts in 
finance (whether they worked in the finance sector or not) and were more confident in 
their knowledge about financial derivatives. With the relevant education and 
experience, these interviewees were more aware about derivatives in detail, and 
understood better the range of risks and benefits. Their viewpoints about the balance 
between risks and benefits in using financial derivatives matches the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2.  
The biggest concern raised related to the state legal environment. The next level of 
concern related to insufficient knowledge because these instruments are complicated 
and sophisticated. Additional risks identified were the potential for large losses, 




The interviews revealed the reasons for directors’ insufficient understanding of 
financial derivatives, which are discussed below.  
7.1.1.2. Reasons for Directors’ Insufficient Understanding of Financial 
Derivatives 
Weak Market Forces  
Businesses rarely use derivatives in an active manner. Financial derivatives are mainly 
recommended by banks to their clients, and are most suitable for larger companies, 
especially when considering hedging opportunities. However, the banks and large (and 
usually state-owned) companies are restricted by laws in selling and using such 
instruments. Weak market forces mean that the level of demand for such instruments 
is not urgent; hence directors do not have a motive to learn about financial derivatives. 
Lack of Legal Framework 
Business people in Vietnam are cautious when talking about financial derivatives, 
partly because they have seen significant and alarming scandals described in Chapter 
3: the cases of ABN Amro bank vs. Incombank (now Vietinbank) and Jetstar Pacific 
airline. Senior staff or executives in these either partially or wholly state-owned 
enterprises were prosecuted under criminal law when they had entered financial 
derivatives transactions and had incurred subsequent significant losses. They were 
accused of “irresponsibility leading to loss of state capital” (Hà Nhân 2010, V.C 2006). 
As a result, directors feel exposed in a legal framework that does not protect their 
business transaction rights, and in which an ordinary business occurrence (during 
which losses have occurred) is treated as a criminal action.  
The absence or ineffectiveness of external institutions can strain the ability of boards 
to direct and control firms (Chakrabarty and Bass 2014). In the Jetstar case, the lack of 
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a framework on financial derivatives in the then legal system in Vietnam was a major 
contribution to the difficulties encountered. If the instruments had been considered 
normal business, there would have been no accusations, no arrests, and no harm to the 
reputation of the company.  
Nature of the Business 
When asked about reasons for not using financial derivatives, the directors interviewed 
pointed out that the scale of business and the business cycle were the main barriers. 
The large volume of standard contracts may not suit small scale companies in Vietnam. 
They are not allowed to use derivatives freely, hence are not interested in their use. 
When companies have not reached a certain threshold of scale, boards of directors do 
not deliberate about risk management, or the use of financial derivatives.  
Lack of Training  
Directors realised that education about financial derivatives is absent from curricula in 
economics, finance, accounting, management or business courses in Vietnam. Even 
the top government body, the State Securities Commission, has demonstrated a distinct 
lack of knowledge. Hence, the training the SSC supplies to securities companies is too 
minimal and not informative enough. The most practical form of training, actual 
market experience, is not available in some sectors in Vietnam. Several directors 
agreed that being part of the market would be the best kind of training.  
Unrelated Experience 
Another explanation for the low level of knowledge is that a considerable proportion 
of directors do not have any working experience in finance. Even in the finance and 
banking sector, directors often come from other industries, so they know little about 




As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the directors interviewed pointed out a situation that is 
common in Vietnam: business people are not careful about preserving their money, 
and instead they simply focus on making money. In other words, risk management has 
not been a focus so far. In the context of a business culture that does not make risk 
management a priority, directors do not recognise the need to learn about instruments 
such as financial derivatives.  
Fundamentals can be learned but only practice teaches people how to actually operate. 
This situation is understandable because directors in Vietnam do not get effective 
training on derivatives and have work backgrounds which have not prepared them for 
using financial instruments. In addition, they have not been helped by the operation of 
weak market forces, by their inexpert business practice and culture within an 
inadequate legal framework which have all contributed to a lack of practice in using 
financial derivatives within their businesses.  
7.1.2. Association between Directors’ Knowledge and Attitude to Financial 
Derivatives 
Directors in the survey showed a highly positive attitude toward using financial 
derivatives. What drives directors to have such a positive attitude to using financial 
derivatives? The biggest driver appeared to be a demand for changes in the market and 
the second was the perceived benefits to be derived from the use of these instruments. 
After 15 years of activities on the stock exchange with only two primary products – 
corporate securities and treasury bonds – business people wanted new products and 
supported trends for a new developmental level of the market, and financial derivatives 
were perceived to be just such products. In addition, attending presentations by 
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financial and accounting experts enabled directors to recognise the potential benefits 
of financial derivatives, such as mitigating and diverting risks in corporate operations. 
In particular, those who had the experience in using less complex securities derivatives, 
such as note, bill and bond REPOs and have had actual experience in judging the value 
of such instruments, would appreciate having access to a well-developed financial 
derivatives market. Finally, directors’ positive attitude was also affected by the opinion 
of others through a crowd psychology mechanism; and directors were affected 
positively by prevailing attitudes in the market. 
In general, participants were highly positive about the usefulness of the instruments, 
but less positive when asked about ease of use. This finding once again supports the 
conclusion in the preceding section that directors may know about different types of 
financial derivatives but not how they actually work. Being comfortable about the use 
of such instruments requires adequate knowledge of transaction procedures, risk and 
price evaluation; however, directors’ responses were weak in all these areas, as 
Chapter 5 demonstrated.  
Among the features of their context, the only one that affects directors’ attitude is their 
company scale in terms of turnover. With big standard contract volumes, financial 
derivatives are more suitable for large-scale corporations than for small ones, if 
considering hedging. Hence directors from big companies may have greater incentive 
and learn more about the instruments, and so they tend to have a more informed 
attitude to using financial derivatives.  
The extensive correlation analysis in Section 5.3.2 showed that directors’ knowledge 
interacts with four other composite variates, one of which is their attitude. The 
interaction is direct and positive. In other words, directors with better knowledge tend 
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to have the most positive attitude to financial derivatives. Directors’ understanding 
about financial derivatives does have a positive impact on their attitude to using these 
products.  
7.1.2.1. Linking Directors’ Knowledge, Attitude, and Intention to Use Financial 
Derivatives and Corporate Governance Policies on Risk Management  
As predicted by the model of theory of planned behaviour, directors’ attitude directly 
and positively interacts with intention in a moderately strong and consistent manner  
(see Section 5.3.2 and Appendix 6 for details).  
Stronger than the attitude–intention relation is the positive association between 
directors’ subjective norm and their intention (correlations .206 to .548, sig. .000 
to .027) (see Section 5.3.2 and Appendix 6). Slightly weaker than the attitude–intention 
correlation is the directors’ perceived behavioural control–intention positive 
correlation (correlations .202 to .431, sig .000 to .030) (see Section 5.3.2 and Appendix 
6). The weakest positive interaction is between directors’ risk propensity and intention. 
All directors’ attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioural control and risk 
propensity have positive associations with their intention to use financial derivatives.   
Even though there is no significant direct correlation between directors’ knowledge 
and their intention to use financial derivatives (either normal or partial correlations), 
knowledge has significant association with all four variables that have significant 
positive correlations with intention. It could be argued from the results that the 
interaction between directors’ knowledge and intention is mediated by the four other 
variables. Directors’ knowledge is significantly correlated with attitude (+), subjective 
norm (-), perceived behavioural control (+) and risk propensity (+), which in turn are 
significantly and positively correlated with their intention to use derivatives for 
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corporate purposes. The correlation is especially strong for the pair knowledge–
perceived behavioural control (see Section 5.3.2). The better the level of knowledge, 
the more clearly directors recognise the obstacles and advantages in the use of 
derivatives. Because of such clear understanding, the directors should assume that 
others with similar knowledge would treat financial derivative with care. This makes 
the only negative correlation between knowledge and subjective norm understandable. 
Education has been shown to be the main source of knowledge. The association 
between directors’ knowledge and other variables is further supported by the fact that 
directors’ education (major study and level of qualification) also affects their perceived 
control and intention.  
To conclude, directors’ attitude to the use of financial derivatives has a direct 
interaction with their intention to use them, while their knowledge about the 
instruments has a mediated interaction with intention via attitude, subjective norm, risk 
propensity and perceived behavioural control.  
In addition to these results, descriptive analysis exposed potential issues relating to 
three variables of directors’ knowledge, attitude and intention. On the same five-point 
Likert scale, knowledge registered a low score, below the mid-level, while attitude and 
intention were relatively high, approaching 4.0.  
The survey asked directors about their intention to use financial derivatives, instead of 
their actual use as in the full theory of planned behaviour model, because at the time 
of survey in mid-2015, there was not yet an official and well developed financial 
derivatives market in Vietnam. With the high expectation of such a market being 
established soon, the follow-up interviews posed questions to directors relating to the 
impact of the situation on corporate policies. The answers were that directors’ 
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insufficient knowledge, combined with strong and positively interacting attitude and 
intention, do expose companies to potential danger, and this outcome requires 
appropriate changes to be made in corporate risk management policies.  
Interviewees were concerned that the gaps between knowledge, attitude and intention 
expose companies to considerable risk of inappropriate strategies and general direction. 
When business people are knowledgeable, they are confident in management of, and 
key decision making in, the firm. When they have low levels of knowledge, they may 
make incorrect decisions or mistakenly approve proposals by subordinates, such as 
over-risky transactions. On the other hand, they may either fail to approve good 
proposals and lose an opportunity for the company, or reject a reasonable opportunity 
as in the case of the coffee industry in Exhibit 1.3.  
The path to failure of the coffee exporters is summarised in Figure 7.2 below.  
Intention is the direct predictor of behaviour (Ajzen 1991). When intention is based on 
insufficient or inaccurate understanding of the situation, this may lead to action with 
an unproductive outcome. Even when the action has not fully occurred, the effort to 
make it happen incurs a cost to the organisation. This is a risk to companies, hence 
there is sound reason to be concerned and find appropriate preventative measures. For 
directors of boards, who are not involved in daily operations, the best measure is the 
introduction of a corporate risk management policy covering the issues at hand. It is 
therefore no surprise that all the interviewees suggested that concerns about financial 
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7.1.2.2. Mechanisms Connecting Directors’ Knowledge, Attitude, Intention and 
Corporate Governance Policies 
The main mechanism channelling the impact of directors’ knowledge and attitude on 
corporate policies is the gaps between the three variables of their knowledge, attitude 
and intention. Since directors’ knowledge about financial derivatives interacts with 
their likelihood for accepting risk, their attitude to the instruments, their perceived 
support from related people (such as subordinates, partners, suppliers) and their 
perceived control over the use, these four components together lead to directors’ 
intention to use. Directors were worried about the gaps for several reasons, such as 
losing opportunities and making an incorrect decision. Even if the intention is that of 
an individual director, the director can bring the matter to the attention of the whole 
board and recommend that this be considered.  
Futures price rise 








Coffee available in 
warehouse 
Purchase need 
Buy Futures to fix purchase 
price 
Sell the futures to make profit 
Can’t re-buy the futures to 
refix price 
Buy coffee at high prices or suffer penalty for no delivery 
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What could happen when a suggestion is considered by people who do not understand 
the issue at hand? Even though a board operates as a group, during a board’s 
deliberations and discussion individual directors can play a critical role. In a discussion, 
the group leader is the one who knows most about the issue under consideration, and 
whose behaviour has important effects on group performance and whose capability is 
derived from their knowledge, skills, abilities, other competencies and prior 
experience (Cascio 2004).  
A director possessing the four qualities of independence, expertise in a domain, 
bandwidth and motivation55 above a threshold is likely to be an effective participant 
in the domain by being able to rise to challenges and raise the board’s efficacy 
(avoiding failures of governance in a given domain) (Hambrick, Misangyi, and Park 
2015). Expertise must be domain-based; directors can only effectively monitor those 
domains in which they possess requisite expertise; of the desirable kinds of expertise, 
financial expertise has special importance and can equip directors to be effective 
overseers in a wide range of domains (Hambrick, Misangyi, and Park 2015). Directors’ 
knowledge and skills are put to use throughout board decision making processes that 
coordinate and integrate individuals’ contributions (Van Ees, Van der Laan, and 
Postma 2008). To conclude, directors’ individual competencies matter for the 
effectiveness of the whole board.  
The composition of a board of directors is therefore crucial. A board without any 
directors who are knowledgeable about financial derivatives is likely to fail at being 
effective monitors in the domain. That is a major challenge for corporations entering 
                                                          
55 Independence (ability to be objective), expertise (ability to comprehend the issues at hand), bandwidth 
(ability to devote requisite time and attention), and motivation (eagerness to exert oneself on behalf of 
shareholders) (Hambrick, Misangyi, and Park 2015). 
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the financial derivatives market, either for hedging or speculation purposes. In general, 
in nearly 60 per cent of failed banks, board members either lacked banking knowledge 
or were uninformed during their supervision (Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 
2009, 54). To prevent potential harm, changes in corporate governance policies related 
to risk management were proposed by interviewees. They posited that directors’ 
knowledge should be improved and a corporate risk management framework should 
be established; discussed further in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. Figure 7.3 shows the process 
from directors’ insufficient knowledge to gaps between such knowledge and high 
intention, positive attitudes that may create risks for companies, and such concerns 
encouraging directors to establish appropriate corporate risk policy.  
Figure 7.3. Process Leading from Directors’ Insufficient Knowledge to a Risk 
Management Policy  
 
 
7.1.3. Key Stakeholders in Board Directors’ Consideration of Using Financial 
Derivatives and their Roles  
The interview component of this research was initially designed to investigate issues 
emerging from the survey, with questions about whether directors agreed with the 
survey results, whether they saw any differences from their own experience, the 
reasons for this, and whether they recognised any potential impact of the results on 
corporate policies. The majority of interviewees identified the government, regulations 
and markets as key issues in their answers. Interviewees often referred to corporate 








derivatives market. Therefore, the government and the financial derivatives market in 
Vietnam are the two major themes emerging from this study.  
The government, banks, financial institutions and other parties in the financial 
derivatives market as identified by directors are stakeholders outside of the internal 
corporate governance domain. The interviewees’ significant consideration of, and 
interest in, these factors was evidence that directors of boards must also take account 
of these stakeholders in their internal corporate policy decisions.  
Stakeholder theory is the theory that identifies the requirement to take into account 
parties other than corporate management and the board when making key corporate 
governance decisions. Using insights from stakeholder theory, directors are now 
encouraged to communicate openly with stakeholders, and establish relationships with 
society, partners and government to ensure the achievement of long-term goals 
("Corporate Governance Reports Précis" 1996). However, the board’s ability to 
navigate firms may be curtailed by the absence or ineffectiveness of external 
institutions (Chakrabarty and Bass 2014).  
Because the government and regulators are important groups of stakeholders of public 
companies (Tegner 1993), corporations need to develop objectives that stakeholders 
would support (Hitt, Freeman, and Harrison 2001, Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks 2003). 
The stakeholders’ influence is channelled through political influence and use of the 
media (Filatotchev and Boyd 2009).  
As discussed in the previous sections, there have been three well-known scandals 
related to financial derivatives in Vietnam: Jetstar Pacific airline, the ABN Amro bank 
and the coffee industry. In the case of ABN Amro vs. Incombank, foreign exchange 
derivatives transactions were conducted between the foreign bank ABN Amro and a 
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branch of the local Incombank (now renamed Vietinbank), and the local bank suffered 
a major loss. Taking advantage of the gap in the then legal framework, Incombank 
filed a case against ABN Amro, and invited the Homeland Security Investigation 
Agency to intervene. The gap was that the nature of currency derivatives had not been 
enshrined in financial laws and regulations. Therefore, the derivatives transactions that 
were perceived to be normal and customary in international financial markets were 
classified as illegal under Vietnam’s legal system. The ostensible reason was that they 
did not conform with requirements for a normal currency and exchange rate transaction.  
As a result, bank staff were put in jail temporarily or placed under constraint during 
the investigation. The scandal raised serious concerns among international financial 
firms in Vietnam and globally; business people worried about their safety when 
conducting normal business activities. The scandal also pushed the Vietnamese 
Central Bank to tighten its regulations on derivatives transactions, and consequently 
required companies to use the instruments only for hedging, by requiring them to have 
counter physical contracts. This was a barrier to a more comprehensive development 
of the financial derivatives market in the country.  
The case of ABN Amro vs. Incombank once again demonstrated how important 
government regulators’ awareness and knowledge of financial derivatives products are 
in deciding their assessment of business customs. This case and the previous case of 
Jetstar Pacific, which were in effect about the same problem, were prolonged for years 
and obstructed market development. 
The situation in the cases of both Jetstar Pacific and ABN Amro is illustrated in Figure 
7.4 below. Government regulators’ lack of knowledge of financial derivatives customs 
leads to no fair legal framework existing and normal business treated as unlawful. As 
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a result, businesses lose their trust in the system and do not participate or establish a 
market. The final outcome is a much slower market development.   
Figure 7.4. Impact of Government Regulators on Financial Derivatives Market 
Development 
 
Financial derivatives have a contentious history but have proved to be attractive to the 
business world, as reviewed in Chapter 2. Directors of boards face a major dilemma, 
with interest in and demand for corporate use of financial derivatives on one side and 
legal risk on the other. Governments can interfere with affairs of corporations, and can 
influence corporate governance either directly (as an owner) or indirectly (via macro-
economic policies) (Aguilera and Jackson 2010). When governments and corporations 
do not share an understanding, one side can act against the other. Considering this, all 
interviewees looked to government actions in order to define and construct their 
corporate policies.  
Business people expect the government to establish a legal framework, regulations and 
requirements for exchanges and markets in general. The goals are to develop 
intermediaries, ensure transparency and compliance and supply human and other 
resources as well as imposing timely penalties or taking disciplinary action. In 
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particular, the government is expected to set up a legal framework for financial 
derivatives that covers accounting regulations, underlying markets and ethics; that 
develops underlying markets such as coffee, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, 
corporate stocks, corporate bonds and treasury bonds; and that disseminates 
knowledge about financial derivatives.  
The directors’ expectation of the government’s role in paving the way for a financial 
derivatives market is appropriate, considering the usual leading role of the government 
in corporate governance in Vietnam (Lien and Holloway 2014) in Chapter 3. While 
the government is proactive, businesses tend to be passive and often wait for the 
government to initiate changes (Lien and Holloway 2014).  
Empowering the powerless among certain groups of stakeholders helps to create 
values for these groups and companies (Freeman 2009). This value is created by people 
who voluntarily come together and cooperate to improve everyone’s circumstances 
(Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar 2004), so including stakeholders can  lead to many 
benefits, including greater profit and shareholder wealth (Donaldson and Davis 1994).   
The cooperation to help improve everyone’s circumstances was demonstrated in the 
case of ABN Amro bank vs. Incombank. Recognising that the regulators and 
authorities spoke a “different language”, and did not share an understanding about the 
nature of FOREX (foreign exchange) derivatives, the foreign bank made a significant 
attempt to guide the authorities through the technical knowledge required by 
businesses globally. Similarly, in the case of Jetstar Pacific, Vietnamese investigators 
did not understand the nature of fuel hedging and considered that a loss on the hedge 
was a serious failure by senior management. Qantas, one of the two main shareholders 
in the venture, tried in every way to help the authorities realise that such a loss is part 
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of normal business and to be expected when the fuel price becomes favourable to the 
airlines. The patience displayed by the two companies worked when finally the 
government authorities accepted that FOREX derivatives and fuel hedging are part of 
the normal business cycle and the detained staff were then freed and all charges were 
withdrawn (Vietnam Economic Forum 2010, Kazmin 2006a). Every party benefited 
from this level of cooperation.  
7.2. Directors’ Recommended Ways to Improve Their Knowledge of Financial 
Derivatives  
Even if the risks from inadequate knowledge are not immediate, directors agreed that 
improving their overall level of understanding is beneficial in the long run and 
suggested several approaches to achieve that goal. They include practice activities or 
actual business operations; using an outside consultancy or adviser; appointing 
knowledgeable members onto boards; and training or self-training through courses or 
self-learning. More detailed analysis of each method follows.  
7.2.1. Combination of Financial Derivatives Experts in Boards of Directors   
It is impossible to require all directors on a board to have good knowledge of financial 
derivatives; it is more appropriate to have a full-time director who does have such 
knowledge and expertise, especially for boards of companies strongly related to the 
instruments. Such directors can then educate and persuade other members when 
decisions are needed. Part-time directors are usually from other industries and 
participate in board operations to a different extent from full-time directors. They are 
more likely to be reactive than proactive. Generally, there are only one or two proactive 
members on a board, who are usually full-time members, and who closely follow and 
monitor company operations. All directors do not have the same level of participation.  
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INT03: “The board of directors should invite independent directors with good 
qualifications to join.”  
INT01: “Those directors will educate, persuade other members when decisions 
are needed.” 
Participation in the financial derivatives market is hard for directors who are reactive, 
but it is easier for those who are proactive. While directors who are reactive tend to 
depend on support from key employees, the proactive directors are more able to make 
decisions on whether to take on a risk or a deal thanks to their more direct engagement 
in corporate affairs. The passive directors are separated from daily corporate activities; 
hence, it is harder for them to assess the benefit-risk relationship of an activity. Most 
of the passive directors will learn from board decision making processes and conclude 
that financial derivatives have potential benefits, but they will still be reluctant to use 
the instruments.  
Boards of directors should invite independent directors with sound expertise and 
qualifications to join. Among directors, the expert(s) on the issue will lead the 
discussion with other directors to arrive at a common understanding. The more passive 
directors can then, to some extent at least, share in the decisions being made about 
these instruments. These passive directors need to be persuaded and those members 
with expertise can advise the rest of the board on the technical issues before decisions 
are made on financial derivatives. 
7.2.2. Training 
Training for directors is hard, especially in financial derivatives, because business 
people have not realised the need for such training. In addition, trainers who 
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understand the market are necessary if there is to be effective training, but there is 
insufficient training expertise available because there is not a comprehensive local 
market in which to develop such expertise. 
In addition, the directors of board are unlikely to participate in mass training courses. 
One obstacle to participation in training is that when the owners have no effective 
understanding of financial derivatives, they will not send relevant staff to attend 
training (INT14). In Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, conferences and workshops held 
by consultancy companies, banks and financial institutions for their clients are good 
methods to ensure effective participation in training. In other provinces, training needs 
to be undertaken through business associations such as the Coffee and Cocoa 
Association in the coffee industry. Business associations are more effective in rural 
provinces than in cities, where industry groups are preferred.  
The government needs to play a role in increasing knowledge about financial 
derivatives and spreading it more widely. The primary responsibility falls on the 
Ministry of Finance, the State Securities Commission and other market members to 
disseminate knowledge and provide appropriate training for interested investors. 
Directors need to have both fundamental understanding and enhanced knowledge. In 
the context of business people being interested in the new financial instruments, they 
are more likely to participate in a well-focused training scheme. Financial derivatives 
suppliers’ promotions that enable the business community to understand the 
instruments in question are part of the longer-term solution. 
7.2.3. Self-learning and Actual Practice 
Directors argued in the interviews that mass training would not work especially for 
directors of boards. The prevailing practice is self-learning by reading and through 
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actual practice on the job by learning from mistakes. The tendency is to start with small 
trades, then continue on to larger contracts. Through decision making on contract after 
contract, their overall knowledge will increase and would likely increase support for 
using the instruments.  
Business people need to experience reality, as only in actual business life can they 
acquire the relevant information and knowledge and then apply this in their business 
activities. For example, in the history of the securities market in Vietnam, business 
people at first thought of listing as an event that was very complicated and potentially 
threatening, but over time they saw this process as part of the expected business cycle. 
Similarly, financial derivatives are relatively new products, thus it will take some time 
for the market, companies and society to understand and accept these instruments, and 
then they will adapt as required.  
INT02: “People have to take risks to raise their knowledge, because there is no 
free lunch.”  
According to the interviewees, raising the board of directors’ awareness and 
knowledge of financial derivatives requires action by several parties including senior 
management of companies. Directors need to learn effectively to enhance their 
financial knowledge, information technology, market developments, new products and 
new risk management tools. Full-time directors may lack appropriate knowledge 
initially, and therefore need to participate either in formal training or participate in 
active self-learning. There are two approaches they can use to learn: reading 
appropriate technical information and participating in specific well-designed short 
courses. Because directors are constrained by tight time schedules, self-learning is the 
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more popular method. A significant majority of the interviewees argued that practice 
is the best way to learn about financial derivatives.  
7.2.4. Outside Consultancy  
All interviewees agreed that using an external consultancy firm is one solution for 
directors wanting to use financial derivatives but not possessing adequate knowledge. 
However, they are divided about the availability of such services. 
INT02: “To participate in the market, boards of directors must use a 
consultancy, must use independent consultants.”  
Six interviewees believed that there were many professional investment companies 
with deep knowledge of the market. These entities can support companies and 
directors in managing financial derivatives transactions. They are securities companies 
and consulting companies. If someone does not have the appropriate knowledge, the 
directors would be better authorising a professional institution to carry out the 
investment transaction. 
Two directors thought that there were no capable and independent consultants in 
Vietnam’s financial derivatives market. They argued that there may be some individual 
experts who could support each other by sharing information and experience, but there 
were no teams dedicated to supplying high-quality consultancy processes.  
Currently, the use of outside consultancies by boards of directors is quite limited. One 
reason is that people are afraid that their ideas for new products would be stolen and 
the products developed and sold by others before they themselves can profit from them 
(INT11). One reason is supposedly the lack of available expert consultancies. In 
addition, during a crisis period, the budget is limited (INT11). 
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More practically, if there is no board member with financial derivatives expertise, the 
board then needs to depend on experts at lower operational levels and on the board’s 
sub committees. For complicated products, such as financial derivatives, boards of 
directors need advice either internally from the finance manager or externally from 
bank staff, or from fund staff in some cases. Interviewees expected that a new 
generation of leaders would help drive a more comprehensive development of the 
financial derivatives market because they would have a more appropriate mindset for 
risk management.  
Among the suggestions to improve directors’ knowledge of financial derivatives, there 
emerged an overall idea of a corporate policy framework on risk management that is 
set out in the following section. 
7.3. Corporate Policy on Financial Derivatives as Suggested by Directors  
In the directors’ recommendations, a corporate risk management framework should 
incorporate leaders’ beliefs and values at the highest level in terms of clear objectives, 
quantitative limits for authority and decisions (levels of delegation) and a policy for 
using outside consultants. The framework would also include norms and regulations 
that are embedded in processes and divisions.  
7.3.1. Risk Management Framework 
A risk (management) framework is a system to deal with risks in organisations (Hardy 
2014), including a set of components for designing, implementing, monitoring, 
reviewing and continually improving risk management throughout the organisation 
(International Organization for Standardization ISO cited in Laycock 2014, 45). There 
are several risk management frameworks including GAO (the US Government 
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Accountability Office), ISO 31000, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission – COSO’s ERM (Enterprise Risk Management) framework, 
the Federation of European Risk Management Associations (FERMA) framework and 
the OCEG (a US non-profit think tank specialising in governance, risk and compliance) 
framework (Hardy 2014) (see Appendix 9). COSO argues that the main responsibility 
for supporting enterprise risk management and involvement in the enterprise risk 
management process is a key role for the board. All the frameworks share basic 
components about the risk management process (identify, assess, evaluate, respond, 
report) and are bounded by corporate objectives.  
Another framework was introduced by the Governance Institute of Australia (see 
Appendix 9). This approach considers that an integrated governance and risk 
management framework is central to board decision making. In addition to elements 
of the risk management process, the framework covers a wider range of issues 
including the key issue of corporate risk appetite (Governance Institute of Australia 
2016, 3). The Group of 100 (CFOs in Australia) maintains that a risk management 
framework would cover the activities of managers of business units, reviewers, 
corporate finance and accounting people, company secretaries, CEOs and CFOs, audit 
committees and boards of directors (Psaros 2009). Finally, setting out the delegation 
of authority is a fundamental component of risk management both at, and below, board 
level (Governance Institute of Australia 2016, 14). 
Boards are widely expected to set the level of corporate risk appetite 56  and risk 
culture57 and communicate these down to lower corporate levels as a way of setting 
                                                          
56 The nature and extent of the risks the board is prepared to take to meet strategic objectives (Fox 2016, 221). 
57 The risk culture of an organisation is the shared attitudes (values) and behaviours of individuals about the management of risk 




boundaries (Fox 2016, Governance Institute of Australia 2016, Laycock 2014). This 
would be implemented through relevant risk management policies (Lam 2013, 392), 
followed by standards and procedures58 (Laycock 2014, 53). The explicit risk appetite 
of the board is the attitude to risk and the limit of risk-taking that senior management 
should then operationalise (Governance Institute of Australia 2016, 14). The boundary 
is essential because each company has a finite risk-bearing capacity, which, if 
surpassed would trigger other risks (Stulz 2013). The risk appetite level is dynamic 
and communication of the risk sources and appetite to stakeholders is challenging but 
crucial (Laycock 2014). It seems that directors with expertise understand this 
requirement. The interviewees often referred to the importance of a corporate risk 
management policy and the top voice.  
A risk management framework specifies governance structure – internal control, 
structures of divisions – to ensure that all divisions are under control and risks are 
recognised. The framework starts with risk recognition. Depending on the recognition, 
mitigation methods will be suggested and financial derivatives are one of the methods. 
Under the framework, a risk policy includes the guidelines for company operations 
and control. A risk framework also covers processes, the supervision system and IT 
system that help in controlling transactions and standards for counterparties. This 
reflects the board of directors’ awareness and knowledge. If all directors arrive at a 
common understanding, this will enable a better outcome for the board of management.  
                                                          
58 The policies are likely to describe the objectives, roles and responsibilities and information requirements. The standards will 
define terms, event escalation, systems to be used and expectations such as timeliness and completeness of reporting, etc. The 
procedures are mostly granular and may be customised for different businesses or various subcategories of risk, for example 




INT09: “Companies must have a risk policy, with a clear risk management 
framework specifying how much of an exposure must be hedged, as foreign 
companies do.”  
The most important thing that directors of a board should do is to give directions on 
recognising risks; only after risks are recognised can people calculate the value at risk 
and how much they would like to hedge. It is a standard procedure in forming a risk 
insurance policy; however, currently, directors in Vietnam just do minimal risk control, 
of which delegation is a minor part of risk management.  
A risk-aware culture is a sub-organisational culture that covers the way directors, 
managers and employees think, communicate and behave about all aspects of risk 
(Governance Institute of Australia 2016, 14). Boards need to make a top-level risk 
culture statement (corporate values, purpose and risk appetite), then widely 
communicate such a statement, to construct a local risk culture that ensures that the 
right people do the right thing at the right time whether supervision is available or not 
(Laycock 2014, 98). For example, in a bank, the board of directors is responsible for 
setting up corporate objectives and a bank’s risk profile to align corporate activities 
with corporate expectations and legal compliance (Van Greuning and Brajovic 
Bratanovic 2009). Directors with expertise in Vietnam are aware of risk culture and 
suggest that companies build such a culture. 
Companies must have a culture of hedging represented in a clear risk policy from top 
management. They need both policies and limits. The limits are needed if risks are of 
a scale considerable enough to influence a company’s profits and development. 
Companies also need regulations on internal controls to enable divisions to participate 
in risk management and cross-check each other.  
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However, among the interviewees, there was a different opinion about risk policy. In 
many companies in Vietnam, members of the board of directors and members of the 
board of management are often the same and the board’s suggestions are immediately 
translated into management actions. So the board of directors does not need to issue a 
risk policy because senior management will readily implement the risk framework.  
7.3.2. Delegation of Approval Authority 
To limit risk, boards of directors need to set down appropriate limits to guide decision 
making. In a risk policy, there will be provisions about delegation, and the level of 
contract value that can be approved by the board of directors, and what level by senior 
management. 
INT05: “The board of directors, such as in my company – a securities company 
– set stop loss limits that are the maximum losses they accept as risks in business. 
Because a financial derivatives market in securities has not been established, my 
company hasn’t considered a risk policy for it. But I think when the time comes, 
we will.”  
Delegation of approval is a way to mitigate risk and for this, thresholds (limits) are 
needed. However, the board of directors should not undertake decision making for 
specific transactions. The set limits and risk propensity enable management to decide 
daily operational transactions. For significantly large transactions that could influence 
a company’s future, management then needs to seek the board’s approval. 
Delegation with limits is the most appropriate and most flexible way for a board of 
directors to supervise company operations. Besides such limits, the policy should also 
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include many “dos and don’ts” and other requirements. Some people even think 
delegation is all about risk management. 
INT13: “Delegation is all that we can do to manage risk. We need to develop 
and issue clear policies, procedures. We need a threshold to make people 
responsible.” 
7.3.3. Ethics 
Similar to the suggestion that a legal framework should also cover ethical issues was 
interviewees’ judgement that a corporate risk policy should include specific 
requirements on ethics. The companies should have a reward and penalty system that 
is clear and effectively enforced. The ethics requirement for staff in the securities 
market and derivatives market should be very high. 
INT11: “Surely we need an ethics policy for people related to financial 
derivatives. When starting derivatives products, we don’t open to all divisions, 
but just use some highly professional divisions because of worries about ethical 
hazards.”  
7.3.4. Outside Consultancy 
A risk policy should be open to the possibility of using an external consultancy, and 
should require that the board seeks an independent consultancy if it struggles to assess 
issues. If a board is not knowledgeable and confident, it should seek advice. 
Consultants, naturally, are required to follow rules of confidentiality to keep clients’ 
information private.  
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Other methods of control are financial year-end auditing undertaken by independent 
auditors. The crucial point is timeliness. Financial derivatives are high-tech 
instruments that are much more complicated than the underlying securities, so it is 
important for board members to understand their own limitations and to have experts 
on the board. For cases with potentially high risks, an effective reporting mechanism 
is needed. 
The interviewed directors’ recommendations for corporate board policy are 
summarised in Figure 7.5 below, followed by a sample policy from a public company 
which one of the directors worked for. The policy is strongly focused on quantitative 
limits in addition to the general terms as described in the recommended framework 
above.  





























Appendix 11 introduces a sample risk management policy from a top securities 
company in Vietnam, where one of the interviewee works. The policy covers two main 
components as suggested in Figure 7.5: the corporate governance system (under the 
name of “Organisation of Risk Management System) and the delegation and approval 
authority for each type of risks and examples for one year in 2015. This sample policy 
also follows the common process of specifying, measuring, dealing with risks and 
reporting. This needs to be developed further to be as complete as the directors would 
expect. 
Additional implications of the research are presented below.  
7.4. Implications  
7.4.1. Implications for Theories  
This thesis is based on two main explanatory theoretical lenses: stakeholder theory and 
the theory of planned behaviour, supplemented by the model of board roles and 
attributes, and in this way has achieved a more comprehensive understanding of board 
directors’ decision making behaviour.  
The attributes of age and gender show no effect on directors’ competencies and 
considerations in decision making (perceived behavioural control, attitude, perceived 
support by others or subjective norm); this finding is in contrast to what is suggested 
by the model of board attributes. However, the attribute of directors’ background in 
terms of knowledge of financial derivatives has an extensive association with the other 
components (above) of their decision making – the way in which board roles on 
strategy, control and service are undertaken.  
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The key elements of the theory of planned behaviour are supported by both survey and 
interview data in this thesis; attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural 
control all express a moderate positive correlation with intention. Stakeholder theory 
is also vindicated in its use in the thesis through the phenomenon that emerged that 
Vietnamese directors do care about government rules and actions when making 
corporate decisions.  
The decision making and intention forming process as posited in the theory of planned 
behaviour is the connection between directors’ personal characteristics and the impact 
of key external stakeholders, the government in this case, on not only the individual 
directors, but also on board and corporate governance policies. This outcome, in the 
validation of the use of the two theories in question, means that using multi-theoretical 
perspectives in mixed methods research is appropriate.  
7.4.2. Implications for Government Authorities  
A strong desire for an official legal framework for financial derivatives was expressed 
clearly by all directors in the research. Governments, not only in Vietnam but also in 
other countries, who would like to facilitate capital flows and meet the requirements 
of businesses should set up an appropriate legal framework for the operation of 
financial markets as a priority. However, the pace of reform appears to be slower in 
Vietnam. In other countries, legal and regulatory framework concerns are about 
conforming to IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) 
principles or requirements by Basel II and Basel III in the areas of exchanges, central 
clearing systems, transaction methods, trading platforms and accounting (World Bank 
2012, International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, Jain 
2014, Kolodizev and Kotsiuba 2016, Ramirez 2015, Robinson and Hronsky 2012, 
285 
 
Valiante 2013). However, the most serious concern in Vietnam is about the 
government’s acceptance of the nature of financial derivatives and businesses’ rights 
in using them.  
The government should clearly define what financial derivatives are, how they are 
recognised in the balance sheet, and what the conditions are for businesses trading and 
hedging. There is a need for recognition by the government that financial derivatives 
are a normal type of business transaction. If they are used with a full duty of care, any 
consequential losses can also be expected at times and should not lead to criminal 
charges. This is especially important for senior and subordinate staff in the state-owned 
enterprise sector. Most financial derivatives scandals that have been due to an 
incompatible level of understanding between government and businesses are in this 
sector.  
The failures of directors in corporate governance scandals in the private sector have 
acted as warning signs to public governance authorities, as for example in Alberta, 
Canada, encouraging these authorities to proactively improve their recruitment, 
evaluation and training for directors of public sector agencies and quasi-government 
organisations (Baxter 2005). The government in Vietnam also needs be active in 
training their representative directors, at least in corporations in which the government 
is the majority shareholder.   
7.4.3. Implications for Corporate Boards 
Boards of directors are usually studied in the literature as groups. A board does, 
naturally, qualify as a group, an intact social system that performs one or more tasks 
within an organisational context with interdependence among members, and defined 
roles (Forbes and Milliken 1999, Cascio 2004, Kaufman and Englander 2005); it is in 
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a better position to manage effective oversight of an organisation than is any individual 
because of its collective knowledge and deliberation (Forbes and Milliken 1999).  
The strength and effectiveness of a board derives from boardroom dynamics. Such a 
dynamic, however, has rarely been studied using qualitative social science research 
methods and direct observation (Letendre 2004). As a prominent board researcher 
using direct observation, Leblanc (2008) emphasised the importance of the role of 
individual director competencies in producing group board effectiveness. The board 
needs to have a good mix of members with skills, experience and other qualities, such 
as understanding their entity’s business and material risks (Governance Institute of 
Australia 2016, 4). The board as a whole needs to make sure that certain competencies 
are possessed by members through effective director recruitment, education and 
training. There is no need for all directors to have the same level of competencies. 
However, competencies specifically necessary for companies, such as understanding 
of financial derivatives for corporations with hedging or speculation need, should exist 
in at least one member. In addition to the nature of business, an effective board should 
know the related risks (Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 2009, 56). 
Boards of directors increasingly recognise risk management to be their top concern 
(Lam 2013, 381), and are often judged by enterprise risk management processes 
(Lorton 2005, 18-9). In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) require a risk committee to be established in public bank 
holding companies and public companies, and the committee must include at least one 
risk management expert who has experience in identifying, assessing, and managing 
risk exposures of large, complex firms (Lam 2013, 382). Even though both the Dodd-
Frank Act requirement and Basel III (2010) demand that bank directors raise their 
capability in overseeing complex risks and regulatory requirements, chief risk officers 
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account for only 5 per cent of board members while a significant proportion of bank 
board members come from CEO (47 per cent), chief financial officer (20 per cent), 
and chief operating officer (7 per cent) backgrounds and academia (8 per cent) (Lam 
2013, 384-5). 
Every board must consider the real legal, financial and reputational risks that their 
companies may face (Lorton 2005). They should be responsible for setting the risk 
policy (risk appetite, guidance on the alignment of corporate strategy with risk appetite 
and the internal risk management structure) (OECD 2014, 12) at both individual risk 
and enterprise-risk level (OECD 2014, 14). Similar to Bob Tricker’s approach of 
performance and conformance in governance, the Governance Institute of Australia 
(2016, 14) suggests directors focus on risk management as both a control and a 
strategic function. The board of directors’ contribution to a firm’s new wealth-creation 
capabilities is the positive link between board independence and the firm’s 
performance (Kaufman and Englander 2005); the link has long been  sought. 
To conclude, in order to free management from concerns about using financial 
derivatives and risk management in general, boards should voluntarily construct 
appropriate corporate risk management policies, whether their companies are in the 
finance sector or not. Appendix 12 has a sample enterprise risk management policy 
that covers risk philosophy, governance structure, risk tolerance levels, risk framework 
and processes, risk policy standards, and risk categories and definitions (Lam 2013, 
392).  
7.4.4. Implications for Directors  
To set up a risk management framework and specific policy for financial derivatives, 
directors’ knowledge and awareness of the nature of the instruments’ nature is crucial. 
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Directors need to know that the costs are explicit but the benefits are less obvious. The 
benefits are: to increase the stability of earnings and cash flows (or to reduce 
uncertainty), to avoid potentially crippling consequences from risks that are beyond 
the management’s control or influence, and to avoid “deadweight costs”59 (Stulz 2013). 
Besides attempting to minimise corporations’ possible financial distress, financial 
derivatives are used to minimise expected tax liabilities, agency conflicts and reduce 
the costs associated with accessing external capital markets (Brown and Khokher 2007, 
47), debt capacity and inefficient investment (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993). The 
most common mistake is to consider losses on a well-designed hedge as risk 
management failure, while in fact the losses are to be expected when the exposure 
moves favourably for the firm (Stulz 2013) and the cancelling effect between the hedge 
and the real underlying asset transactions is to leave the company with expected 
earnings.  
However, many organisations have an inadequate level of knowledge of a relevant 
framework for corporate risk management (Hung 2012, 69). To satisfy the need for 
knowledge and awareness, directors of boards should proactively and voluntarily 
prepare themselves for the position by teaching themselves or by taking formal courses. 
The more they know, the more competent they are and the more likely they are to be 
offered a better directorial position in the future.  
There are three levels of risk management: corporate, business and project (equivalent 
to strategic, tactical and operational perspectives), and at strategic or board level, risks 
are not usually quantifiable (Merna and Al-Thani 2008, 258). Corporate level risk 
management is therefore less formal but more important; it covers global or 
                                                          




uncontrollable risks, often associated with political, legislative, regulatory, economic 
and environmental factors (Merna and Al-Thani 2008, 261). Boards and directors need 
to have some knowledge to understand decisions to do with risk appetite at this level 
(Laycock 2014, 38).  
The nature of more informal and subtle corporate-level risk management means that 
directors need to have more than an understanding of a specific area. They do not need 
to be geniuses, but they need to know the fundamentals in a wide variety of fields.  
To be qualified to undertake risk oversight, directors must have appropriate 
professional experience and personal attributes, business acumen and education (Lam 
2013, 385-6). Training and courses play some role, but long-term industry engagement 
contributes the most significant knowledge (OECD 2014, 17) as Hambrick et al. (2015) 
summarised in their list of factors determining directors’ ability to comprehend the 
issues at hand. The factors are areas and levels of formal education and certification, 
the number of public company boards they serve, the types of issues they face on other 
boards, and their experience in the focal company’s industry (Hambrick, Misangyi, 
and Park 2015, 330).  
To be effective, directors need to have more than qualifications. It is better that people 
with the desire to be a director take part in actual business practices and develop deeper 
levels of expertise before becoming a director. That is the key way to help them acquire 
the appropriate experience. Once they are appointed as a director, the chance to do this 
is more limited, owing to the principle of independence that states they should not 
participate in daily corporate tasks for the board. It is risk expertise and experience that 
establishes the credibility of individual board directors (Laycock 2014, 116).  
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Risk appetite is only useful in a firm with a firm-wide level of expertise (Laycock 2014, 
114). However, where wide distribution is not present, directors should consult with 
internal or external experts in order to construct more effective decisions (Van 
Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 2009, 57).  
7.4.5. Implications for Training Organisations  
Director training on financial derivatives was identified by all the interviewed directors 
to improve their current knowledge; this is supported by the survey finding that 
directors’ education (qualification) has a significant impact on their level of knowledge 
(see Section 5.3.1.1). Simply recommending formal training for current directors is 
recognised to be ineffective because of the expected low participation rate. Training 
organisations need to devise more creative training methods that suit directors’ tight 
time schedules.  
Barriers to formal director training have been widely recognised. Instead of lengthy 
formal classroom based training, short presentations in professional workshops, 
combined with conferences or meetings, would increase directors’ knowledge of the 
instruments over time. This would be another form of on-the-job training. Training 
organisations should design concise and easy-to-digest booklets or materials to be 
delivered to directors, as part of an ongoing self-learning process.  
It is more effective to get future directors more effectively prepared for working in a 
business world with financial derivatives through education. In addition, curriculum 
material on financial derivatives should be included in business, finance and 
management degree-awarding courses such as bachelor or master’s degrees, as well as 
in internal training courses for mid-level management staff.  
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7.5. Conclusion  
Multi-theoretical viewpoints were used with a mixed methods research approach in 
this study. Stakeholder theory, the theory of planned behaviour and the model for 
board attributes and roles were intertwined and used as theoretical lenses to explore 
directors’ poor understanding of financial derivatives and the corresponding 
relationship with corporate governance policy, especially in the area of risk 
management. The Vietnamese government needs to be proactive in setting up a 
comprehensive legal framework, and disseminating knowledge about financial 
derivatives in order to establish necessary conditions for an expanded financial market. 
The boards of directors need to recruit well-qualified directors for financial derivatives 
oversight roles, to supply members with effective education and training about these 
instruments, and to establish a risk management policy as a guide for daily 
management tasks. Individual directors should be trained, train themselves and take 
part in actual business practice to improve their knowledge of using financial 
derivatives up to the level necessary for the board’s risk management policy. Finally, 
training organisations should customise their courses to meet the time frame and board 
directors’ demand for essential knowledge about financial derivatives.  




Chapter 8 Contributions and Conclusion  
Introduction  
Specific results and findings from two sub-studies of this thesis were presented, 
connected and analysed in the previous three chapters. They provide the substantive 
material for the overall contribution of this thesis. These contributions to knowledge, 
to theory and practice and to methodology are clarified in this chapter, followed by the 
limitations and recommendations for future research. The chapter concludes with final 
remarks.  
8.1. Contribution to Knowledge  
This thesis is one of the few studies to investigate individual board director behaviour 
in Vietnam, and revealed and analysed directors’ understanding of financial 
derivatives and related decision making in an emerging economy. The thesis has also 
connected directors’ knowledge with the wider areas of risk management and 
corporate governance. A key outcome of this thesis is a holistic overview of 
developments in corporate governance in Vietnam (Lien and Holloway 2014) which 
provided the background to the main research questions. 
There have been a number of studies on corporate governance in Vietnam, but a dearth 
of visible research on individual directors’ behaviour. These studies have included a 
wide range of areas including the regulatory framework, especially compared to 
benchmarks such as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (World Bank 2013, 
Centre for Asia Private Equity Research 2015, Freeman 2005, Le Minh and Walker 
2008, McGee 2009, Nguyen 2005, Owoeye and Van der Pijl 2016); the causal 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Malesky, 
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McCulloch, and Nhat 2015, Nguyen 2013, Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy 2015b, Nguyen 
and van Dijk 2012, Okuda and Nhung 2012, Trinh, Duyen, and Thao 2015, Trong 
Tuan 2014, Van Tuan and Tuan 2016, Vo and Nguyen 2014, Vo 2016, Xuan-Quang 
and Zhong-Xin 2013); and, the legal aspects of corporate governance (Hai 2006, Trong 
Dan 2005). However, research on the board as an entity and its members is rare, 
although there has been some research on the diversity of board members, especially 
in relation to gender (Hoang, Abeysekera, and Ma 2016, Linh et al. 2016, Nguyen, 
Locke, and Reddy 2015a). This thesis has effectively contributed to a deeper 
understanding of corporate governance and directors’ behaviour and voices on 
financial derivatives in Vietnam. 
There are a number of contributions from this thesis. Firstly, this study adds to the 
literature on mixed methods research which is expanding, by applying this approach 
to a relatively limited-access group of corporate directors in the under-researched area 
identified above. Access to directors is one of the main barriers to research of this type. 
To resolve this difficulty, the thesis acquired primary empirical data from directors, 
both executive and non-executive, directly through a survey and interviews, instead of 
collecting information on board members via CEOs, managers or analysts. Direct 
access to directors of all types has contributed to a more comprehensive view of 
directors’ actual knowledge and the effect they judge this to have on their decision 
making behaviour. 
Secondly, the evidence in Vietnam of directors’ lack of effective knowledge about 
financial derivatives adds further evidence from an emerging economy to directors’ 
understanding of these instruments worldwide. Directors in Vietnam are no different 
from their peers in developed economies including the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands. The greater the level of concern about this lack of 
294 
 
understanding, the more urgent are warnings to related parties such as directors 
themselves, investors and regulators to take measures to prevent unexpected 
consequences.  
Third, even though not required by regulations to be responsible for risk management 
(except for those in the finance and banking sector), directors interviewed in this 
research showed a serious interest in risk management and an awareness of the 
importance of their role. They recognised that the board of directors is responsible for 
establishing corporate risk management policies with certain key elements: a general 
framework, requirements on ethics, independent auditing, delegation and approval 
authority and an open door for external consultancy. This is no surprise because all the 
interviewees had financial expertise, so they were well acquainted with the concept 
and practice of risk management. In other words, appropriately educated in formal 
education or at work, directors certainly have an appropriate attitude to financial 
derivatives; and an appropriate tone at the top would be beneficial for corporate risk 
management in general as can be extrapolated from the model in Figure 8.1. As the 
figure shows, people’s attitude shapes their behaviour that in turn forms their 
organisational culture. Once formed, the culture works to enhance the attitude and 
reinforce the behaviour. 
Risk culture60 is heavily influenced by the “tone from the top”, and the behaviour of 
the board, executives and management, which will be adopted by others (Laycock 
2014, 100-3). This influence is shown in Figure 8.1: the attitude of senior leaders forms 
group norms, which then influence the behaviour of other team members; the 
                                                          
60 The norms and traditions of behaviour of individuals and of groups within an organisation that 
determine the way in which they identify, understand, discuss, and act on the risk that the organisation 
confronts and the risks it takes (Laycock 2014, 100). 
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behaviour of leaders influences the risk culture in a recursive manner (Laycock 2014, 
107). 
Figure 8.1. Attitude – Behaviour – Culture Model 
 
Source: Laycock (2014, 107) 
 
Failures and losses are not uncommon in hedging and trading, such as the loss of US$9 
billion by Morgan Stanley in a hedge in 2007 (Stulz 2013), and JP Morgan Chase’s 
trading loss of US$6.2 billion in 2012 (Lam 2013). The primary reason for the latter 
loss was the failure of the company’s risk oversight in preventing the CIO from raising 
corporate risk appetites hundreds of times in only months because, at the time, none 
of the company’s risk committee had wide risk experience (Lam 2013, 386-7).  
Among the three main lines of defence61, the board of directors is the last and the most 
important, and the only one that can appreciate the subtle, inherent dangers. In carrying 
                                                          
61First line of defense: Business and operating units decisions should be in line with the company’s risk appetite, which is 
established by the board of directors. 
Second line of defense: CRO and ERM function (and Compliance). One of their primary duties is to establish 
and implement risk and compliance programs. These programs include policies that will guide and constrain the decision making 
processes of the business units, establishing the infrastructure and best-practice standards for ERM. This includes developing risk 
policies and procedures, analytical models, and data resources and reporting processes. 
Third line of defense: Board of directors (and Internal Audit). As an industry standard, the audit committee usually serves as the 
third line of defense by itself (Lam 2013, 388). 
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out the three main responsibilities of governance62, policy63 and assurance64 (Lam 
2013, 388), boards face problems of insufficient risk experience and expertise among 
board members. This makes it more difficult for the board to challenge management 
on major risk issues. 
To sum up, directors’ insufficient understanding about financial derivatives in 
Vietnam is a matter for serious concern; however, there are a number of ways in which 
this can be improved as discussed in Chapter 7. 
8.2. Contribution to Theory and Practice 
The main theoretical contribution is the use of a combination of stakeholder theory, 
the theory of planned behaviour and the model of board attributes and roles in order to 
achieve a multi-angle view of directors’ behaviours in decisions on financial 
derivatives. Stakeholder theory and the model of board attributes are theories in 
management, while the theory of planned behaviour is based in the discipline of 
psychology. Board directors are individuals, so their actions can be studied from a 
psychological perspective.  
Stakeholder theory supports the pragmatism and pluralism approaches (Freeman, 
Wicks, and Parmar 2004), accepting that there is a collection of interacting, reinforcing 
and contradicting theories of business strategy instead of an absolute one (Hitt, 
Freeman, and Harrison 2001, Hutton 1997). To analyse the behaviour of directors of 
boards in Vietnam, it is crucial to see them and their corporations in the context of the 
                                                          
62 Governance. Establish an effective governance structure to oversee risk. How should the board be organised to oversee ERM? 
What is the linkage between strategy and risk management? How can the independence of the risk management function be 
strengthened? 
63 Policy. Approve and monitor an ERM policy that provides explicit risk tolerance levels for key risks. Do risk management 
policies and risk tolerance levels effectively capture the board’s overall risk appetite and ERM expectations? What is the linkage 
between risk policies and compensation policies? 
64 Assurance. Establish assurance processes to ensure that an effective ERM program is in place. What are the performance metrics 
and feedback loops for ERM? How to improve the structure and content of board reports? How should that assurance be disclosed 
to investors, rating agencies and regulators? 
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business environment of the country. Directors’ personal attributes are the foundation 
for their decision making, and the outcome of that process depends on compatibility 
with the environment. The absence of an external institutional factor such as a legal 
framework in Vietnam for financial derivatives prohibits the private sector from fully 
developing the financial instruments market.  
Corporate governance bundles, a concept initially introduced in 1995, are a 
combination of corporate governance practices that interact and, consequently, 
complement or substitute for each other as a bundle of related practices (Yoshikawa, 
Zhu, and Wang 2014). Schiehll, Ahmadjian, and Filatotchev (2014) viewed corporate 
governance systems as comprising bundles of interrelated or even intertwined external 
(country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces operating at both levels to govern the 
owner-manager relationship within an economy. National corporate governance 
bundles are the latest development and are different from either firm-level governance 
bundles or national governance systems (Schiehll, Ahmadjian, and Filatotchev 2014). 
The combination of factors into bundles suggests that interaction between firm and 
national factors is a better mechanism for investigating corporate governance issues. 
In a similar way, this thesis has combined the two-level factors to some extent and 
found a range of reasons for directors’ limited knowledge of financial derivatives.  
8.3. Contribution to Methodology 
This study was an application of mixed methods research, using a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate the complicated relationship 
between board directors and financial derivatives. By using a mix of survey and 
interview, comprehensive empirical data on this topic were produced. The follow-up 
interviews provided insights into issues that arose from the survey results; they served 
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to provide deeper explanations for the quantitative findings. In addition, three major 
themes (directors’ understanding of financial derivatives, the influence of their 
understanding on directors’ features in the research model, and the relationship 
between gaps, risks and corporate policy in the directors’ perceptions) and three sub-
themes (business culture, the government roles in setting up financial derivatives 
market and the market of these instruments) emerged from the interviews. The themes 
expanded the research beyond individual directors and internal companies to include 
the country’s legal environment.  
While other mixed methods studies usually use qualitative research as the first step to 
establish concepts and variables, and then follow this up with quantitative research to 
test causal relationships among the variables, this thesis reversed this process. The 
study commenced with a survey to discover the overall scale of directors’ 
understanding of financial derivatives in Vietnam and any potential implications for 
corporate risk management and corporate governance policy. This was followed by 
interviews to explore more deeply the issues arising from the survey results. The 
quantitative component of this thesis successfully adapted and developed a survey to 
measure key facets of individual directors’ decision making with a high level of 
reliability.  
Social research is often divided into two main areas of study: general laws of group 
life and diagnosis of a specific situation; these are also called the explanation and 
understanding65 approaches (Coghlan 2011, 56). This thesis is an example of both 
combined in one study.  
                                                          
65  The former emulated the natural sciences, by grounding research in high standards of both evidence and 
inference, and led to the empiricist tradition of research. The latter, critical of the former’s ability to deal with 
human meaning, sought to emphasise the interpretation of human meaning in the science of human organisation 
and action and led to the hermeneutic tradition of research (Coghlan 2011, 59). 
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8.4. Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research  
This research was based on data on board directors from the single country of Vietnam. 
This limits how far the results can be generalised globally. It is suggested that future 
research could simultaneously measure individual directors’ attributes in multiple 
countries and undertake cross-country analyses. This option is possible if time and 
funding are available and can be done by translating the survey developed in this thesis.  
The size of the thesis sample is another limitation. The number of 119 usable 
questionnaires was not sufficient to use various multivariate data analysis techniques. 
However, tests of the hypotheses that were undertaken and the further correlations 
performed are defensible. In addition, significant effort was made to increase the 
response rate, including using both online and paper-based survey delivery; repeating 
the distribution of the survey; and using both public databases and personal 
relationships to obtain access to directors. In the prevailing conditions, especially the 
culture, of Vietnam and with the difficulty in accessing directors, it was impossible to 
collect a full random sample, so a convenience sample was used in the survey and 
snowball sampling was used to select interviewees. Both sampling methods limit the 
capacity to generalise from the results. Furthermore, this thesis was undertaken at an 
opportune moment just before the launching of the first official derivatives market in 
Vietnam in August 2017 (State Securities Commission of Vietnam 2017a). The thesis 
findings, even though limited due to sample size, can be used as a baseline for future 
longitudinal research.   
In spite of the advantage of diversifying data by directly asking directors about their 
knowledge and thinking, rather than via another party, the direct data collection in this 
study suffers from the self-report bias that is normal for research on directors. This 
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bias means that care is needed in interpreting the results. Participants usually modify 
their answers to meet social or interviewers’ expectations. Future studies in Vietnam, 
when the financial derivatives market is fully formed, should use data from multiple 
sources to reduce the bias effect.  
This study is cross-sectional, with data collected at one point in time. Change over 
time in directors’ knowledge, intention and other characteristics should be of interest, 
and this is an option for future studies.  
The survey design might lead to a learning effect in which participants could predict 
the purpose of the questions and change their answer accordingly. Separating sections 
of the survey by using distracting questions or multiple surveys is suggested for future 
research to address this issue.  
Data were collected from directors of publicly listed companies only; directors of 
private joint stock companies were excluded. Future studies could expand the 
participants to include the latter group. In addition, this thesis has one key finding 
about the difference in risk propensity between directors from state-owned enterprises 
and private companies, a difference that should be explored further in future research.  
Active and involved directors are good for corporate performance (Letendre 2004), 
since they create an engaged board that can use members’ cohesion and human capital 
(Charan, Useem, and Carey 2013). To fulfil their duties, directors need in-depth 
knowledge (Sherony and Crum 2014); however, they are not selected on the basis of 
qualifications, but on their support for the management (Brown 2015, 133). That is the 
reason why their lack of knowledge is persistent. Directors lacking knowledge were 
blamed for bank failures during the 2008 global financial crisis (Lam 2013). However, 
having a higher proportions of domain-expert directors may lead to greater likelihood 
301 
 
of organisational failure in decisions where there is a great deal of uncertainty 
(Almandoz and Tilcsik 2016, 1143). Furthermore, greater numbers of independent 
directors with financial expertise were closely related to lower performance during the 
crisis because they had a strong tendency to take risks (Minton, Taillard, and 
Williamson 2014, 351). Either too little or too much expertise is problematic, so the 
question of “How much is enough?” provides an opening for further research.  
8.5. Conclusion  
This research adds to the literature on the usefulness and compatibility of mixed 
method approaches, provides support for the use of a combination of stakeholder 
theory, theory of planned behaviour and model for board roles and attributes, and 
provides deeper knowledge about individual directors’ behaviour in an emerging 
economy.  
The initial major research question of how directors of boards in Vietnam understand 
the use of financial derivatives, their attitudes to using derivatives, and the subsequent 
effects on corporate governance has been answered by the two sub-studies in this 
mixed methods approach.  
Directors’ knowledge of the use of financial derivatives and risk acceptance tendency 
together with their personal attributes (age, gender, education, working experience) 
and corporate features (industry, scale) were integrated into the model of theory of 
planned behaviour to simultaneously measure the knowledge level and its associations 
with other factors, especially the attitude and the intention to use the instruments. 
This thesis provides support for the current evidence in the literature that board 
directors in Vietnam do have some basic understanding about financial derivatives, 
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but lack sufficient knowledge about most of the important aspects such as pricing, 
transaction procedures and risk management, so in general their understanding about 
derivatives is lower than expected, compared to their peers in more developed 
economies. 
The knowledge is significantly and positively correlated with directors’ attitude, risk 
propensity and their perception of control; however, its correlation with perceived 
support from related people is significantly negative. The direction of these 
correlations is reasonable. Nevertheless, the major gaps between directors’ low 
knowledge, highly positive attitude and strong intention do raise significant concerns 
among those directors with financial expertise.  
Vietnam’s corporate governance context plays a crucial role in shaping directors’ 
perceptions about financial derivatives and related issues. An inadequate legal 
framework and a business culture without a focus on risk management inhibit market 
establishment and development. A weak market does not create sufficient motivation 
for directors to learn and better understand the use of such instruments.  
On 10 August 2017, the stock index financial derivatives market in Vietnam was 
officially launched with futures contracts on HNX30 index (State Securities 
Commission of Vietnam 2017a). The engine has been started to meet the demand for 
new trading products as well as risk management tools by financial institutions and a 
number of individual investors. These organisations and individuals need a market 
with liquidity which means more and more participants are needed to keep the market 
running smoothly. The market is now restricted to domestic participants, and 
foreigners, who are more knowledgeable and financially healthier, are excluded. There 
will be campaigns to attract companies and people into the market to create liquidity. 
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Therefore, raising potential investors’ (including board directors) understanding and 
awareness of financial derivatives is essential for a healthy market.  
The directors who were interviewed and do have financial expertise were fully aware 
of the importance of raising directors’ knowledge about financial derivatives as a way 
to ensure an expanded use of the instruments for business purposes. The question 
remains as to how this will be achieved. In a corporate governance domain dominated 
by the leading role of the government, the government in Vietnam is once again a key 
stakeholder. The reliance on the government has been strengthened by the experience 
of failure in the coffee industry, airline fuel and currency exchanges, in which the 
mismatch in understanding by the government and the related companies and banks 
was a primary causal factor. The government’s primary task is to set up legal 
framework, develop underlying markets and conduct knowledge dissemination and 
widespread training. The recent opening of the newly formed stock index derivatives 
market is one more step in this process.  
The responsibility also lies with companies and directors themselves. Companies 
should count on using outside financial derivatives experts as a source of information, 
expertise and training. At the policy level, boards of directors should establish a 
rigorous corporate policy on financial derivatives that encompasses a risk management 
framework, delegation of approval authority, ethics for staff and using external 
consultancies. A carefully drafted financial derivatives policy would release directors 
from tracking daily transactions to a more enhanced focus on trajectory of corporate 
operations, providing more autonomy to lower management officers, and setting the 
foundation for an effective business system.  
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Individual directors can increase their own knowledge through self-learning and by 
enhancing their practical work experience. These are more practical and efficient 
recommended changes. Directors’ expertise is crucial to success of the stakeholder 
governance model. Learning from Athen’s demarchy form of governance in which 
decision makers are systematically and randomly selected, Sherony and Crum (2014) 
suggested a dual-chamber board of directors. One includes shareholder representatives 
and the other chamber holds members drawn by lot from other stakeholders. The two 
chambers are designed to include fair representation of stakeholders and adequate 
levels of expertise in order to make the random selection effective (Sherony and Crum 
2014), 11).  
Vietnam has joined the 41 countries with active financial derivatives markets on the 
global stage (a statistic by the researcher in 2017). The findings from Vietnam should 
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Appendix 4: Non-Parametric Correlations among Directors’ Knowledge, 
Attitude, Risk Propensity, Subjective Norm, Perceived Behavioural Control and 
Intention to Use Financial Derivatives 
 
Correlations 









Knowledge Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .225* .248** .088 .574** .168 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .014 .007 .342 .000 .068 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 
Attitude Correlation Coefficient .225* 1.000 .261** .590** .289** .516** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .014 . .004 .000 .001 .000 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 
RiskPropensity Correlation Coefficient .248** .261** 1.000 .222* .206* .292** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .004 . .015 .024 .001 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 
SubjectiveNorm Correlation Coefficient .088 .590** .222* 1.000 .457** .548** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .342 .000 .015 . .000 .000 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 
PerceivedControl Correlation Coefficient .574** .289** .206* .457** 1.000 .431** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .024 .000 . .000 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 
Intention Correlation Coefficient .168 .516** .292** .548** .431** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .068 .000 .001 .000 .000 . 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 









Appendix 5: Double Check on Factor Analysis by Covering All Selected Items 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .861 






 Initial Extraction 
3. Technical issues related to forward contracts 1.000 .812 
4. Technical issues related to futures contracts 1.000 .788 
5. Technical issues related to SWAP contracts? 1.000 .814 
6. Technical issues related to Options 1.000 .761 
7. Methods for pricing financial derivatives 1.000 .833 
8. Techniques for evaluating risks associated with using financial derivatives 1.000 .814 
9. Purpose(s) of using financial derivatives 1.000 .803 
10. The risks associated with using financial derivatives 1.000 .774 
11. Procedures in financial derivatives transactions 1.000 .864 
12. In general, my knowledge of financial derivatives is ……… 1.000 .873 
13. To what extent would you consider yourself informed about financial derivatives? 1.000 .769 
14. The information search I have performed about financial derivatives is……. 1.000 .725 
16. Using financial derivatives is ……. for managing business. 1.000 .736 
17. Using futures contracts is …… for control overall business risks. 1.000 .672 
18. It is ….. to use forward contracts for controlling accounting records. 1.000 .573 
21. Putting money into financial derivatives is …….. 1.000 .678 
22. Managing financial derivatives is ….. 1.000 .717 
23. Outcomes from using financial derivatives are …. 1.000 .803 
25. How likely are you to choose riskier alternatives which could have a major impact 
on your own future? 
1.000 .691 
26. How likely are you to choose riskier alternatives which rely upon analyses that are 
high in technical complexity? 
1.000 .692 
27. How likely are you to initiate a financial action which has the potential to backfire? 1.000 .688 
28. How likely are you to support a decision when you are aware that relevant 
analyses were done while missing several pieces of information? 
1.000 .774 
29. "Most people who are important to me would think that using financial derivatives 
is a wise idea." 
1.000 .722 
30. "Most people who are important to me would think I should use financial 
derivatives." 
1.000 .777 
31. "My subordinates would think that using financial derivatives is a wise idea." 1.000 .675 
32. "Company shareholders who are important to me would think that using financial 




33. "Business partners who are important to me would think that using financial 
derivatives is a good idea." 
1.000 .810 
34. "My family who are important to me would think I should use financial derivatives." 1.000 .736 
35. For me to evaluate forward contracts is …….. 1.000 .751 
37. How much control do you have over transaction of financial derivatives? 1.000 .571 
38. “I believe that I have the ability to enforce decision to use SWAP contracts when 
needed” 
1.000 .702 
40. How confident are you that you will be able to persuade your companies to use 
options? 
1.000 .627 
42. To what extent do you feel that ordering management to use financial derivatives 
is within your control? 
1.000 .616 
44. "I would like to use financial derivatives for my business in the near future." 1.000 .886 
45. "I intend to use financial derivatives for my business in the near future." 1.000 .881 
46. "I plan to use financial derivatives for my business in the near future." 1.000 .736 
47. "I will make an effort to prepare my company to using financial derivatives in the 
near future." 
1.000 .720 






Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 11.787 31.858 31.858 11.787 31.858 31.858 9.141 24.707 24.707 
2 6.405 17.311 49.168 6.405 17.311 49.168 4.078 11.023 35.729 
3 2.393 6.468 55.636 2.393 6.468 55.636 3.457 9.344 45.073 
4 2.201 5.948 61.583 2.201 5.948 61.583 3.276 8.853 53.926 
5 1.529 4.132 65.715 1.529 4.132 65.715 2.713 7.332 61.258 
6 1.200 3.244 68.959 1.200 3.244 68.959 2.123 5.738 66.996 
7 1.105 2.985 71.945 1.105 2.985 71.945 1.618 4.372 71.368 
8 1.018 2.753 74.697 1.018 2.753 74.697 1.232 3.329 74.697 
9 .853 2.307 77.004       
10 .828 2.239 79.242       
…. …. …… ……       
37 .054 .147 100.000       






Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
3. Technical issues related to forward contracts .823 .228 .067 .009 .054 .148 -.049 .228 
4. Technical issues related to futures contracts .790 .145 .010 -.035 .046 .206 .056 .306 
5. Technical issues related to SWAP contracts? .820 .139 .033 .008 .002 .205 -.006 .283 
6. Technical issues related to Options .803 .116 .018 .055 .125 .206 .072 .189 
7. Methods for pricing financial derivatives .895 .132 .004 -.007 .041 .061 .093 -.026 
8. Techniques for evaluating risks associated with using financial derivatives .867 -.058 .031 .112 -.048 .037 -.036 .202 
9. Purpose(s) of using financial derivatives .866 .096 .031 -.034 .156 -.056 -.090 -.080 
10. The risks associated with using financial derivatives .855 .100 .012 .014 .119 -.018 -.067 -.116 
11. Procedures in financial derivatives transactions .909 -.004 .017 .146 .086 -.008 -.018 -.094 
12. In general, my knowledge of financial derivatives is ……… .882 .084 .026 -.035 .039 .167 .123 -.204 
13. To what extent would you consider yourself informed about financial derivatives? .732 -.093 .124 -.119 .081 .244 .110 -.343 
14. The information search I have performed about financial derivatives is……. .764 .038 .062 .068 -.060 .090 .089 -.335 
16. Using financial derivatives is ……. for managing business. .031 .732 .103 .133 -.033 .038 .303 .276 
17. Using futures contracts is …… for control overall business risks. .107 .747 -.085 .053 .244 .044 .173 -.012 
18. It is ….. to use forward contracts for controlling accounting records. .070 .669 .121 .263 .054 .000 .027 -.183 
21. Putting money into financial derivatives is …….. .166 .686 .333 .154 -.050 .088 .160 .099 
22. Managing financial derivatives is ….. .289 .517 .047 .509 .239 .006 -.210 -.066 
23. Outcomes from using financial derivatives are …. .177 .842 .165 .125 .045 .128 -.025 .033 
25. How likely are you to choose riskier alternatives which could have a major impact on your own 
future? 
.072 .231 .282 -.010 .662 .080 .059 .323 
26. How likely are you to choose riskier alternatives which rely upon analyses that are high in 
technical complexity? 
.153 .175 .137 .051 .734 -.006 .222 .168 
27. How likely are you to initiate a financial action which has the potential to backfire? .168 .058 .144 .125 .785 .005 -.005 -.059 
362 
 
28. How likely are you to support a decision when you are aware that relevant analyses were done 
while missing several pieces of information? 
-.018 -.075 -.043 .054 .814 .165 -.013 -.272 
29. "Most people who are important to me would think that using financial derivatives is a wise 
idea." 
-.008 .312 .123 .657 -.013 .187 .344 -.156 
30. "Most people who are important to me would think I should use financial derivatives." -.024 .251 .418 .722 -.065 .037 .109 .014 
31. "My subordinates would think that using financial derivatives is a wise idea." -.018 .373 .175 .657 .181 .144 .032 -.137 
32. "Company shareholders who are important to me would think that using financial derivatives is 
a good idea." 
.047 .411 .132 .375 .228 .043 .592 -.200 
33. "Business partners who are important to me would think that using financial derivatives is a 
good idea." 
.031 .299 .131 .291 .122 .085 .768 .075 
34. "My family who are important to me would think I should use financial derivatives." -.043 .073 .195 .729 .125 .096 .301 .209 
35. For me to evaluate forward contracts is …….. .291 .130 .042 .049 .063 .801 .011 -.009 
37. How much control do you have over transaction of financial derivatives? .497 .062 .214 .272 .075 .421 -.105 -.083 
38. “I believe that I have the ability to enforce decision to use SWAP contracts when needed” .191 .009 .315 .514 .000 .487 -.045 .249 
40. How confident are you that you will be able to persuade your companies to use options? .297 .208 .224 .326 .215 .509 .183 -.002 
42. To what extent do you feel that ordering management to use financial derivatives is within your 
control? 
.277 .010 .323 .286 .107 .512 .280 -.020 
44. "I would like to use financial derivatives for my business in the near future." .030 .060 .894 .208 .154 .028 .054 .107 
45. "I intend to use financial derivatives for my business in the near future." .029 .055 .895 .193 .143 .011 .089 .106 
46. "I plan to use financial derivatives for my business in the near future." .048 .237 .739 .205 .134 .219 .038 -.147 
47. "I will make an effort to prepare my company to using financial derivatives in the near future." .102 .379 .628 .121 .029 .326 .053 -.217 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 





Appendix 6: Normal and Partial Non-Parametric Correlations of Variates in the 
Research Model 
Pair Significant Correlations – Controlled for… 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 None Knowledge RiskPropensity Attitude SubjectiveNorm 
1. Knowledge – Risk 
Propensity 
.259   .210 .244 
Sig. .005   .023 .008 
2.Knowledge – Attitude .237  .182  .223 
Sig. .010  .049  .015 
3.Knowledge – 
SubjectiveNorm 
  .043 -.053  
Sig.   .644 .567  
4.Knowledge – 
PerceivedControl 
.588  .566 .559 .614 
Sig. .000  .000 .000 .000 
5.Knowledge – Intention   .113 .069 .151 
Sig.   .224 .458 .102 
6.Risk Propensity - Attitude .261 .213   .165 
Sig. .004 .021   .075 
7.Risk Propensity – 
SubjectiveNorm 
.222 .205  .088  
Sig. .015 .026  .345  
8.Risk Propensity - 
PerceivedControl 
.206 .070  .142 .121 
Sig. .024 .454  .126 .192 
9.Risk Propensity - Intention .292 .258  .190 .208 
Sig. .001 .005  .039 .024 
10.Attitude - 
SubjectiveNorm 
.590 .586 .565   
Sig. .000 .000 .000   
11.Attitude - 
PerceivedControl 
.289 .191 .249  .027 
Sig. .001 .038 .006  .772 
12.Attitude - Intention .516 .495 .476  .285 
Sig. .000 .000 .000  .002 
13.SubjectiveNorm - 
PerceivedControl 
.457 .497 .431 .371  
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000  
14.SubjectiveNorm - 
Intention 
.548 .542 .518 .352  
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000  
15.PerceivedControl - 
Intention 
.431 .409 .396 .344 .243 





Continued Appendix 6 
Pair Significant Correlations – Controlled for… 
 6 7 8 9 10 
 PerceivedControl Intention Knowledge – Risk 
Propensity 
Knowledge – Risk 
Propensity - Attitude 
Knowledge – Risk 
Propensity - 
SubjectiveNorm 
1. Knowledge – Risk 
Propensity 
.173 .219    
Sig. .061 .017    
2.Knowledge – Attitude .086 .171    
Sig. .354 .064    
3.Knowledge – 
SubjectiveNorm 
-.238 -.001    
Sig. .010 .995    
4.Knowledge – 
PerceivedControl 
 .575    
Sig.  .000    
5.Knowledge – Intention -.101     
Sig. .275     
6.Risk Propensity - Attitude .215 .135    
Sig. .020 .146    
7.Risk Propensity – 
SubjectiveNorm 
.147 .078    
Sig. .112 .401    
8.Risk Propensity - 
PerceivedControl 
 .093    
Sig.  .314    
9.Risk Propensity - Intention .230     
Sig. .012     
10.Attitude - 
SubjectiveNorm 
.538 .429 .568   
Sig. .000 .000 .000   
11.Attitude - 
PerceivedControl 
 .087 .181  -.139 
Sig.  .351 .051  .136 
12.Attitude - Intention .453  .466  .245 
Sig. .000  .000  .008 
13.SubjectiveNorm - 
PerceivedControl 
 .293 .494 .483  
Sig.  .001 .000 .000  
14.SubjectiveNorm - 
Intention 
.437  .517 .346  
Sig. .000  .000 .000  
15.PerceivedControl - 
Intention 
  .406 .370 .202 
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Pair Significant Correlations – Controlled for… 
 11 12 13 14 15 















Knowledge – Risk 
Propensity –  
SubNorm-
PerceivedControl 
1. Knowledge – Risk 
Propensity 
     
Sig.      
2.Knowledge – Attitude      
Sig.      
3.Knowledge – 
SubjectiveNorm 
     
Sig.      
4.Knowledge – 
PerceivedControl 
     
Sig.      
5.Knowledge – Intention      
Sig.      
6.Risk Propensity - Attitude      
Sig.      
7.Risk Propensity – 
SubjectiveNorm 
     
Sig.      
8.Risk Propensity - 
PerceivedControl 
     
Sig.      
9.Risk Propensity - Intention      
Sig.      
10.Attitude - 
SubjectiveNorm 
.559 .431    
Sig. .000 .000    
11.Attitude - 
PerceivedControl 
 -.011    
Sig.  .911    
12.Attitude - Intention .437    .282 
Sig. .000    .002 
13.SubjectiveNorm - 
PerceivedControl 
 .363    
Sig.  .000    
14.SubjectiveNorm - 
Intention 
.398   .206  
Sig. .000   .027  
15.PerceivedControl - 
Intention 
  .246   
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Pair Significant Correlations – Controlled for… 
 16 17 18 19 20 



















1. Knowledge – Risk 
Propensity 
   .197 .183 
Sig.    .035 .049 
2.Knowledge – Attitude      
Sig.      
3.Knowledge – 
SubjectiveNorm 
     
Sig.      
4.Knowledge – 
PerceivedControl 
     
Sig.      
5.Knowledge – Intention     -.078 
Sig.     .406 
6.Risk Propensity - Attitude      
Sig.      
7.Risk Propensity – 
SubjectiveNorm 
     
Sig.      
8.Risk Propensity - 
PerceivedControl 
     
Sig.      
9.Risk Propensity - Intention     .147 
Sig.     .115 
10.Attitude - 
SubjectiveNorm 
 .467    
Sig.  .000    
11.Attitude - 
PerceivedControl 
  -.199   
Sig.   .033   
12.Attitude - Intention      
Sig.      
13.SubjectiveNorm - 
PerceivedControl 
.408     
Sig. .000     
14.SubjectiveNorm - 
Intention 
     
Sig.      
15.PerceivedControl - 
Intention 
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Pair Significant Correlations – Controlled for… 














1.Knowledge – Risk Propensity .220 .203 .188 .216 .159 
Sig. .018 .029 .044 .020 .087 
2.Knowledge – Attitude .272     
Sig. .003     
3.Knowledge – SubjectiveNorm   -.312  -.338 
Sig.   .001  .000 
4.Knowledge – PerceivedControl  .622  .624  
Sig.  .000  .000  
5.Knowledge – Intention    .094 -.158 
Sig.    .314 .089 
6.Risk Propensity - Attitude .116     
Sig. .214     
7.Risk Propensity – 
SubjectiveNorm 
  -.001  .038 
Sig.   .991  .683 
8.Risk Propensity - 
PerceivedControl 
 .089  .118  
Sig.  .395  .205  
9.Risk Propensity - Intention    .171 .152 
Sig.    .066 .102 
10.Attitude - SubjectiveNorm      
Sig.      
11.Attitude - PerceivedControl      
Sig.      
12.Attitude - Intention      
Sig.      
13.SubjectiveNorm - 
PerceivedControl 
     
Sig.      
14.SubjectiveNorm - Intention     .258 
Sig.     .005 
15.PerceivedControl - Intention    .245  
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Pair Significant Correlations – Controlled for… 
 26 27 28 29 




PerceivedControl – Intention  
1.Knowledge – Risk Propensity .201 .217 .220 .203 
Sig. .030 .019 .017 .028 
2.Knowledge – Attitude  .261 .190 .149 
Sig.  .004 .041 .110 
3.Knowledge – SubjectiveNorm -.083   -.216 
Sig. .373   .019 
4.Knowledge – PerceivedControl .571  .602  
Sig. .000  .000  
5.Knowledge – Intention  .003   
Sig.  .975   
6.Risk Propensity - Attitude   .163 .128 
Sig.   .080 .170 
7.Risk Propensity – 
SubjectiveNorm 
.023   .053 
Sig. .809   .569 
8.Risk Propensity - 
PerceivedControl 
.083  .074  
Sig. .374  .427  
9.Risk Propensity - Intention  .186 .112  
Sig.  .045 .228  
10.Attitude - SubjectiveNorm    .424 
Sig.    .000 
11.Attitude - PerceivedControl   -.045  
Sig.   .628  
12.Attitude - Intention  .287   
Sig.  .002   
13.SubjectiveNorm - 
PerceivedControl 
.284    
Sig. .002    
14.SubjectiveNorm - Intention     
Sig.     
15.PerceivedControl - Intention     






Appendix 7: Test of Normality of Variates 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Six Variates 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Knowledge 119 12.00 52.00 31.5630 9.18883 
Attitude 119 11.00 30.00 22.5294 3.19115 
RiskPropensity 119 4.00 20.00 10.8067 2.92354 
SubjectiveNorm 119 11.00 30.00 20.3361 3.62028 
PerceivedControl 119 7.00 25.00 14.2101 3.30607 
Intention 119 5.00 20.00 14.1933 2.60793 
Valid N (listwise) 119     
 
 









Continued Appendix 7 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Knowledge .070 119 .200* .982 119 .103 
Attitude .189 119 .000 .906 119 .000 
RiskPropensity .129 119 .000 .973 119 .017 
SubjectiveNorm .122 119 .000 .954 119 .000 
PerceivedControl .124 119 .000 .976 119 .031 
Intention .218 119 .000 .865 119 .000 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 






Appendix 8: Kruskal-Wallis Test of Differences in Knowledge among Groups of 
Personal and Corporate Features 
 
  N Mean Rank Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
48. What is your 
highest qualification? 
Vocational training 4 47.00    
Bachelor's degree 75 54.23    
Master's degree 34 73.56    
Doctorate or higher 6 64.00    
Total 119  8.020 3 .046 
  N Mean Rank Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
49. What is your 
qualification 
specialization? 
Other 13 44.65    
General management 46 54.82    
Finance 32 76.97    
Accounting 28 56.25    
Total 119  11.712 3 .008 
  N Mean Rank Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
50. What is your 
primary area of 
working experience? 
Other 7 38.57    
General management 50 51.51    
Finance 38 80.04    
Accounting 24 52.21    
Total 119  19.822 3 .000 
  N Mean Rank Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
51. What is your 
company’s primary 
industry? 
Oil and gas 1 62.00    
Basic material 14 53.61    
Industrial manufacturing 32 59.08    
Consumer goods 20 45.18    
Health care 4 45.00    
Consumer services 10 59.05    
Telecommunication 1 85.50    
Public services 11 48.41    
Banking and finance 25 83.04    
Technologies 1 69.00    
Total 119  18.014 9 .035 
  N Mean Rank Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
52. What is your age? Under 30 3 69.67    
30 to 40 59 52.16    
40 to 50 41 68.71    
50 to 60 16 64.78    
Total 119  6.216 3 .102 
  N Mean Rank Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
53. What is your 
gender? 
Female 19 66.63    
Male 100 58.74    
Total 119  .837 1 .360 
  N Mean Rank Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
54. What is the 
number of employees 
of your company? 
1 to 100 47 52.18    
100 to 200 21 57.07    
200 to 500 23 67.93    
500 to 1000 14 55.43    
1000 or more 14 82.18    
Total 119  9.838 4 .043 
  N Mean Rank Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
55. What is your 
company’s last year 
turnover? (Billions 
Vietnam Dong) 
0 to 5,000 93 56.62    
5,000 to 10,000 10 63.00    
10,000 to 15,000 5 79.90    
15,000 or more 11 76.77    






Appendix 9: Risk Management Frameworks 
 
 
Source: Hardy (2014, 131) 
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Continued Appendix 9 
Governance Institute of Australia – A Model for Board Oversight of 
Risk Management 
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T-TEST GROUPS=QualificationFAandOthers(1 2) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=Knowledge 





QualificationFAandOthers N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Knowledge Others 59 29.5763 9.49628 1.23631 
Finance and Accounting 60 33.5167 8.50820 1.09840 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 







Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Knowledge Equal variances assumed .538 .465 -2.385 117 .019 -3.94040 1.65224 -7.21257 -.66823 
Equal variances not assumed   -2.383 115.164 .019 -3.94040 1.65377 -7.21615 -.66464 
 




  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=Knowledge 






ExperienceFAandOthers N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Knowledge Others 57 28.8421 9.57450 1.26817 
Finance and Accounting 62 34.0645 8.11772 1.03095 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Knowledge Equal variances assumed .940 .334 -3.218 117 .002 -5.22241 1.62307 -8.43681 -2.00801 





Appendix 11: A Sample Risk Management Policy 
 
ABC Corp Risk Management Policy  
ABC Corp is one of the top ten securities companies in Vietnam.  
Chapter 1: Overview 
Objectives 
Definitions 
Chapter 2: Organization of Risk Management System 
Organization 
Duties and Responsibilities  
 Board of Directors 
 Executive Board 
 Internal Audit and Internal Control 
 Director in charge of Risk Management 
 Risk Management Division 
 Other Divisions  
Chapter 3: Policy on Types of Risk  
Market Risk 
 Objectives and Scope of Regulation 
 Methods for specifying risks 
 Measure of risks 
 Measures of investment risks 
 Value at risk (VaR) measure of investment 
 Measures of risk in margin transactions 
 Risk limits 
 Risk information system and reporting mechanism  
Payment Risk 
 Objectives and Scope of Regulation 
 Risk Specification and Measurement 
 Payment risk in margin transaction 
 Payment risk in deposits in commercial banks 
 Payment risk in issuance underwriting Treasury Bonds 
 Risk limits 
 Risk information system and reporting mechanism  
 Liquidity Risk 
 Objectives and Scope of Regulation 
 Liquidity risk Specification and Measurement 
 Liquidity risk limits 
 Risk information system and reporting mechanism 
Operation Risk 
 Objectives and Scope of Regulation 
 Risk specification methods 
 Specifying risks based on objectives 
 Specifying risks based on situations 
 Specifying risks based on experience and antecedence 
 Specifying risk by mixed method 
 Operation risk measurement 




 Risk information system and reporting mechanism 
Legal Risk 
 Objectives and Scope of Regulation 
 Risk specifying methods 
 Cooperation among Risk management division, Legal division, and other 
divisions 
 Drafting Compliance List in accordance with legal regulations 
 Fraud analysis and lessons learned  
 Risk limits 
 Risk information system and reporting mechanism  
 




RISK LIMITS FOR the year 2015 
Legitimate risk limits 
 Legitimate Limits Specified in Circular 210/2012/BTC 
 Limits on loans 
 Limits on borrowings 
 Limits on Investment 
 Limits on lending for margin transactions (Decision 637/2011/UBCK) 
 Limits on lending for margin transactions 
 Limits on time duration of lending for margin transactions  
Company Risk Limits 
 Limits on investment 
 Investment in shares and fund certificates 
 Investment in treasury bonds 
 Deposits 
 Limits on services 
 Limits on issuance underwriting with certainty commitment  









Appendix 12: A Sample Enterprise Risk Management Policy 
■ Executive summary: The executive summary provides a concise description of the 
purpose, scope and objectives for ERM. It may also provide a high-level summary 
of the key limits and risk tolerance levels.  
■ Statement of risk philosophy: The statement of risk philosophy discusses the 
overall approach to risk management. It should also include guiding risk principles 
that articulate the desired risk culture of the organization. 
■ Governance structure: The section on governance structure summarizes board 
committees and charters, and roles and responsibilities. Additionally, it should 
delineate the delegation of authority, including risk management and oversight 
responsibilities for key individuals.  
■ Risk tolerance levels: This section provides a statement of risk appetite, including 
specific limits or tolerance levels for critical risk exposures. It also provides 
exception management66 and reporting requirements.  
■ Risk framework and processes: This section summarizes the ERM framework, as 
well as key processes and specific requirements for overall risk management.  
■ Risk policy standards: This section discusses policy standards for all other risks 
so that the structure and content of risk policies are consistent across the 
organization.  
■ Risk categories and definitions: This section provides a taxonomy for commonly 
used risk terms and concepts, facilitating a common language for risk discussions. 
Source: Lam (2013, 392) 
 
 





Appendix 13: Mean Knowledge Scores Across Groups of Directors 
Descriptives Statistic Std. Error 
Qualification in Finance and Accounting and Others   
Others  29.5 1.2 
Finance and Accounting  33.5 1.0 
Experience in Finance and Accounting and Others   
Others  28.8 1.2 
Finance and Accounting  34.0 1.0 
48. What is your highest qualification?   
Vocational training  28.7 2.4 
Bachelor's degree  29.7 0.9 
Master's degree  35.5 1.6 
Doctorate or higher  33.6 3.7 
49. What is your qualification specialization?   
Other  26.9 3.6 
General management  30.3 1.2 
Finance  36.0 1.3 
Accounting  30.6 1.6 
50. What is your primary area of working experience?   
Other  25.1 5.1 
General management  29.3 1.2 
Finance  36.7 1.2 
Accounting  29.7 1.4 
51. What is your company’s primary industry?   
Basic material  29.4 2.3 
Industrial manufacturing  31.1 1.5 
Consumer goods  28.4 1.5 
Health care  27.5 5.8 
Consumer services  31.0 3.5 
Public services  28.4 2.5 
Banking and finance  37.7 1.7 
52. What is your age?   
Under 30  34.0 0.5 
30 to 40  29.7 1.1 
40 to 50  33.4 1.6 
50 to 60  32.9 1.8 
53. What is your gender?   
Female  33.2 1.5 
Male  31.2 0.9 
54. What is the number of employees of your company?   
1 to 100  29.2 1.2 
100 to 200  31.1 1.6 
200 to 500  32.9 2.0 
500 to 1000  30.8 2.2 
1000 or more  38.2 2.6 
55. What is your company’s last year turnover? (Billions 
Vietnam Dong)   
0 to 5,000  30.6 0.9 
5,000 to 10,000  32.8 3.1 
10,000 to 15,000  37.4 4.3 
15,000 or more  35.6 2.4 
 
